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Abstract
Dramaturgies of Intellectual Property Law
in Read-Write Theatre
by
Andrew Kircher
Advisor: Dr. Peter Eckersall

Digital and networked technologies have intensified our relationship to knowledge: all
the world’s information and creativity are so immediately and personally accessible that they
become embodied. Into this moment, a new theatrical practice has emerged, what I identify as
Read-Write Theatre (after Lawrence Lessig). In Read-Write cultural production, artists sample
and speak through the full spectrum of disembodied data that is the internet—text, video, audio,
and images. The artists I include in this critical category are marked by their posthuman
relationship to knowledge and, most importantly, the ways that their theatrical work confounds
contemporary intellectual property law.
In this dissertation, I reframe intellectual property laws as dramaturgies, looking beyond
what these laws permit to consider what modes of cultural production they insist. We live in an
era of abundance, but the copyright laws that shape theatremaking assume—or even manufacture
—a pre-digital notion of scarcity. I begin this project by tracing the legal and dramaturgical
limits of copyright, before proposing three alternative models for Read-Write cultural
production: a commons-based dramaturgy (Creative Commons), a reception- and aestheticsbased dramaturgy (trademark law), and an epidemiological dramaturgy (memes). In my
conclusion, I consider the destabilizing impact that interconnected sensor data and DNA memory
research could have on copyright dramaturgy.
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Introduction
Theatrical monologist Mike Daisey certainly has a way with words. That fact has been
proven time and again in his many lauded solo performances, however in this case I am referring
to the increasingly frequent bold proclamations Mike has made in online spaces. Once, I saw a
choice Daisey statement roll by in my oft-neglected Facebook stream: “Suck it Samuel French.”1
This vulgar command was in response to the publisher Samuel French’s vain efforts to claim that
Courtney Meaker’s thatswhatshesaid—a play constructed from dialogue and stage directions
given to women in the 11 most produced plays in the 2014/15 United States theatre season—had
infringed the copyrights of some of the authors French represents. Daisey’s Facebook post also
linked to one of several articles that have succinctly argued the defensibility of Meaker’s
composition on the grounds of Fair Use.2 Fair Use—a concept I will unpack at length later in this
dissertation—is one of several impactful yet frequently misunderstood instruments of intellectual
property law which, I argue, shape how theatrical performances are created, framed, and received
within a capitalist and highly technological culture. As evidence of my contention, I offer that in
the same month as the thatswhatshesaid fracas, the Wooster Group and the Harold Pinter estate
waged a public war over copyright licensing terms, and playwright Richard Nelson was

1. Mike Daisey, “Suck it Samuel French,” Facebook, February 12, 2016, www.facebook.com/
mike.daisey.
2. Rich Smith, “That'swhatshesaid Didn't Ask Permission Because They Didn't Have To, Says
Attorney” The Stranger, http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2016/02/12/23562675/
thatswhatshesaid-didnt-ask-permission-because-they-didnt-have-to-says-attorney.
1

erroneously accused of trademark infringement for using the play title Women of a Certain Age.3
These are just three of many recent examples that point to a larger cultural anxiety and legal
ambiguity surrounding intellectual property and theatrical performance.
Admittedly, concerns about property and ownership are certainly not new in the
professional theatre. As Lisa Surwillo illustrates through her history of theatre in Spain, Stages of
Copyright, the trajectory of a nation’s theatrical identity is inextricably bound to its evolving
legal conceptions of authorship.4 Nevertheless, I contend that recent phenomena—including the
development of the internet, the social acceptance of digital piracy in the 1990s, and the recent
rise in personal connected devices—have cultivated a pervasive yet unrecognized (and largely
misunderstood) dramaturgy of intellectual property law. What I have observed in my research,
and will relate through this dissertation, is a radical shift in the theatre regarding how knowledge,
creativity, and property are understood through the hyper-connected and hyper-mediated self.
To illustrate my point, I return to my unfiltered online ombudsman, monologist Mike
Daisey. Daisey, a technically-literate and bombastic solo performer, pierced the New York theatre
bubble and rose to public prominence in 2012 with his sensational performance, The Agony and
The Ecstasy of Steve Jobs.5 Scandal arose when the public radio program This American Life
3. For the Wooster Group legal challenges, I direct the reader to David Ng, “The Wooster Group
runs into problems with Harold Pinter production,” Slate, accessed December 1, 2017, http://
www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-wooster-group-harold-pinterroom-20160127-story.html. Richard Nelson’s legal challenges were not documented in any press
—I personally advised on that matter.
4. Lisa Surwillo, The Stages of Property: Copyrighting Theatre in Spain (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2007).
5. The Agony and The Ecstasy of Steve Jobs, by Mike Daisey, Martinson Hall, The Public
Theater, New York, NY, 2012.
2

followed their broadcast of the monologue with a more sober revelation that several elements of
Daisey's first-person narrative were not lived, but rather borrowed from internet sources.6 His
own scandal having since quieted, Daisey recently penned a public missive to the similarlyscandaled NBC news anchor Brian Williams, urging Williams to apologize—not for telling lies
on his network news program about wartime experiences, but for “adding the first person,
inserting yourself into stories in order to heighten and intensify their telling” (emphasis mine).7
Daisey does not simply take a postmodern position that everything is iterated construction—
rather he challenges the division between lived and simulated experience, and reconsiders
embodiment to be something retroactively applied to knowledge for dramatic effect.
I would argue that this sentiment is characteristic of the internet age. As many before me
have lamented, we no longer sit at the bar and argue over trivia, because with the iPhone we
know everything. The ubiquity of broadband data access, the digitization of hitherto inaccessible
knowledge and content, and the proliferation of smartphones (the very subject of Daisey’s praise
and ire) comprise the new infrastructure for our post-postmodern age of intensification. Here I
employ Jeffrey T. Nealon’s notion of the post-postmodern: a cultural economy which circulates
something more than mere goods or services—it offers consumers the promise of a new

6. The original airing of the abridged monologue was Ira Glass, “454: Mr. Daisey and the Apple
Factory,” This American Life, WBEZ, podcast audio, January 6, 2012, https://
www.thisamericanlife.org/454/mr-daisey-and-the-apple-factory; that episode was retracted with
the airing of “460: Retraction,” This American Life, WBEZ, podcast audio, March 16, 2012,
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/460/retraction.
7. Mike Daisey, “What I’d Tell Brian Williams,” Slate, February 12, 2015, accessed February 6,
2016, http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2015/02/
mike_daisey_s_advice_for_brian_williams_the_monologist_tells_the_nbc_news.html.
3

subjectivity, activated through experience and intensity.8 Nealon uses Las Vegas to illustrate his
concept of intensities (“the thrills of winning, the aches of losing, the awe of the spectacle,
weddings and divorces”), but I would argue that intensities have become an everyday product in
our post-postmodern economy.9 This can be seen in the recent rise in virtual and augmented
reality technologies, as well as on-demand digital media streaming, personalized news feeds, and
one-hour Amazon delivery. Everything is here, now, and individuated for the post-postmodern
consumer. In the theatre, we have seen this phenomenon rendered through immersive and
interactive forms. Adam Alston observes, in Beyond Immersive Theatre:
As businesses sought to adapt to an emerging neoliberal paradigm, economic
production had to contend with a new kind of consumer and a new kind of
producer…the neoliberal consumer is increasingly offered personalized and
experiential forms of consumption in an expanding ‘experience economy’…
Immersive theater is a part of the experience economy.10
While immersive theatre offers a highly legible example of post-postmodern (and, as Alston
explains, neoliberal) theatrical reception, my research is concerned with an emergent postpostmodern artist subjectivity that is defined by the intensification of knowledge, an
8. Jeffrey T. Nealon, Post-Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 31.
9. Nealon, Post-Postmodernism, 27. See also the 2017 Eventbrite report, which suggests that
over 75% of millennials prefer to spend their money on experiences rather than “things.”
Eventbrite, The Experience Movement: How Millennials Are Bridging Cultural and Political
Divides Offline, 2017, https://s3.amazonaws.com/eventbrite-s3/marketing/landingpages/assets/
pdfs/Eventbrite+Experience+Generation+report-2017.pdf.
10. Adam Alston, Beyond Immersive Theatre: Aesthetics, Politics and Productive Participation
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 16.
4

intensification made possible through networked personal technology devices and the
digitization of cultural products. It is worth noting that Nealon borrows the concept of intensity
from Deleuze.11 For Deleuze, the intensive exists in relation to the extensive; the two are
interrelated modes of regarding difference.12 Extensive measurements are empirical—the length
of a table, for example—whereas intensive is a networked, subjective measurement: the heat of a
fire is hot relative to the temperature of my skin.13 Deleuze does not offer these as binary,
separable concepts, but rather as an interrelated system. The artistic form I examine here is one
shaped by the extensive power of technology—the power to network knowledge—and the
intensive subjectivity that emerges through that network.
Nealon aligns his framing of the post-postmodern with Fredric Jameson’s definition of
the postmodern not as artistic movement but as a period of late capitalist development. Postpostmodernism, according to Nealon, aims to “construct a vocabulary to talk about the ‘new
economies’ (post-Fordism, globalization, the centrality of market economics, the new
surveillance techniques of the war on terrorism, etc.) and their complex relations to cultural
production in the present moment.”14 He asserts that the post-postmodern economy is not
concerned with Fordist products or post-Fordist services, but with sensation.15 This is
11. Jeffrey T. Nealon, Post-Postmodernism, 27.
12. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1994), 213.
13. For this distinction between extensive and intensive, I am indebted to Julie Van der Wielen,
“Living the Intensive Order,” Nursing Philosophy 19.4 (2018).
14. Nealon, Post-Postmodernism, 15.
15. Ibid., 26.
5

exemplified by the intimacy we share with portable computing devices, which are more than
mere tools—they provide sensation, and they extend our knowledge, experience, and subjectivity
in a way that is perfectly cyborgean. Donna Haraway anticipated this moment in her landmark
essay, “A Cyborg Manifesto”: “The boundary between physical and non-physical is very
imprecise.”16
Seen in this light, Daisey’s and Williams’ stories of wars and factory abuses were not
lived experiences—they were accumulations of knowledge, things read and seen on the internet,
made intimate and intense through the form of personal narrative. Nevertheless, the underlying
facts of their stories remain true. This is the post-postmodern paradox of “embedded
knowledge.” Performance theorist Matthew Causey has argued that “the era of virtuality (a
problem of illusion and representation) has given way to a more troubling model of
embeddedness (a problem of materiality and embodiment).”17 It is no longer a question of
distinguing between the real and the virtual, as all knowledge is embodied and refracted through
subjectivity. In post-postmodern storytelling (be it Daisey’s theatrics or William’s news),
embedded no longer refers to the author’s physical presence in an event (as in an embedded
journalist), but rather the intensive embeddedness of an unlived event in an author. Here we
speak of an intensity and compression of time and space—everything is here, now, and
embodied.

16. Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York:
Routledge, 1991), 153.
17. Matthew Causey, Theatre and Performance in Digital Culture: From Simulation to
Embeddedness (London: Routledge, 2006), 2.
6

The Read-Write Theatre
Embedded knowledge is one of several characteristics attributed to what I term the ReadWrite Theatre. First, I should clarify that I am not identifying Read-Write Theatre as an artistic
movement or creative practice, nor is it the primary focus of my argument. Rather, I will
establish Read-Write Theatre as a critical category of artists—as Martin Esslin did with The
Theatre of the Absurd—that reflects a certain post-postmodern cultural and technological
consciousness, and whose work lends itself to my intellectual property-based dramaturgical
analyses.18 I did not coin the term Read-Write; mine is an elaboration on the useful metaphor
introduced by Lawrence Lessig in his book Remix. Lessig, a Harvard Law professor and cultural
critic, leverages the obscure rhetoric of computer permissions settings as a means of illustrating
different modes of cultural production and reception. He explains: “the analogy is to the
permissions that might attach to a particular file on a computer. If the user has ‘RW’ [Read/
Write] permissions, then he is allowed to both read the file and make changes to it. If he has
‘Read/Only’ permissions, he is allowed only to read the file.”19 Lessig argues that while legal
interventions in the late 1990s—such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act—reified an
already dominant read-only consumer culture (in which cultural production is professionalized,
commoditized, and uni-directional), digital media hardware and software have, at the same time,

18. Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd (London: Bloomsbury, 1961).
19. Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (New
York: Penguin, 2008), 28.
7

removed what he terms the “economic censor” by making read-write cultural production—
sampling, remixing—accessible to all.20
The Read-Write Theatre is certainly a product of this technological and cultural shift.
Read-Write artists borrow, repurpose, and (like the technologies they utilize) generally disrupt
the read-only cultural economy. I use this moniker to identify theatremakers and theatrical works
that engage with external sources (data, text, audio and video recordings) in a way that is not
deconstructive, glib, or postmodern. Read-Write artists engage with sources—or properties—in a
way that is sensational, embodied, and distinctly post-postmodern. I typographically call
attention to my use of the word properties because it is through that term we can begin to
understand what is so unique about this new mode of cultural production. I will hereafter use the
word property when referring to any sampled or appropriated media in a Read-Write Theatre
production for two distinct reasons: first, in the eyes of the law, any copyrighted texts, songs,
videos, and photographs are propertied works of intellect; but second, and perhaps more
importantly, I am drawn to this term for its real estate evocations. It transforms media in
performance from something to possess into someplace to inhabit. Michel de Certeau gives us, in
The Practice of Everyday Life, an image of the text-as-real-estate:
[The reader] insinuates into another person's text the ruses of pleasure and
appropriation: he poaches on it, is transported into it, pluralizes himself in it like

20. Ibid., 39, 83. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was signed into law in 1998, and served
to implement two 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization treaties. Under the WIPO
treaties, member states would criminalize technological methods or tools for tampering with or
circumventing digital rights management systems for the purpose of copyright infringement. See
Library of Congress, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office
summary (Washington, DC: Copyright Office, Library of Congress).
8

the internal rumblings of one's body . . . A different world (the reader's) slips into
the author's place. This mutation makes the text habitable, like a rented apartment.
It transforms another person’s property into a space borrowed for a moment by a
transient. Renters make comparable changes in an apartment they furnish with
their acts and memories.21
The theatre artists and groups I include in my study of the Read-Write Theatre—including Gob
Squad, Elevator Repair Service, and Daniel Fish—inhabit their texts like rented apartments. But
theirs is not the silent authorship practiced by Certeau’s reader. They move beyond the
“insinuation” of Read-Only culture and write from within the property. They may not own these
properties, they may be renters (or sometimes illegal squatters), but they are certainly making
some renovations and are not getting their deposits back.
Germany and UK-based artist collective Gob Squad provides the most literal and material
rendering of this abstract concept with Kitchen.22 In an attempt to reconstruct the 1965 Andy
Warhol / Ronald Tavel film of the same name (or, in order to demonstrate the impossibility of
said task), Gob Squad’s performance takes place in a semi-faithful reproduction of the apartment
where the seminal film was shot. Initially, their play is a clownish and somewhat surface-level
restaging of the film’s events (as well as two other Warhol film projects, Sleep and Screen Tests),
projected live on a large screen that divides the viewing public from the onstage film set.

21. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2008), xxi.
22. Kitchen (You’ve Never Had It So Good), by Gob Squad, Newman Theater, The Public
Theater, New York, NY, January 23, 2012.
9

Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Production stills from Gob Squad’s Kitchen. (Photos by David
Baltzer, from “Kitchen,” Gob Squad, https://www.gobsquad.com/projects/gobsquads-kitchen-youve-never-had-it-so-good.)
As the play progresses, the Gob Squad performers begin to write their own narratives from
within the Kitchen apartment; they quite literally speak from inside that property, and through
their reconstructed film they observe the aesthetic, political, and social distance between
themselves and Warhol’s art. As the play goes on, members of Gob Squad are one by one
replaced by audience members, who take the performers’ places in the film(s). These audience
members are guided through the remainder of the play via headset by the performers, who have
crossed the proscenium (or, the medial threshold) and taken their proxies’ places in the
auditorium. This movement—between the stage and the house, the past and the present, the
medium and the real—is anticipated in the first moments of the performance event, when the
audience is shuffled through the onstage Kitchen set before descending into the auditorium. As
the audience watches the projected live film, they also are able to project themselves back into
the set they just traversed. The performance is always at once both mediated and immediate, and
the performers are always at once both in the stage kitchen, and in the film Kitchen.
I love this gesture. It so beautifully captures a post-postmodern Read-Write Theatre
practice. Artists like Gob Squad do not perceive distance and difference from without. Unlike
10

postmodern artists who deconstruct and aestheticize their critical distance, the Read-Write
theatremaker embeds themselves within a property (and, conversely, the property within
themselves), thereby collapsing the critical, physical, and temporal space between. However, the
original sampled property is never lost in the collapse, or dissolved into the new composition. It
is always indexed and metonymized in some medial form:
• In Kitchen, the Warhol film literally stands between the audience and the live art. It
spatially and temporally precedes Gob Squad’s work, and the film is always already
mediating the performers’ utterances.

Figure 1.3. Production still from Daniel Fish’s A (radically
condensed and expanded) Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never
Do Again —after David Foster Wallace. (Photo by Paula
Court, from “Daniel Fish,” Walker Art Center, https://
walkerart.org/calendar/2016/daniel-fish.)
• In Daniel Fish’s A (radically condensed and expanded) Supposedly Fun Thing I'll
Never Do Again —after David Foster Wallace, four performers recite a mashup of
David Foster Wallace books on tape, fed into their ears at varying speeds and volumes
by Fish, who visibly controls the audio mix from onstage. The large headphones and
overabundant audio cables strewn about the deck index Foster Wallace, whose voice is

11

never heard by the audience, but whose literary spirit haunts the space through this
medial representation. The actors read and write before our eyes as they listen to,
individuate, and articulate the text in real time.23

Figure 1.4. Production still from Elevator Repair Service’s
Gatz. (Photo by Sara Krulwich, from “Theater Talkback:
Thinking About ‘Gatsby’ After Seeing ‘Gatz’,” New York
Times, https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/
theater-talkback-thinking-about-gatsby-after-seeing-gatz.)
• Throughout the full six hours of Elevator Repair Service’s word-for-word enactment of
The Great Gatsby, entitled Gatz, narrator and protagonist Scott Shepherd is always
holding a copy of the novel. His complex role as both reader and writer of this story is
contained in that singular stage property.24
These projections screens, audio cables, and dog-eared books gesture toward—and give material
presence to—now-digitized (and therefore easily disappeared) properties: films, texts, and

23. A (Radically Condensed and Expanded) Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again—after
David Foster Wallace, by Daniel Fish, The Chocolate Factory, Astoria, NY, March 25, 2012.
24. Gatz, by Elevator Repair Service, Newman Theater, The Public Theater, October 6, 2010.
12

recordings. They become an emblem of remediation, wherein we witness the collision and
cohabitation of medial forms. As defined by Jay David Bolter and John Grusin, remediation is
“that which appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of other media and
attempts to rival or refashion them in the name of the real. A medium in our culture can never
operate in isolation, because it must enter into relationships of respect and rivalry with other
media.”25 The Read-Write artists above understand that a work of art cannot be separated or
appreciated apart from its medium (or, the social significance of that medium). In both A
Supposedly Fun Thing and Gatz, the artists remediate the private experiences of listening and
reading into public, performative acts. To further expand my earlier reading of Certeau, if the
text is an apartment, then the medium is a neighborhood. And as conscientious cultural
gentrifiers, Fish and Elevator Repair Service fully immerse themselves in the local customs of
their media. To read-write, therefore, is to remediate, to transform, to accumulate.
As Andrew Sofer explains in The Stage Life of Props: “simply by virtue of being placed
on stage before an audience, objects acquire a set of semiotic quotation marks.”26 Sofer clarifies
that the stage prop is not fixed in its semiotic signification, suggesting that it is a “temporal
contract” between artist and audience, subject to a moment-by-moment renegotiation.27 In the
Read-Write Theatre, stage props such as Fish’s audio cables index the artist’s discursive readwrite practice in a manner that is at once semiological (we perceive the sign that references the

25. J. David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1999), 98.
26. Andrew Sofer, The Stage Life of Props (Ann Arbor: University. of Michigan Press, 2008), 31.
27. Ibid., 56-7.
13

original property) and phenomenological (we sense the aura of the original property, or at least
the absence of an aura). While it could be argued that Fish’s audio cables have no semiotic value,
that we regard them for what they are and the purpose they achieve (namely, transmitting sound),
I contend that they not only are unnecessary in an age of wireless monitors—which would allow
for more freedom of movement for the actor—they also are laid out in an ostentatious,
performative way so that we are reminded of the medium, and of the underlying properties being
remediated.
While I have addressed my reasons for using word properties to indicate borrowed or
sampled creative works, I should acknowledge that the compound intellectual property remains
an evocative term. It reinforces the Romantic notion that ideas are the private property of a single
and singular genius. In Remix, Lessig tells of how composer John Phillip Sousa defended
amateur musicianship on the grounds that it creates affinity and appreciation, which in turn
assigns value to professional musicianship.28 Lessig’s (and Sousa’s) defense of amateur
expression seems to suggest that artistic works are not inherently valuable, but rather accrue
value through circulation and Read-Write discursivity. While I subscribe to this belief, I will
nevertheless employ the term intellectual property, as it is the most common way to collectively
refer to the legal instruments that grant monopolistic control over the circulation and
reproduction of a work of intellect. What unifies the protections included under this banner—
copyright, trademark, patent, trade secrets—is that they all assign value to intangible properties:
ideas, techniques, processes. The artists I include in the Read-Write Theatre—as case studies for
my dramaturgical and legal analyses—are defined by their relationship to these intangible

28. Lessig, Remix, 25.
14

properties, and by the creative ways in which they reconcile the legal mechanisms of intellectual
property.
The post-postmodern artists in my critical category could also fall under other theoretical
classifications, particularly a certain other “post”: Hans-Theis Lehmann’s Postdramatic Theatre.
Lehmann’s seminal text—itself a response to the equally important Theory of the Modern Drama
by Peter Szondi—took Szondi’s “crisis of drama” as a point of departure, looking beyond a
drama/epic dialectic (with Brecht as the point of rupture) to imagine a theatre without drama—
which is often identified in the United States as ‘contemporary performance.’29 Lehmann’s
formulation of the postdramatic is concerned with the joint text authored between the audience
and performer.30 Like Jameson, his “post” does not connote a chronology. Postdramatic is “no
longer dramatic” in that it is not defined by its relationship to, or rupture from, the dramatic
narrative traditions.31 Lehmann argues that critical shifts in forms such as this come at a
paradoxical moment, a caesura, which is both the moment of recognition and, ironically, “the
interruption of recognition.”32 In other words, we recognize something has changed, but the
change itself is unrecognizable through the semiotics of that moment. Postdramatic Theatre is
that moment of recognition in the “caesura of the media society”; it is that unrecognizable

29. According to Karen Jürs-Munby in her introduction to Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic
Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (London: Routledge, 2006), 2-4.
30. Ibid., 17.
31. Ibid., 93.
32. Ibid., 40.
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theatrical form—unrecognizable according to the drama, that is—which is a product of mass
mediation.33
I offer that the Read-Write Theatre comes at another, more recent caesura, which some
have called the digital age, others the connected age, and which was captured with poetic
vibrancy by Katherine Hayles in How We Became Posthuman.34 At the posthuman caesura, we
can perceive the influence of network and media technologies on performance. Following
Hayles’ assertion that in posthumanism “information lost its body,” I offer that the Read-Write
Theatre is a space wherein all information is immediately accessible, knowable, personal, and reembodied through performance.35 Read-Write Theatre is neither concerned with questions of
virtuality and the real, nor the auratic values of the digital and the analogue; rather, it is an
artistic manifestation of this networked and embedded age. As a posthuman art form, it does not
negotiate the ontological notions of presence and absence, but the informatics of patterns and
randomness.36 Read-Write artists do not subscribe to—or push against—notions of truth and
intentionality in their citational compositions; rather they infer patterns, and embrace multiplicity
and contradiction. The Read-Write Theatre is rhizomatic—time, cultures, and difference are
collapsed as the artists speak through—not to—the full spectrum of disembodied knowledge.37 If
33. Ibid., 22.
34. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature,
and Informatics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
35. Ibid., 4.
36. Ibid., 27.
37. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 15-25.
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we accept Nealon's assertion that in post-postmodernism we witness the inevitable collapse of
the economic and the cultural, then we might consider the post-postmodern Read-Write Theatre
to be a product of said inevitable collapse.
The Read-Write Theatre is not, in short, a taxonomy based on aesthetics or content, but
on an artist’s relationship to property. This is an art practice that most closely resembles the hip
hop sample. It is an art practice that emerged alongside internet inventor Tim Berners-Lee’s
vision of a “writable web”—the greatest ecosystem of cultural production to date.38 This
relationship to property is the only distinguishing feature that unites the otherwise largely
dissimilar roster of Read-Write Theatre artists. To illustrate my assertion, I offer another
selection of Read-Write Theatre artists:

Figure 1.5. Production still from Agrupación Señor Serrano’s
Brickman Brando Bubble Boom. (Photo by Sara Krulwich,
from “Brando as Godfather of Housing Crisis,” New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/theater/
brickman-brando-bubble-boom-at-ellen-stewart-theater.html.)

38. For more on the notion of a “writable web,” see Andrew Oram, Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the
Benefits of a Disruptive Technology (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly & Associates, 2001), 53.
17

• In Brickman Brando Bubble Boom, the artists of the Barcelona-based Agrupación
Señor Serrano mix live feed of miniatures with clips from Marlon Brando films and
interviews to create a biography for John Brickman— Agrupación Señor Serrano’s
composite figure of a rags-to-riches capitalist who single-handedly architects the credit
default swap and brings down the housing market.39

Figure 1.6. Production still from Toshi Reagon’s
Octavia E. Butler’s Parable of the Sower. (Photo
courtesy of the artist, from “Octavia E. Butler’s
Parable of the Sower: The Concert Version,” Penn
Live Arts, https://pennlivearts.org/event/octavia-ebutlers-parable-of-the-sower-the-concert-version.)
• In the opera Octavia E. Butler’s Parable of the Sower, Toshi Reagon projects herself
into the seminal science fiction text to imagine how she, a musician, will be called to
act “when the world’s on fire.” Her songs do not explicate the novel, but rather offer a
window into the artist’s deep relationship to this text, and her personal connection to

39. Brickman, Brando, Bubble, Boom, by Agrupación Señor Serrano, La MaMa, E.T.C., New
York, NY, January 12, 2015.
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the hyper-empathic protagonist, Laura Olamina.40 This deeply personal narrative is,
surprisingly and to great effect, performed by an enormous ensemble—enormous at
least by the standards of touring experimental productions.

Figure 1.7. Production still from James Sprang’s Life
Does Not Live. (Video still, from “Gazr,” James Allister
Sprang, https://jamesallistersprang.com/GAZR-1.)
• James Sprang, as his alter ego Gazr in Life Does Not Live, augments the words of
Adorno and attributes them to rap producer Timbaland, and leads the audience through
a YouTube fueled mapping of the discursive cultural spaces produced through poetry
(high art) and rap (low art), as defined by their respective aesthetics and politics.41
Sprang himself becomes a projection surface (literally and symbolically).
Note the post-postmodern intensities at work in these three projects. There are intensities of scale
(miniature compositions, immense ensembles), of proximity (both emotional and physical) to the

40. Octavia E. Butler’s Parable of the Sower, by Toshi Reagon, The Public Theater., New York,
NY, January 10, 2015.
41. Life Does Not Live, by James Sprang, The Robert Moss Theater at Playwrights Downtown,
New York, NY, January 7, 2017.
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property, and of mediatization (or mediation). These intensities reflect the artists’ immediate and
deeply personal connection to each property—Brando’s films, Bulter’s novel, and Adorno’s
writings.
I don’t mean to write with rose-colored glasses. It is true that when I think about the
awesome cyborgean potential that has come from the networking of disembodied knowledge, I
often succumb to what Klemens Gruber termed “epistemological euphoria.”42 As I illustrated
with the Daisey anecdote at the beginning of this dissertation, there are real risks in embedded
knowledge. In a rhizomatic knowledge system, it is difficult to attribute ownership, agency, and
—perhaps most important—liability. To illustrate such risks in post-postmodern cultural
production, I will utilize a metaphor by political theorist Jane Bennett. In her book Vibrant
Matter, Bennett argues that truly distributed systems complicate our traditional, humanist notions
of agency and action: “what this suggests for the concept of agency is that the efficacy or
effectivity to which that term has traditionally referred becomes distributed across an
ontologically heterogeneous field, rather than being a capacity localized in a human body or in a
collective produced (only) by human efforts.”43 If we follow Bennett’s logic, a networked system
of knowledge enacts a distributed agency, which in turn suggests a distributed ownership, and a
distributed liability. In Bennett’s model, Mike Daisey didn’t act alone; when he appropriated
internet facts and passed them as personal experience, he was a single actant in what she terms a

42. Klemens Gruber, “Early Intermediality: Archeological Glimpses,” in Mapping Intermediality
in Performance, ed. Bay-Cheng, Sarah, et al (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010),
253.
43. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2010), 22-3.
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“heterogenous assemblage.”44 As such, he participated in a system which allowed him to offer “I
regret that I allowed THIS AMERICAN LIFE to air an excerpt from my monologue” as a sort of
apology for his actions—note that Daisey distributes his liability across two actants (himself who
allowed, and This American Life who aired).45 It should not come as a surprise, then, that Daisey
now allows royalty-free public performances and adaptations of The Agony and the Ecstasy of
Steve Jobs, crediting optional.46

On Dramaturgy
Before I conclude this introduction, it is essential that I explicate my use of the word
dramaturgy, a contested (though often underused) term in theatremaking and scholarship. I have
chosen to use the term “dramaturgy” in the titling and framing of my research in order to elevate
the question of intellectual properties above the realm of pragmatics. Dramaturgy is a potent
word—it positions the material conditions of production as coequal to any supposed artistic
intention or structural signification. I define the focus of my project specifically—dramaturgies
of intellectual property law—as a means of recognizing the dramaturgies I offer in the chapters
that follow as just a few in an infinite list of dramaturgical frameworks one could imagine.
In a 2006 Theatre Research International article, Peter Eckersall quoted fellow dramaturg
Melanie Beddie: “Dramaturgy can be thought of as the midwife between theory and practice. It
44. Ibid., 23.
45. Mike Daisey, “Friday, March 16, 2012,” Mike Daisey: His Secret Fortress on the Web, http://
mikedaisey.blogspot.com/2012/03/statement-on-tal.html
46. Mike Daisey, The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs, accessed December 1, 2017, http://
mikedaisey.com/Mike_Daisey_TATESJ_transcript_2.0.pdf
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can provide a process for bringing ideas into a concrete form.”47 While I enjoy this image of the
dramaturg-midwife, and the notion of dramaturgy as praxis, what I find most relevant to this
project is how Beddie’s definition of dramaturgy—a process for bringing ideas into a tangible
expression—so closely mirrors the language of United States copyright law. Both—dramaturgy
and copyright—are processes that lead from abstract idea to material—and valuated—
expression. There is no artistic product without the dramaturgical process, just as there is no
economic product without the legal process that grants ownership. While perhaps Beddie’s first
sentence offers a less poetical yet more practicable definition of dramaturgy—the midwife
between theory and practice—I like the suggestion of movement. However, I find the term
midwife to be too unidirectional—you can only birth one way, and there’s no going back. As a
substitute, I propose a more posthuman term: codec. Codec is a portmanteau of coder/decoder, a
term used in technology culture to identify software and algorithms used for the compression,
transmission, and decompression of digital media, a popular example being the mp3 codec.48 The
codec allows for movement between states; it packs and unpacks, contracts and expands. This is
the image of dramaturgy I wish to invoke—dramaturgy as codec. Dramaturgy is the technology,
the means by which theories and ideas are compressed into practice, into concrete expressions.
But it is also the site wherein we can begin to unpack, to disassemble, to expand expression into
abstract thought.

47. Melanie Beddie, quoted in Peter Eckersall, “Towards an Expanded Dramaturgical Practice: A
Report on ‘The Dramaturgy and Cultural Intervention Project,’” Theatre Research International
31.3 (2006): 284.
48. For a glossary of technology terms, including codec, I refer the reader to the “Gartner IT
Glossary,” Gartner, accessed February 6, 2016, http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary.
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I should clarify one key point: while this is a study of dramaturgies, the figure of the
dramaturg is absent. There are several rich studies of this artistic profession which trace its
development from Gotthold Lessing’s Hamburg Dramaturgy in the 18th century through figures
like Bertolt Brecht and Kenneth Tynan up to the profession as it is today. Two strong entries in
this field are Mary Luckhurst’s Dramaturgy: A Revolution in Theatre and Cathy Turner and
Synne Behrndt’s Dramaturgy and Performance.49 While Luckhurst’s text is primarily concerned
with the formation of dramaturgy as a profession—or the dramaturg as literary manager—Turner
and Behrndt expand the conversation to include new notions of dramaturgy, including dance and
new media dramaturgies. I find my work most directly aligns with the notion of ‘new
dramaturgies’ put forth by Katalin Trencsényi and Bernadette Cochrane in the introduction to
their edited volume New Dramaturgy: International Perspectives on Theory and Practice:
“Dramaturgy, having been freed from its historical association with Aristotelian poetics or
considered only as an attribute of a dramatic text and/or textual analysis, gradually reconfigured
itself by the late twentieth century, and has become synonymous with the flow of a dynamic
system.”50 Trencsényi and Cochrane’s characterization of dramaturgy as the movement within a
dynamic system pairs beautifully with the ideals of read-write cultural production.
Returning to the dramaturg, it is also worth quickly noting that that professional role is
quite often absent in the crafting of Read-Write Theatre—it is, as a form, inherently and

49. See Mary Luckhurst, Dramaturgy: A Revolution in Theatre (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); and Cathy Turner and Synne K. Behrndt, Dramaturgy and Performance
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
50. Katalin Trencsényi and Bernadette Cochrane, eds, New Dramaturgy: International
Perspectives on Theory and Practice (London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2014), xi.
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internally dramaturgical. In the rare case that a dramaturg is credited, we usually find they are
one of the new dramaturgs heralded by Trencsényi, Cochrane, Turner, and Behrndt. As an
example, in many of Elevator Repair Service’s productions, Katherine Profeta is credited as
Movement Dramaturg, for her creative contributions to the aesthetic and gestural language of the
performances.51 I hope that my dissertation might signal the need for an intellectual property
dramaturg, but until such time this study will consider the subject of dramaturgies as something
wholly distinct from—and unrelated to—the professional dramaturg.

Methodology and Chapter Breakdown
This dissertation is comprised of a series of dramaturgical codecs. I will examine the
many legal instruments that are used to concretize artistic ideas into legally valuated expressions,
and define each as a unique dramaturgy. In each chapter, I will focus on a Read-Write Theatre
case study, interrogating their work at the intersection of the two aforementioned processes—the
dramaturgical procession toward artistic production and the legal procession toward property. In
other words, if we take theatrical productions to be both cultural products and economic
products, then the focus of my project is the space where the legal and the artistic become
inextricably bound and progress as one. This is not a comparative study of dramaturgy and
intellectual property law, but of the shared space these two processes occupy.
Over the course of this dissertation, I will unpack four distinct dramaturgies of
intellectual property law in Read-Write Theatre, beginning with the dominant legal instrument
51. In my professional experience, I have witnessed that this titling has caused some confusion
for awards committees, who refuse to recognize ERS as a collective choreographer for their own
works.
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for theatre and performance: copyright. In the next three chapters, I follow the example of
Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola—who concluded their book Creative License with a series
of radical proposals for the legal future of hip hop sampling—by proposing three new legal (and
in my case dramaturgical) directions that I imagine for the Read-Write Theatre, and the field as a
whole: commons, trademarks, and memes.52
In Chapter 1, I establish a model for my dramaturgical analysis, beginning with the
dominant intellectual property instrument in the theatre: copyright. I use Taylor Mac’s A 24Decade History of Popular Music—a work of Read-Write theatre that presents a number of
challenges contemporary copyright—as an occasion to unpack the mechanics of copyright law,
particularly as they relate to contemporary Read-Write practices and dramaturgies. I suggest that
in this seminal work, Taylor Mac is performing a clever act of misuse, pushing beyond the
bounds of the ASCAP license to make a meta-statement about popular culture in the United
States.53 Mac, a cabaret icon, is undoubtedly familiar with the broad concepts of the ASCAP
license, which allows for cabaret artists to publicly perform covers of copyrighted works with
some restrictions on the narratological function these works can perform.54
While more than half of the songs in Mac’s 24-hour show are within the public domain, a
large portion of the performance includes works that are still protected by copyright. I argue that
52. Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola, Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital
Sampling (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
53. A 24-Decade History of Popular Music, by Taylor Mac, St. Ann’s Warehouse, New York,
NY, 2016.
54. “Common Music Licensing Terms,” ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/
termsdefined.aspx. ASCAP acknowledges that dramatic and non-dramatic are not terms defined
by law, and as such are subject to interpretation.
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if Mac’s show were simply, as advertised, a collection of historically themed concerts, ASCAP
would provide a presenting venue with the appropriate legal protections. However, for each of
the twenty-four one-hour segments, Mac has crafted a ridiculous narrative that ties together the
songbook in a queer re-imagining of “America.” I contend that these playful and paper-thin
narratives are quasi-dramatic; each tells a story, but that story is quickly jettisoned for another
story, and then another, and another, as Mac ambivalently drags us through the history of popular
culture in the United States. Mac’s work is always at once dramatic and non-dramatic, lavishly
rich and scrappily poor. In this chapter I look beyond the brilliance of Mac’s performance to read
this thrillingly subversive meta-meditation on genre and property.
This first chapter reads like a detective novel, as I dig through court cases across time in
pursuit of stable definitions for author, work, and fixed—three critical terms in copyright law
which exist in tautological balance with one another. I chase down every possible legal rationale
for A 24-Decade History of Popular Music, and build on the work of intellectual property
theorists Siva Vaidhyanathan, Jessica Reyman, Jessica Litman, and McLeod and DiCola to
explore how copyright dramaturgy is shaped by key critical terms—Fair Use, de minimis,
compulsory and ASCAP licensing, dramatic/nondramatic, and the important idea-expression
dichotomy.55
I consider the impact of recent court decisions, including VMG Salsoul v. Madonna, in
which the defendant’s sampling of a “horn hit” from a recording by the plaintiff was determined
55. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How
It Threatens Creativity (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Jessica Reyman, The
Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law and the Regulation of Digital Culture (New
York: Routledge, 2010); Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual Property on
the Internet (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2001).
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by the court to be de minimis, or inconsequential.56 I argue that this decision, which counters the
6th Circuit Bridgeport ruling that de minimis can only be applied to compositions, and not
musical recordings, will reopen a critical debate in media culture—one that will in turn have
major implications for Read-Write Theatre composition.57 In the ways that the Bridgeport
decision transformed hip hop music production (by criminalizing the read-write practices that
originally defined the genre), so too will this recent decision define the limits of this emergent
Read-Write Theatre form.
In Chapter 2, I play a game with my reader: The Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma. Through
this game, I consider some possible economic impacts of Read-Write sampling. This leads to a
deep interrogation of ‘the commons,’ particularly as it has been theorized by Garrett Hardin and
Elenor Ostrom. I use the work of Jessice Reyman to consider the impact of rhetoric on
commons-based solutions, copyright ethics, and the conception of intellectual property as private
property.58 I then turn my attention to Creative Commons, the Bay-Area-based non-profit that
offers customizable legal addenda artists can add to the traditional copyright terms of use to
allow for Read-Write sampling.59 I explain the core questions that shape any Creative Commons
license: Are derivative artworks allowed or must the work remain whole? Must the artist share
alike (meaning, must the derivative artwork carry the same Creative Commons license as the
borrowed content)? Is commercial use allowed? I also demonstrate how the three-tiered shape of

56. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
57. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
58. Reyman, The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property.
59. Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org.
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the Creative Commons license (machine code, everyday language, and legal code) complements
a digital read-write dramaturgical practice.60 I offer that commons-based solutions like Creative
Commons undermine the core assumptions of my Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma game, yielding
unexpected economic outcomes and pointing to an alternative Read-Write cultural economy.
To illustrate this point, I offer as a case study Merce Cunningham’s late-in-life
collaboration with The Open Ended Group, specifically their shared efforts to preserve and
perpetuate Cunningham’s solo hand dance, Loops, using motion capture data.61 The Loops
choreography and software are both available with licenses that freely allow for Read-Write
exchange, allowing for future artists (particularly a group of commissioned artists at the 2009
Boston CyberArts Festival) to see to the preservation and expansion of this theatrical work. I
focus on how derivative works reinterpret Cunningham’s chance operation for the digital age,
and in so doing create an intellectual property paradox.
I conclude this chapter by offering an answer as to why we have not seen a widespread
adoption of Creative Commons in the theatre industry. I share the story of a cultural revolution
that never happened, led by popular theatre website HowlRound—a pioneer in commons-based
solutions for the theatre.62 I argue that their proposal for a peer-to-peer theatre commons
currency, Culture Coin, revealed an inherent textocentricity and intellectual property
conservatism that is endemic to the field. Culture Coin, a solution for valuating (and thus

60. “About the Licenses,” Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/.
61. “Loops—New Iterations,” Boston CyberArts Festival, http://bostoncyberarts.org/festival/
loops/.
62. Howlround, http://howlround.com.
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normalizing) sweat equity in the theatre, notably exempted playwrights (who, presumably,
should instead be paid in legal tender) from this virtual economy.63 I contend that the theatre has
not embraced Creative Commons (in the way it has been by film, music, and photography)
because it is a cultural economy built around its one circulable, copyrightable good: playscripts.
Theatre has not embraced the commons as a solution to the limits of copyright since so much of
theatrical creativity is not protected by—and therefore not limited by—copyright law, which
only recognizes creativity that is expressed in a tangible medium.
In Chapter 3, I explore the dramaturgical and legal dimensions of trademark and trade
dress—a derivative of trademark that refers to all aesthetic packaging elements that serve to
indicate the source of a good or service. I position trademark as a reception-based alternative to
copyright, and perhaps a more appropriate instrument for protecting the ephemeral elements of
performance. While there are some instances where trademark protections have been invoked by
theatre practitioners, it is largely overlooked as a legal remedy. I interweave my theatrical case
studies with examples from technology, fashion, pornography, and comic books. I cite the shift in
these fields toward a more fluid and market-driven trademark system—and away from legal
protections based in government-backed monopolies like patent and copyright—as both a
practical and dramaturgical model for the Read-Write Theatre.
This chapter opens in the courtroom of Judge Lucy Koh, at the recent Apple-Samsung
trials, which concerned patent violation (did Samsung steal Apple’s tablet computer
technologies?) but also included a trade dress argument (did the iPad-like design of Samsung’s

63. “Howlround—Challenge Semi-Finalist,” ARTSFWD, http://artsfwd.org/challengehowlround/.
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tablets lead to customer confusion?).64 I find this legal approach relevant to theatre and
performance for two distinct reasons. First, patent protection is, like copyright, limited to a
certain period of time, after which the protected invention (or expression) becomes public
property. Trademark, on the other hand, is a protection granted without expiration; the degree to
which a mark is defensible is directly proportional to its performance in the market. A trademarkbased cultural economy would have a more dynamic, responsive public domain, and would
reward those creators with distinctive aesthetics. Second, while patents and copyrights are
author-centric instruments—the author/inventor creates and holds value through registration—
the audience determines the strength and worth of a trademark.65 And this is not a static
determination; rather, the defensibility of a mark is constantly renegotiated according to its
distinctiveness and recognition.
I trace a dramaturgical history of trademark, beginning even before the Lanham Act (the
1946 legislation that established federal trademark laws) with a proto-trademark case study:
Augustin Daly and Dion Boucicault’s legal battles over their melodramatic train track sensation
scenes.66 I then explore a series of more recent trademark infringement claims, including: two
instances of directors who fought regional theatres plagiarizing their direction (Gerald
Gutierrez’s Most Happy Fella, Joe Mantello’s Love! Valour! Compassion!); the Blue Man
Group’s efforts to block a tobacco company from using their name; and the battle between the
64. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
65. The exception to this rule being that government regulation—responding to questions of
public health, morality, and safety—can supersede the otherwise populist trademark valuating
system.
66. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868).
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Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders and porn kingpin Michael Zaffarano over costuming.67 I use these
cases to demonstrate the ways in which aesthetics become a mark, or a source indicator (as
trademark is legally defined). I contend that Read-Write practitioners express their unique voices
through means other than rhetoric, and that this legal instrument would allow for a more direct
protection of (the hitherto legally unrecognized) live performance. Through trademark, we could
protect the art itself, rather than the imprinted records—the stage directions and photographs that
merely recall an ephemeral theatrical event, and yet are privileged by copyright over the event
itself.
I then imagine the future dramaturgical implications of the recent Second Circuit Court
decision in Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent, in which the court upheld the exclusive right of the
former to use a red shoe sole as trademark.68 In this decision, the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the red sole could not be protected according to the doctrine of Aesthetic
Functionality (which, in short, prevents a product design feature—which should be protected by
patent—from being eligible for trademark protection). The defendant unsuccessfully argued that
in the case of these shoes, aesthetics (or fashion) was the function. The court’s decision in favor
of Louboutin might open the door for aesthetically-based practices—fashion and theatre—to
leverage trademark as a legal instrument. I conclude this chapter with a brief, unresolved ReadWrite Theatre case study: Factory 449’s attempts to defend their appropriation of Temporary

67. Gutierrez v. DeSantis, No. 95-1949 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Blue Man Productions, Inc. v. Tarmann, 75 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1492 (TTAB 2005);
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
68. Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent, 3303 (2d Circuit, 2012).
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Distortion’s signature aesthetics (as discussed on the prominent performance website
CultureBot).69
In Chapter 4, I introduce the concept of an author functionality curve, a Foucauldian
graph that represents the relative function of authorship (as a taxonomic and economic indicator)
for all creative works within an economy.70 The focus of this chapter is work at the far end of the
author functionality curve, where authorship approaches zero and where culture easily
disintegrates into memes. I invite my reader to imagine a memetic theatre—a theatre that is built
from memes (or, rather, a theatre that reads culture memetically). This is a dramaturgy without
any troublesome author to impede the free Read-Write circulation of ideas. I engage with the
work of Richard Dawkins, Susan Blackmore, Robert Aunger, Limor Shifman, and Daniel
Dennnett as I craft my own dramaturgical understanding of memes, the smallest unit of cultural
production and the cultural equivalent of a gene.71 I use popular internet memes (as well as predigital examples) to show how a meme spreads, contributes to the formation of individual and
social subjectivity, and erases any trace of authorship.

69. Jeremy Barker, “UPDATED: Were Temporary Distortion’s Designs and Concepts Stolen by
Another Company?” Culturebot, http://www.culturebot.net/2012/06/13733/was-temporarydistortions-designs-and-concepts-stolen-by-another-company/.
70. I am expanding on the “author function” as defined in Michel Foucault, “What Is An
Author,” trans. Josué V. Harari in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism
(London: Methuen, 1980), 141-160.
71. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Susan J.
Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Robert Aunger, The
Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think (New York: The Free Press, 2002); Limor
Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014); Daniel Dennett,
Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991).
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A large portion of this chapter is dedicated to a close reading of the multi-part Art of Luv,
a work of memetic theatre by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble.72 Dressed in goldface and
religious garb, this self-described “musical priesthood”—consisting of visual artist Sean
McElroy and theatre designer Tei Blow—created a multi-year, intermedial work constructed
from memes and exploring memetic constructs, such as male desire and misogyny. As their name
suggests, Blow and McElroy transform found video into karaoke texts for ritual performance: in
one part of The Art of Luv, they recited the words from muted YouTube videos as though they
were religious incantations; in another, they meticulously recreated an online video that had no
viewers; in a third, they critically examined the Meg Ryan/Nora Ephron trilogy of films, rerendered by Blow and McElroy as kaleidoscopic mandalas.
Royal Osiris’s work reveals much about the meme: their repeated use of VHS tapes as a
medium for their already-digital YouTube content renders the wear and abuse of replication
visible (and, following Philip Auslander, gives their projections an auratic liveness).73 We see
through their analog technologies that replication can be a violent act—a violence belied by the
fidelity of digital replicators. I read the trajectory of The Art of Luv in conversation with

72. The Art of Luv (Part 1): Elliot, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, La Mama, ETC, New
York, NY, January, 2015. The Art of Luv (Part 2): LUV Pavilion, by Royal Osiris Karaoke
Ensemble, Pop-up venue, Queens, NY, May, 2015. The Art of Luv (Part 3): Meg Mondays, by
Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, Pop-up venue, Queens, NY, May, 2015. The Art of Luv (Part
4): Project Peplum, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, video project. The Art of Luv (Part 5):
ROKÉ Cupid, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, The Bushwick Starr, Brooklyn, NY, May,
2017. The Art of Luv (Part 6): Awesome Grotto!, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, Abrons
Arts Center, New York, NY, June, 2018.
73. Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (London: Routledge,
1999), 49.
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Baudrillard, with each installment of the work representing a step in the progression toward
memetic simulacrum.74
In the final pages of this chapter, I consider the economic implications of a memetic
dramaturgy. I theorize a patronage-based system of valuating work and compensating artists that
could function in an authorless, memetic theatre. I look to the recent and precipitous rise in nonfungible tokens, or NFTs, as a patronage system for the twenty-first century—what the founder
of the patron-funded platform Patreon calls “the Second Renaissance.”75
In my conclusion of this project, I point toward what I believe is the next question for this
field: what new dramaturgical and legal dimensions will emerge in the age of the “quantified
self?”76 How will the proliferation of sensors and cameras disrupt conventional understandings
of agency and authorship? Will sensor data function as intellectual property? I consider these
questions, particularly as they reverberate in the aforementioned collaborative work of Merce
Cunningham and The OpenEnded Group, but also in the sensor-driven interactive experience
The Ascent by XXXY?77 Raw sensor data (which includes movement, but also temperature,
luminosity, sound timbre, and much more) offers a new means of transcribing—into a tangible
expression—the hitherto unrecorded elements of the theatre. What, then, becomes of the
74. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1994).
75. Jack Conte, “The Second Renaissance is Coming,” YouTube, September 24, 2020, accessed
November 20, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTw9vkgxPQU&t=3s.
76. The “quantified self” is a concept introduced by Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly in “Know
Thyself: Tracking Every Facet of Life, from Sleep to Mood to Pain, 24/7/365,” Wired, June 22,
2009, accessed April 10, 2021, https://www.wired.com/2009/06/lbnp-knowthyself.
77. The Ascent, by XXXY, East of Hollywood, Brooklyn, NY, June 21, 2015.
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foundational conceits of theatre and intellectual property: respectively, performance ephemerality
and the idea-expression dichotomy? Turning to one of my own upcoming creative projects, I also
consider the ways that this already-unstable foundation of copyright is rattled by recent scientific
discoveries that could change how we think about DNA, memory, and authorship.
***
This dissertation was partly inspired by the work of Sarah Bay-Cheng, Jennifer ParkerStarbuck, and David Z. Saltz, three scholars I have long admired. Henry Bial (another one of the
greats) told me, as an emerging scholar reading his essay in 2007, that theatre historians are rock
stars, and I believed him.78 I tracked my trio of celeb-scholars, and devoured all they had to say
about media and performance. I wanted a seat at that table—nay, I wanted to play in their rock
band. When I finally met them at an ATHE conference, all three surprised me with their
generosity and willingness to bring me in.79 They had figuratively done for me what Bial literally
proposed for textbooks—they left some empty space for me to write my theatrical history.80
Parker-Starbuck’s excellent Cyborg Theatre, in particular, gave me my empty space.81
Her cyborg matrix, a taxonomy for considering the political implications of subjective/objective/
abjective bodies in cyborg configuration with subjective/objective/abjective technologies is

78. Henry Bial, “The Theatre Historian as Rock Star, or Six Axioms for a New Theatre History
Text,” Theatre Topics 17.1 (2007):81- 86.
79. The Association for Theatre in Higher Education, athe.org.
80. Bial, “The Theatre Historian as Rock Star,” 85.
81. Jennifer Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre: Corporeal/Technological Intersections in
Multimedia Performance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
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nothing short of brilliant, but it does leave out the question of property.82 We understand, through
her matrix, that when technologies speak (with subjectivity), they throw the political status and
agency of the performing body onstage into relief. But what are the legal dimensions of this
matrix? My hope is that this dissertation will project Parker-Starbuck’s x/y matrix into the z
space, inviting us to consider the degree to which these cyborgs are made of propertied
technologies and propertied bodies.
This idea is encapsulated in Guillermo Gomez-Peña’s 1998 performance installation El
Mexterminator, a series of “ethno-cyborg” creations reflecting a national preoccupation with
immigrant bodies. Gomez-Peña writes:
Our intention in this new project was to allow Internet users and live audience
members to help determine the physical and psychological profiles of our "ethnocyborgs,"…how we should be costumed, what kinds of music we should listen to,
what sorts of props and objects we should handle, and most importantly, what
types of ritualized actions we should perform and how we should interact with
audience members. Our goal was to incarnate the intercultural fantasies and
nightmares of our audiences…an army of Mexican Frankensteins ready to rebel
against their Anglo creators.83
El Mexterminator places historically objectified immigrant bodies (which have moved toward
abjectification in the two decades since the performance installation) in a cyborg configuration

82. Ibid., 41.
83. Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Dangerous Border Crossers: The Artist Talks Back (London:
Routledge, 2000), 35-57.
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with a subjective technology, namely Arnold Schwarzenegger’s robotic antihero in The
Terminator.84 The resulting mediaphoric bodies offer a brilliant critique of America’s immigrant
terror: the subjective technology (an unlicensed satire of The Terminator) reads as illegal, just as
the immigrant bodies also read as illegal (or, undocumented).85 Gomez-Peña intensifies
immigrant terror by refracting it through the late 1990s capitalist preoccupation with illegal
media piracy and rampant technophobia.
It was through this, my own reading of the Mexterminator cyborgs, that I first began to
perceive the dramaturgies of intellectual property law. I recognized that there are critical,
political, and aesthetic dimensions to these seemingly practical legal issues that increasingly
concern artists and producing institutions. Five years ago, I decided to take classes in intellectual
property law, so that I might become a resource for my creative community. Armed with this new
knowledge, I have been able to help artists navigate the complex challenges of IP law, and devise
new modes of Read-Write cultural production. As a practicing dramaturg and creative producer, I
write this dissertation from a privileged and sometimes complicated position; I have worked
closely with nearly all of the artists I mention in this dissertation. My professional career, which
gives me a unique insight for this project, has also sometimes been the chief impediment to my
completing this dissertation. For years I have tried to keep my professional and academic careers

84. The Terminator, directed by James Cameron (1984; Los Angeles: MGM Home
Entertainment, 2001), DVD.
85. It is important to draw a distinction between satire and parody. In the case of parody, the
target of the criticism is the appropriated artwork being parodied (or some element of that
artwork), whereas in the case of satire, the target is some third party. Fair Use, as we will
discover in the next chapter, does offer a defense for parodic works—satire, on the other hand, is
not defensible under Fair Use.
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separate, and in competition; but with this project, I merge them and claim my total biography. I
am a rock star, and this is my anthem (all rights reserved).
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Chapter One: Copyright
“How can I do what Taylor did?” I am not exaggerating when I say that this is one of the
questions I am most often asked—by more than ten artists over the past year. The “Taylor” they
all refer to is Taylor Mac, a prolific multi-hyphenate whose work—as actor, director, playwright,
singer/songwriter, and performance artist—has been seen and celebrated at festivals around the
world, in downtown clubs, and on Broadway. What Taylor “did” was craft a 24-hour concert
experience featuring popular music from twenty-four decades of American history.1 For artists in
the Read-Write Theatre this was a watershed moment—not only for the production’s scale,
ambition, and audacity—but because it seemingly set a precedent for license-free use of popular
copyright-protected music on the stage. But things aren’t always what they seem.
Navigating intellectual property law is always complicated, but Taylor’s dialogic ReadWrite approach to culture is particularly messy. I will, over the course of this dissertation,
reframe intellectual property as dramaturgy, and offer three alternative legal/dramaturgical
frameworks to copyright that recognize—and are recognized by—this post-postmodern cultural
economy. In this first chapter, however, my purpose is to establish the post-postmodern (ReadWrite) limits of copyright, and to illustrate, through this Taylor Mac case study, how copyright
(dis)functions as a dramaturgical framework. I will unpack the legal truths and misapprehensions
surrounding this famous production, and use it as a lens through which to perceive the many
instruments and definitions that make contemporary copyright protection confounding for so
many. My aim is not to argue that Taylor Mac’s use infringed hundreds of artist copyrights (that

1. A 24-Decade History of Popular Music, by Taylor Mac, St. Ann’s Warehouse, New York, NY,
2016.
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would result in a very short chapter, unfortunately); rather, I am interested in the ways that this
production points to widening gaps between the original intent and the present application of
copyright law, to the subjectivity of legal interpretations, and to the need for alternative
intellectual property laws that can recognize and reflect our post-postmodern economy and the
Read-Write Theatre.
Taylor, who uses the pronoun judy, crafted A 24-Decade History of Popular Music over
the course of several years, building each decade’s concert largely at cabaret venues below 14th
Street in New York (a fact that will prove relevant later in this chapter).2 Judy describes the
piece, which premiered in 2016 at St. Anne’s Warehouse, as “A 24-hour music theater work
about how communities are built as a result of being torn apart.”3 At the premier, nearly 600
people braved the run time, taking part in what the New York Time’s reviewer called “one of the
great experiences of my life.”4 But at around 2:30am something happened. Something that most
—if not all—of the 600 attendees missed, either because they were sleeping (as Suzy Evans
admits to in American Theatre) or because it was an uncharacteristically subtle moment of

2. Here I cite my own experience, having presented some of the early development concerts in
the context of the Under the Radar Festival at The Public Theater.
3. Taylor Mac, “A 24-Decade History of Popular Music,” Taylor Mac, accessed January 6, 2019,
http://www.taylormac.org/portfolio_page/24-decade/
4. Wesley Morris, “Review: Taylor Mac’s 24-Hour Concert Was One of the Great Experiences of
My Life,” New York Times, October 11, 2016, accessed November 2, 2019, https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/theater/review-taylor-macs-24-hour-concert-was-one-of-thegreat-experiences-of-my-life.html
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political resistance that got lost in the brilliant noise.5 At 2:30am, Taylor’s setlist crossed an
invisible yet aggressively guarded American border—the border between the Public Domain and
Private Copyright.6 While there is no hard line for when things enter the public domain (because
of the pre-1992 renewal system and the differences between corporate and individual
copyrights), only creative works published prior to 1921 were certain to be in the public domain
in 2016. I will explain how this invisible line came to be, and what the implications of crossing
are, but first I will answer that burning question: did Taylor’s post-2:30am setlist constitute
infringement? Yes, but that’s not the point.
To fully appreciate this act of transgression, we need to first need to understand what is
being transgressed. Quite simply: what is copyright? Copyright is a complicated concept, and
finding a concise, comprehensive definition is a fools errand. As Justice Story explained in 1841,
“copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to
what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be,
very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”7 This quote by Justice Story, still
often cited today, makes my case for the inadequacy of copyright (so perhaps I should just end
my chapter here), and also frames a delightful paradox: copyright is itself evanescent, however—
as my reader will soon learn—it cannot and will not protect evanescent works of art, such as
performance.
5. Suzy Evans, “A Trip Around the Sun With Taylor Mac’s ‘24-Decade History,’” American
Theatre, October 14, 2014, accessed November 2, 2019, https://www.americantheatre.org/
2016/10/14/a-trip-around-the-sun-with-taylor-macs-24-decade-history/
6. Capitalization used for emphasis, and to reinforce the geographic metaphor.
7. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), 344.
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The United States Copyright Office web glossary offers the following definition for
copyright:
A form of protection provided by the laws of the United States for “original works of
authorship”, including literary, dramatic, musical, architectural, cartographic,
choreographic, pantomimic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, and audiovisual creations.8
Note how narrowly the copyright office defines what a work of authorship can be. If this list
(“literary…pantomimic…audiovisual”) seems both oddly specific and yet broad, that is because
it has grown longer with each Copyright Act over the past 230 years; the Copyright Act of 1790
only recognized a “map, chart, or book” as a work of authorship.9
The more important thing to note, however, is that it isn’t enough for a work to have an
author—it must exist, materially, in one of the compositional forms listed above. Many things
are authored, but only some things can be copyrighted. These two terms—author and work—are
forever entwined in United States copyright law, and tracing their historical relationship can offer
us a unique perspective on how our present legal, rhetorical, and philosophical view on copyright
came to be. While Lionel Bently cautions in The Modern Law Review that “the histories fail to
establish conclusively any causative, necessary or determining link between the legal and the
literary,” he does concede that “there is a complimentary and reinforcing connection, a parallel

8. “U.S. Copyright Office Definitions” Copyright.gov, accessed November 2, 2019, https://
www.copyright.gov/help/faq/definitions.html.
9. “Copyright Act of 1790” Copyright.gov, accessed November 2, 2019, https://
www.copyright.gov/help/faq/definitions.html.
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development.”10 I will, then, proceed with caution, not suggesting any causal relationship
between the histories of authorship and copyright law, but rather offering a comparative reading
of these histories that reveals much about the nuance contained in these everyday words—author
and work—which shape our contemporary copyright law.
The English Statute of Ann, passed in 1710, provided the foundation for copyright law in
the United States. As Bently argues, “The Act was concerned with ‘books’ and their
‘proprietors’ (ie the Stationers), not authors and their works.”11 It recognized and protected
physical objects—namely books—and the industry that produced them. Peter Jaszi explains in
the Duke Law Journal:
The terminology of the “work,” denominating a free-standing abstraction as the subject
of literary property, emerged only in the mid-eighteenth century…this development was
one consequence of the commercialization and commodification of print culture that
proceeded apace throughout the eighteenth century…In effect, the “work” was the
commodity form of objectification of the “author’s” labor, and the publisher was able to
realize the surplus value of that labor.12
Copyright was, in its origins, an incentive to produce printed works. It gave limited exclusive
rights to printers and publishers to make and distribute copies.

10. Lionel Bently, “Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law,” The Modern
Law Review 57:6 (1994): 978.
11. Ibid., 975.
12. Peter Jaszi, “Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
‘Authorship,’” Duke Law Journal (1991): 473.
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As Jaszi indicates, copyright did not assign value to—or even consider—the act of
authorship; rather, it was concerned with the derivatives of authorial labor. It is important to
remember this because while popular perceptions of copyright have been distorted through the
lens of Romanticism, the law itself remained relatively steadfast in its narrow purpose. Jaszi
laments the Romantic “tendency to mythologize ‘authorship,’” and the failure to recognize
copyright for what it truly is, “a culturally, politically, economically, and socially constructed
category rather than a real or natural one.”13
In his study of authorship in the eighteenth century, Mark Rose argues that the confusion
of copyright as “natural right” could be traced to the publication of John Locke’s Second Treatise
on Government. He writes that “the key to Locke’s thought was the axiom that an individual
‘person’ was his own property. From this it could be demonstrated that through labor an
individual might convert raw materials of nature into private property.”14 According to Locke, if
every person is their own property (and cannot be propertied by another), then it stands to reason
that the products of one’s own labor—including intellectual labor—is an extension of their
property and self. Jessica Reymen likens Locke’s proto-Romantic view of copyright to
agricultural production: “an individual’s right to what results from his or her labor, such as the
land he or she has cultivated, was a natural right, and this right had to be protected by legal order.
When applied to intellectual property, this right became an author’s rights to the fruits of his or

13. Ibid., 459.
14. Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2011), 5.
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her labor, a copyrighted work.”15 It’s no surprise that this Romantic misconception of copyright
prevails still today—it aligns with a meritocratic self-image of the United States, and displaces
(or rather, obscures) the role of government in intellectual property protections. It casts a
libertarian hue on a decidedly federalist construct, suggesting that copyright isn’t an arbitrarilydefined, government-backed limited monopoly, but rather a natural right and private property.
Further, it isn’t surprising that this view is so prevalent in the American theatre—natural rights
can be (and have been) selectively recognized. This is why nearly every theatre aggressively
protects a playwright’s natural right while at the same time using pop music for scene transitions.
Pop music is corporate, lowbrow, and certainly not a work of genius—it is therefore unnatural,
and free to be used in scene transitions (or so I surmise is their argument). My more informed
readers might retort it isn’t a question of values, that scene transitions are covered by
performance licenses with ASCAP and BMI. Read on.
Despite these misconceptions, and the significance of Romanticism in literary theory,
Rose reminds us that the figure of the author is not recognized by English copyright law until the
late eighteenth century; before then, the law’s protections were extended to stationers (printers)
only.16 When the first copyright law appeared in the United States—An Act for the
Encouragement of Literature and Genius, passed in Connecticut in 1784—the figure of the
Author had emerged as the principle beneficiary, named in the preamble:
15. Jessica Reyman, The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law and the Regulation of
Digital Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010), 67.
16. Mark Rose, “The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741),’” Cultural Critique 21 (1992): 214.
Russ VerSteeg notes that the Supreme Court has only defined the word author twice, and only in
dicta: Russ VerSteeg, “Defining ‘Author’ for Purposes of Copyright,’” The American University
Law Review 45 (1996): 1323.
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Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the Principle of natural Equity and Justice, that every
Author should be secured in receiving the Profits that may arise from the sale of his
Works, and such Security may encourage Men of Learning and Genius to publish their
Writings, which may do Honour to their Country, and Service to Mankind.17
Here is the author, in all its Romantic glory and rhetorical flourish (“natural Equity,” “Genius”).
And here in this Connecticut Act we also find the original duration of United States copyright
protection: fourteen years.
I became obsessed—why was the original term of copyright protection fourteen years?18
Over the course of two centuries, the term would expand until, in 1998, it is brought to the
present-day duration of ninety-five years, however the original term of fourteen years seemed to
me to be too small and too specific to not be an indicator of values and purpose. I found my
answer in South Carolina’s An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Science, the first patent
law in the United States, passed in 1794: “the Inventors of useful machines shall have a like
exclusive privilege of making or vending their machines for the like term of 14 years, under the
same privileges and restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.”19 The

17. Thorvald Sorberg, ed., Copyright Enactments: 1783-1900 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1900), 9-10.
18. In my efforts to find the original rationale behind the fourteen-year copyright term, I
stumbled upon a fascinating attempt by economist Rufus Pollock to calculate, empirically, what
the optimal term for copyright protection would be. Calculating the rate of diminishing
commercial value—what he terms cultural decay—at 5%, he argues that for up to 14 years, a
work is more valuable as a public good than it is a private property. Rufus Pollock, “Forever
Minus a Day? Some Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright,” Rufus Pollock, accessed
November 2, 2019, https://rufuspollock.com/papers/optimal_copyright.pdf.
19. Sorberg, 21.
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fourteen-year copyright term is inherited from the patent system, and the suggestion is that books
are—like machines—a commodity to be made and vended. The term for patent protection was
long fixed at fourteen years—even up to 2015, in the case of design patents—and the rationale
originally was that this would allow for two cycles of apprentice training in a craft or
technology.20
It stands to reason that if (as the South Carolina Act suggests) copyright and patents are
analogous—and authors and inventors are analogous—then the lawmakers who set this term
duration were concerned not with maximizing the surplus value of a property, but rather with
training—or, the circulation and integration of knowledge. It calls to mind what Thomas
Jefferson said of patents:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.21
The transitive relation between patent and copyright suggested by South Carolina allows us to
imagine that Jefferson, one of the founding fathers of the United States, could have argued the
20. Joo-Young Lee, A Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, Innovation and
Access to Medicines (New York: Routledge, 2016), 7.
21. Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Isaac McPherson,” in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, eds.
Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh (Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Association, 1905), available online at The Founders' Constitution, accessed November 2, 2019,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
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same for authored works—that they “cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.” In the first
federal copyright law—the Copyright Act of 1790—the term was fourteen years, with the
possibility of a fourteen-year renewal; and each subsequent federal act through 1909 extended
these terms by multiples of 14.22 This suggests that through the nineteenth century, the primary
function of copyright was knowledge production rather than value production; as the country
grew, it simply took more cycles of fourteen to achieve this purpose.
Returning to South Carolina’s An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, there
is one more analogy to mine: if authors are like inventors, then books are like “useful machines.”
It would take literary criticism more than 150 years to arrive at the same conclusion: that an
authored work is like “a pudding or a machine. One demands that it work.”23 This quote comes
from the seminal writing of New Criticism, The Intentional Fallacy, by William K. Wimsatt and
Monroe Beardsley.24 In this 1946 essay, the authors capture a shifting perspective in late modern
literary criticism. The genius author, and all of his or her creative intent, would be subordinated
to the inherent value of a work, according to “empirical” measurements.
Focusing on intentionality, we continue to trace the parallel histories of copyright and
authorship in the United States. Until the late modern era, copyright is—like literary criticism—
shaped by intentionality. Intent is the factor that determines copyrightability on two counts. First,
authorship legally requires intent—one must intend to be an author, and intend to author a work.
22. Sorberg, 30.
23. W. K. Wimsatt Jr. and M. C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” The Sewanee Review 54:3
(1946): 469.
24. Knowing that the first South Caroline patent was for a machine that processes rice, I am
struggling to find what seems to be an obvious rice pudding joke, but it isn’t coming to me.
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In Childress v. Taylor—the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff,
playwright Alice Childress, who insisted sole authorship of a play about “Moms” Mabel, which
was written at the behest of—and with research support from—the defendant, Clarice Taylor.
Judge Newman explained that this decision hinged on intent: “What distinguishes the writereditor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from the true joint author relationship is
the lack of intent of both participants in the venture to regard themselves as joint authors.”25
Copyrightability is not defined by the labor performed or the content created; it is defined by
one’s intent to make a copyrightable work, and the fulfillment of that intent. The 1909 Copyright
Act first extended protections to “all the writings of an author,” while the 1976 Act narrowed the
scope to “original works of authorship;” it’s a seemingly minor rhetorical difference, but the
point is that not everything written by an author is copyrightable, only that which is intentionally
authored.26 Playscripts? Yes. Shopping lists? No.27 I don’t meant to suggest that intent is
everything, or that intent must match outcome; as Legal scholar Russ VerSteeg argues, “when a
25. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991), 507.
26. 1909 Copyright Act: An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub.
L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (Mar. 4, 1909), available at “An Act to Amend and Consolidate the
Acts Respecting Copyright,” Copyright.gov, accessed November 2, 2019, https://
www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (Oct. 19, 1976), codified at various parts of Title 17 U.S. Code, available at “Copyright Act
of 1976,” Wikisource, accessed November 2, 2019, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/
Copyright_Act_of_1976.
27. Or, not yet. As Monroe E. Price and Malla Pollack explain, a note tacked on a refrigerator
door might be copyrightable if the author is famous enough. “These may be scribbles done under
the impulse of communication, with no thought of their entry into the system of art; yet, at a later
point, because of the identity of the scribe, they may become art.” This illustrates Foucault’s
author function in economic action. Monroe E. Price and Malla Pollack, “The Author in
Copyright: Notes for the Literary Critic,” Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 10
(1992): 703-20.
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pop artist throws paint at a canvas, he does not necessarily picture in his mind what the
expression will look like after the paint settles. Nevertheless, his failure to conceptualize the
expression mentally before its physical creation does not prevent the work from being
copyrightable, nor does it prevent him from being an author.”28 However, the intent to throw
paint at a canvas is what makes a work a work—and an author an author—in the eyes of
copyright.
The second, and perhaps more noteworthy way that copyright has been shaped by intent
is that until fairly recently, copyright was granted to only those who registered their works, both
for the initial term and any copyright extension. Monroe Price and Mall Pollack explain in the
Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal: “until 1978, copyright law turned, to a remarkable
extent, on the expressed intention of the author to make use of the system of copyright.
Generations of lawyers were taught to ask whether the work carried the necessary signal of
intention to seek the umbrella of statutory protection (the now-disestablished "c" in a circle).”29
Price and Pollack call attention to the once ubiquitous copyright symbol, which is still in use but

28. VerSteeg, 1340.
29. Price, 712.
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largely unnecessary.30 That symbol, the ©, was an indexical representation of intent; it pointed
the intent to author, the intent to copyright, and the intent to protect that copyright. In 1978—
when the Copyright Act of 1976 was implemented—that once-mighty symbol was rendered
nearly impotent.
The Copyright Act of 1976 marked a radical shift in intellectual property law on a
number of fronts, including the introduction of one brief sentence: “registration is not a condition
of copyright protection.”31 With this, copyright was once again aligned with literary criticism’s
view of authorship. A work was, like a pudding or a machine, ontologically true regardless of
legal registration. Since 1978, any work of authorship is protected by copyright simply for its
having been fixed in tangible form. This dissertation is copyrighted because I wrote it down.
Here, in the Copyright Act of 1976, we mark the death of the author—presaged by Roland
Barthes nine years prior. Barthes contends that “the unity of a text is not in its origin, it is in its
destination,” and that a text is just a matrix of signifiers to be decoded and valuated by the

30. The US copyright office clarifies that “although notice is optional for unpublished works,
foreign works, or works published on or after March 1, 1989, using a copyright notice carries the
following benefits: (1) Notice makes potential users aware that copyright is claimed in the work.
(2) In the case of a published work, a notice may prevent a defendant in a copyright infringement
action from attempting to limit his or her liability for damages or injunctive relief based on an
innocent infringement defense. (3) Notice identifies the copyright owner at the time the work
was first published for parties seeking permission to use the work. (4) Notice identifies the year
of first publication, which may be used to determine the term of copyright protection in the case
of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire. (5) Notice may prevent
the work from becoming an orphan work by identifying the copyright owner and specifying the
term of the copyright.” See “Circular 3: Copyright Notice,” Copyright.gov, accessed November
2, 2019, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ03.pdf.
31. “Copyright Act of 1976.”
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reader.32 Without required registration, there is no moment when an author transforms their
writing into a work, when they—as author—endow it with meaning and value. Everything can
be and is copyrighted, and in a late-capitalist turn, it is the reader—or, plurally, the market—who
assigns meaning and value.33
Still, I feel compelled to ask the question Michel Foucault asked his friend Roland in
1969: “what is an author?”34 Copyright law tells us that Taylor Mac is not an author (in the case
of A 24-Decade History) because the “work” in this case is ephemeral performance—nothing is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. It’s surprising that the definition we cited earlier in this
chapter—from the Copyright Office’s own glossary—leaves out this most critical criterion, the
one factor that unites an otherwise motley list of works (literary, dramatic, musical, architectural,
cartographic, choreographic, pantomimic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, and audiovisual
creations): that copyright only protects “original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium
of expression.”35 U.S. Code Title 17, Chapter 1 expands on this idea:
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
32. Roland Barthes, “Three Essays,” trans. Richard Howard, UbuWeb, accessed November 2,
2019, http://www.ubu.com/aspen/aspen5and6/threeEssays.html.
33. Sociologist Celia Lury notes “a shift in authority from producers to the audience. This shift is
legally acknowledged in the previously noted movement from copyright to trademark as the
principal legal principle through which rights in intellectual property are constituted in relation to
audience practices.” Celia Lury, Cultural Rights: Technology, Legality and Personality, (New
York: Routledge, 2002), 8.
34. Michel Foucault, “What Is An Author,” trans. Josué V. Harari in Textual Strategies:
Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (London: Methuen, 1980), 141-160.
35. 17 U.S. Code § 102.
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permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.36
So, then an author is the person who fixes a work in a tangible medium of expression? Sort of.
Russ VerSteeg notes that in Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, the court
“succinctly pointed out how the Act's definition of ‘fixed’ makes it possible for something to be a
‘work’ and for someone to be an ‘author’ before the moment of fixation.”37 Note that in the
above definition of “fixed,” the work must already exist in some immaterial form, and the author
must exist to authorize it. And so we ask again, what is an author? If we define a work as being
an expression which is fixed by an author into a tangible medium, and—as Justice Marshall
explained in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid—an author is “the party who
actually creates the work, that is the person who translates an idea into a fixed expression
entitled to copyright protection,” we begin to see the challenge.38 Not only are these terms—
author and work—slippery and under-defined, but they exist in a tautological relationship with
one another. Each is defined relative to the other, so neither provides the absolute definition we
seek.
In order to resolve these two terms, we need to arrive at a concrete, non-circular
definition for one of them—I choose author. And as a one-time undergraduate economist, I offer
an alternative approach to this task: marginal analysis. Rather than define “author” (which

36. 17 U.S. Code § 101.
37. VerSteeg, 1323.
38. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), 737. Bolded for
emphasis and meaning.
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already seems to be an impossible task), we will look to cases involving joint authorship to
determine the marginal cost of one additional author; in other words, what are the tests courts
have used to assess whether a marginal contribution constitutes authorship. We already
mentioned Childress v. Taylor, which offers us “intent to author” as a test for authorship. In the
case of Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, the contributions of Trinity’s acting company to three plays
by the plaintiff were found to be non-authorial according to the subject matter test, introduced by
Paul Goldstein.39 According to Goldstein, “[a] collaborative contribution will not produce a joint
work, and a contributor will not obtain a co-ownership interest, unless the contribution represents
original expression that could stand on its own as the subject matter of copyright.”40 The 7th
Circuit determined that the ensemble did not meet this test; their contributions were not whole
and separable from the playscripts. Judge Ripple explains: “the actors, on the whole, could not
identify specific contributions that they had made to Ms. Erickson's works. Even when Michael
Osborne was able to do so, the contributions that he identified were not independently
copyrightable. Ideas, refinements, and suggestions, standing alone, are not the subjects of
copyrights.”41 When observed thusly, marginally, we see an author is one who, with intent,
creates a work that is whole and complete. Still an unsatisfying definition, but having arrived
here it is remarkable to look back at our Read-Write artists from the introduction of this
dissertation. Their work—the work of Gob Squad, Daniel Fish, Agrupación Señor Serrano,

39. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994). This ruling set precedent for
merging authorial contributions.
40. Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright, (New York: Aspen, 2014), §4.2.2.1.
41. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 1073.
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Toshi Reagon, Elevator Repair Service, James Sprang—is fractured, discursive, and often built
on non-consensual intermedial co-authorship.
In the case of Erickson, the court also cited legal scholar David Nimmer, who proposed
that joint authorship only requires more than a de minimis contribution.42 De minimis is a latin
term, an abbreviation of the phrase de minimis non curat lex, which translates to “the law does
not concern itself with trifles.”43 For Nimmer, one must contribute more than trifles to be
considered an author by the court. Remember, copyright is a construct, not a natural right; if the
court does not recognize an author’s authorship, they are not—legally—an author. But de
minimis cuts both ways: if the court does not recognize an infringer’s infringement, it also is not
—legally—infringement. De minimis is more often invoked for this purpose; in Ringgold v.
Black Entertainment Television, the Second Circuit court defined de minimis as when “copying
has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold of substantial
similarity, which is always a required element of actionable copying.”44 It’s important to note
that there is no absolute limit—neither in terms of duration or quantity—of triviality. In
Ringgold, a work of poster art by the plaintiff was partially shown in the background of a
television show, 1-4 seconds at a time, for a total of 26 seconds.45 This, the court determined,
was not trivial—curat lex. If you have ever heard a theatre practitioner say (or, heaven forbid, if

42. Ibid., 1069-70.
43. Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola, Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital
Sampling (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 232.
44. Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997), 74.
45. Ibid., 73.
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you have ever said), “it’s ok for us to use this song if it’s under x seconds,” or “it’s not
infringement if we only use some of the image,” then they (or, you) are referring to de minimis,
and are also incorrect.
De minimis was recently invoked by Epic Games, the makers of the videogame
phenomenon, Fortnite. This battle royale shooter, initially released in 2017, earned its publisher
Epic Games $2.4 billion in 2018.46 A popular feature of the game—and surprising source of
revenue—is the emote, a short dance animation that players can purchase for their character to
perform.47 Emote dances include The Milly Rock, and also a dance move made famous by
Alfonso Ribeiro on The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air: The Carlton. Epic Games renamed these dance
moves, and did not credit or compensate the originators, most of whom are artists of color.
Ribeiro recently filed for a copyright of The Carlton, which he now calls The Dance by Alfonso
Ribeiro - Variation B, to strengthen his claim in an upcoming suit. Ribeiro’s copyright
registration was denied by the United States Copyright Office on the grounds that it is “a simple
dance routine.” They further explained:
…the term “choreography” is not synonymous with “dance.” When drafting the current
copyright law, Congress made it clear that it did not intend to protect all forms of dance
or movement, specifically stating that “‘choreographic works’ do not include social

46. Patrick Shanley, “‘Fortnite’ Earned $2.4 Billion in 2018,” Hollywood Reporter, January 16,
2019, February 19, 2019, accessed November 2, 2019, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/heatvision/fortnite-earned-24-billion-2018-1176660.
47. If my readers balk at the idea of videogames-as-performance, I encourage them to pause this
dissertation so that they can read Playing Along by Kiri Miller, which offers a rigorous
ethnographic look at games as performance: Kiri Miller, Playing Along: Digital Games,
YouTube, and Virtual Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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dance steps and simple routines.” … Additionally, “[i]ndividual movements or dance
steps by themselves are not copyrightable, such as the basic waltz step, the hustle step,
the grapevine, or the second position in ballet.”…The fact that a dance or movement
may contain more than a trivial amount of original authorship is irrelevant to this
determination.48
This denial halted the progress of several copyright suits against Epic Games, since it clarified
that although the publisher was incorrect in its assertion that Ribiero could claim only a trivial
(de minimis) amount of authorship, and that Epic’s use was itself trivial (also de minimis), The
Carlton nevertheless did not constitute a copyrightable choreographic work. The Carlton, The
Milly Rock—these are like Michel de Certeau’s “pedestrian speech acts;” they are not a product
of—or a product in—the American capitalist system, but rather, as de Certeau describes, “‘turns
of phrase’ that are ‘rare,’ ‘accidental’ or illegitimate.”49 Tragically, the “illegitimacy” of these
dance moves gives them cultural capital while at the same time depriving their authors of the
economic capital realized by Epic Games.
Read-Write artist Toshi Reagon put it best when she sang “it’s all about race, it’s all about
race, no matter what they tell you—it’s all about race.”50 Copyright law may purport to be blind,

48. Quoted in Daniel Takash, “Woe to the Vanquished: Carlton Edition,” Captured Economy,
accessed November 2, 2019, https://capturedeconomy.com/woe-to-the-vanquished-carltonedition. Original document is presently stored at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
5737799-Ribeiro-copyright2.html.
49. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2008), 99.
50. I have no citation for this—I saw Read-Write artist Toshi Reagon’s The Parable of the Sower
more times than I can count, so although it is unpublished, it is committed to memory.
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but it has been written by people who most certainly are not. The rules around copyright
enforcement are—as I will demonstrate—as baroque and unstable as I have (hopefully) shown
copyright itself to be, and they tend to disfavor black artists and black cultural production
disproportionately. Knowing the history of copyright, it should be no surprise that it is—
historically—an inherently textocentric legal instrument. What is surprising, however, is that it
continues to blatantly favor literary knowledge production and circulation. If you sample a piece
of text in a playscript (say, Courtney Meaker’s thatswhatshesaid, an example from my
introduction), it is called a citation; if you sample a piece of recorded media for a hip hop album,
it is called infringement. The former sample is from a composition, and the latter is from a
recording, and as such they entitled to different protections under the law.51
Here is where copyright proves itself to be a rather unnatural right: it wasn’t until
recently, with the landmark 2005 Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films decision by the Sixth
Circuit, that a legal distinction between composition and recording even existed.52 The focus of
Bridgeport was “100 Miles and Runnin’” by rap group N.W.A., in which the artists had sampled
two seconds of a guitar riff from Funkadelic’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam.”53 The district court
ruled in favor of N.W.A. and Dimension Films, determining that this use was de minimis, but the

51. Jonathan Lethem’s collage essay “The Ecstasy of Influence”—published in Paul Miller,
Sound Unbound (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008)—directly confronts this hypocrisy. In a book on
media citationality, he builds an essay entirely out of other people’s writings. His essay is legal,
if not celebrated, while hip hop media citation is criminal.
52. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
53. The plaintiffs argued—in the initial suit—that since the sample (nested within the N.W.A.
song) was used in the film I Got the Hook-Up without a synchronization license, Funkadelic’s
copyright had been infringed. Ibid., 796.
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circuit court reversed that ruling with a radical argument.54 In the circuit court’s decision, Judge
Guy drew a distinction between compositions (music notation) and sound recordings, stating that
“when those sounds are sampled they are taken directly from that fixed medium. It is a physical
taking rather than an intellectual one.”55 Although recordings are now largely digital, they were
—historically—physical objects. Jessica Reyman argues that the materiality of recordings, their
once-physical form, survives in metaphor and rhetoric—particularly in court decisions such as
this.56 Judge Guy likens sampling to stealing a physical compact disc, a street crime.
How far we’ve come from the Statute of Ann; in just under three hundred years, a system
of laws designed “for the Encouragement of Learning” has transformed into a cynical instrument
of capitalism. Or, should we be surprised, since the Statute of Ann was really just about securing
a monopoly for the stationers? Perhaps copyright has always been this cynical, and it merely
took the courage of Judge Guy to affirm it. With Bridgeport, the Sixth Circuit cleaved our
cultural economy in two—the intellectual and the material. The court recognized that with their
decision, they were, and I quote, “announcing a new rule”: de minimis no longer applied to
recordings.57 In other words, there is no such thing as a trivial amount of media sampling—it’s
all criminal. With this “have your cake and eat it, too” decision, the United States could preserve
its intellectual Eurocentric literary culture, dismantle the predominantly black culture of media
citation, and honor the unspoken purpose of copyright: to maximize value where value is most

54. Ibid., 792.
55. Ibid., 801.
56. Reyman, 39-41.
57. Ibid., 804.
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likely. I contend that Bridgeport could be seen as another attempt by the white, Eurocentric
cultural elite (like the jazz age culture war chronicled in David Savran’s Highbrow/Lowdown) to
quell an emergent and distinctly American cultural practice.58
Peter McLeod and Kembrew DiCola’s Creative License examines the impact of this
decision on hip hop music, calculating the post-Bridgeport costs to produce seminal albums such
as Public Enemy’s Fear of A Black Planet (which, with its 81 samples, they demonstrate would
be produced at a loss of nearly $7 million).59 Bridgeport was an aggressive assault on ReadWrite cultural discursivity—it stripped practitioners of their authorship and artistry and
reinforced a unidirectional, consumer-based cultural economy. Anthropologist Néstor García
Canclini summarized this strategy succinctly in Hybrid Cultures:
…three operations…made it possible for the elites, against every modernizing change, to
reestablish over and over their aristocratic conception: (a) spiritualize cultural production
under the guise of artistic “creation”…(b) freeze the circulation of symbolic goods…(c)
propose as the only legitimate form of consumption of these goods the also spiritualized,
heiratic method of reception that consists in contemplating them.60
Judge Guy spiritualized a uni-directional model for creativity and consumption by drawing a
sharp distinction between cultural forms of sampling; it’s either intellectual discourse, or it’s
thievery. His decision drastically muted Read-Write cultural production for over a decade, and
58. David Savran, Highbrow/Lowdown: Theater, Jazz, and the Making of the New Middle Class,
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010).
59. McLeod and DiCola, 207.
60. Néstor García Canclini, Hybrid Cultures, trans. Christopher L. Chiappari and Silvia L. Lopez
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1995), 43.
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forever altered the course and voice of rap music. It prescribed a conservative view of authorship
and citation, and reinforced a hierarchy of cultural production and consumption. However, a
recent decision by the Ninth Circuit gives us reason to hope: in their 2016 VMG Salsoul v.
Ciccone decision, the court sided with the defendant, recording artist Madonna, on the grounds
that her sample of a horn hit recording on the song “Vogue” was de minimis. They acknowledged
(and openly disagreed with) the Bridgeport decision, arguing that “the Supreme Court has held
unequivocally that the Copyright Act protects only the expressive aspects of a copyrighted work,
and not the ‘fruit of the [author’s] labor.’”61 There is a lot to unpack in that quote, but effectively
what it asserts is that capital investment has no bearing on a de minimis determination.
Bridgeport favored the capitalist culture machine; VMG Salsoul says expression is expression is
expression, regardless of how much it costs. The Supreme Court usually arbitrates where the
circuit courts are split, so likely there is more to come. But hip hop music might be saved by a
white knight, Madonna.62
The Ninth Circuit recently made another landmark decision, one that threatens to
destabilize copyright’s very foundation. In the 2018 Williams v. Gaye decision, the court upheld
the district court determination that Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, and Clifford Harris (aka TI)
had infringed Marvin Gaye’s copyright for his song “Got to Give it Up.”63 What is perplexing, if
not worrying, is that their song, “Blurred Lines,” did not sample Gaye’s recording, or use his

61. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016), 898.
62. Of course this white knight has a complicated reputation for cultural appropriation, ironically
for this very song, Vogue, which borrows from black queer ballroom culture.
63. Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018).
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melody or lyrics; it sampled the general feel of the song, or rather—as the court put it—it had
“substantial similarity.”64 This is concerning because copyright is a protection extended to an
expression of an idea, and expressly not to the underlying ideas or feeling. Recalling our
tautological web, specifically Justice Marshall’s definition of author—“the person who translates
an idea into a fixed expression entitled to copyright protection”—we see this productive tension
between ideas and expressions.65 This is the foundational principle of copyright, and it has a
name: the idea / expression dichotomy. While this dichotomy has always undergirded AngloAmerican copyright law, the 1976 Copyright Act clarified and solidified the distinction between
idea and expression: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.”66 This is a critical distinction for performing artists to embrace: copyright only
protects things that are—to be reductive—written down. Copyright is, as a poststructuralist
instrument of capitalism, antithetical to the principles of performance: the idea belongs to the
author, while the expression belongs to the reader. Copyright produces value by facilitating the
exchange and circulation of ideas (as expressed in a tangible form), while performance, as Peggy
Phelan so succinctly stated, “refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy

64. In fairness, the Ninth Circuit did not make a determination regarding infringement. Rather,
they refused to overturn the district court ruling, citing “not an absolute absence of evidence of
extrinsic and intrinsic similarity between the two songs.” In other words, they made a double
negative determination: it wasn’t not infringement. Ibid., 1171.
65. Bolded for emphasis and meaning.
66. “Copyright Act of 1976.”
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fundamental to it.”67 She further explains that “performance honors the idea that a limited
number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no
visible trace afterward.”68 Copyright, unfortunately, only honors those visible traces.69
In the case of A 24-Decade History of Popular Music, what this means is that the script,
songs, and design sketches are protected, but the performance event itself is not. It’s important to
hold this distinction in mind as we read Taylor’s performance through the lens of copyright
dramaturgy; while Taylor’s performance is virtuosic and moving, it is not a work of authorship in
the eyes of the law, and it holds significantly less value than the infringed songs in question. I
would hasten to say this is not a value judgement, but that is exactly what it is. Copyright creates
value in a capitalist economy by assigning a limited monopoly for the reproduction and
circulation of creative works. The irreproducibility of Taylor’s performance—an exhausting feat
which judy can only do so many times, and each time uniquely—is a value producer in a postpostmodern economy of experience. But according to copyright, judy’s performance is worthless.
It’s easy to understand why many believe (incorrectly) that copyright protections should
be extended to performance, especially the work of stage directors. Title 17 of the United States

67. Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993), 149.
68. Ibid.
69. I don’t mean to suggest that this dichotomy is unassailable. As Jessica Reyman observes,
there are always exceptions: “while copyright law traditionally has protected expression of ideas
rather than the ideas themselves…in several cases in recent history this boundary between
expression and ideas has been challenged…” Here Reyman references Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995), in which Honda’s use of
a James Bond-like character in a car commercial was deemed infringement because the character
of James Bond, while itself an unexpressed idea, is central to the many expressions in film and
literature. See Reyman, 56.
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Code grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce, prepare derivative works,
distribute, and publicly perform their copyrighted work.70 Some have misread this law to mean
that copyright protects performance; it doesn’t—in fact it protects works from being performed.
It considers performance to be a means of distributing (or infringing) a work of art; performance
is not a work of art in and of itself. A play (when performed) is merely a loose confederacy of
propertied elements, each with their own authors—the playwright’s script, the designer’s plot,
the composer’s music, the choreographer’s notation. Each author brings their work to the table,
and they leave with it when the show has closed. This is why composer David Cale was able to
employ one of his compositions in two distinct theatrical projects: 600 Highwaymen’s Employee
of the Year and his own solo piece, We Are Only Alive A Short While. That melody, Canada
Geese, was never legally integrated into some larger, propertied whole. It was only creatively
integrated, then disintegrated, then integrated into another play. As an audience member of both
Cale and 600 Highwaymen’s plays, I experienced each as total works of art; but according to the
law, they were merely arrangements.
If performance is just a delivery mechanism for a loose confederation of propertied
works, then Taylor Mac’s A 24-Decade History of Popular Music—with 246 songs and more
than twice as many authors—is veritable empire. Measuring this empire presents a challenge,
since there are no set rates for grand rights music licensing (as they are not compulsory, and
usually scale to the venue size and ticket price). Simply to establish a baseline, I can take rates I
have seen for incidental music (for licensing and a clearance agent)—$1000 per song—and
(assuming approximately 97 of those songs were still under copyright in 2016) deduce that for

70. 17 U.S. Code § 101.
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this production licensing alone should be considerably in excess of $97,000—and that is
assuming the rights holders agree to license their work.71 “How can I do what Taylor did?”—this
is what artists ask me. Usually, before I can respond someone nearby interrupts with the
evergreen answer—“it must be fair use, right?” I would wager that you, my reader, have had the
same thought, and so I will interrupt my answer to the question “How can I do what Taylor did?”
and quickly unpack the Fair Use doctrine, which is not the secret to Taylor’s success, but is
nevertheless critical to our appreciation of copyright dramaturgy.
First, do not let the name fool you—Fair Use is not about fairness (or natural rights). Its
origins can be traced to a 1741 dispute between two London publishers, Gyles v. Wilcox.72 Ruling
that the defendant’s abridgment of the plaintiff’s publication did not constitute a new
copyrightable work, the Lord Chancellor declared:
Where books are colourably shortened only, they are undoubtedly infringement within
the meaning of the [Statute of Anne] . . . But this must not be carried so far as to restrain
persons from making a real and fair abridgment, for abridgments may with great
propriety be called a new book, because . . . the invention, learning, and judgment of the
[secondary] author is shewn in them.73
71. A full audit of the copyright status of all 246 songs would take weeks, and access to several
databases (since there is no central repository). As such, I will again take 1921 as my dividing
line, since any song published after that year might have still been under copyright protection.
Following this logic, 39.6% of the set list could still be under copyright: 97 songs. I say it should
be “considerably in excess” since incidental music is licensed at a lower rate.
72. Gyles v. Wilcox, Barrow, and Nutt (1741) 2 Atk. 141, available at “Gyles v. Wilcox,” Arts
and Humanities Research Council: Primary Sources on Copyright, accessed November 2, 2019,
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1741.
73. Ibid.
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A fair abridgment is more than an editorial effort; it reflects the secondary author’s “invention,
learning, and judgment”—or, their authorship. It can be rather challenging to determine what is
“colourably shortened” and what is a “fair abridgment,” and so Title 17 of the United States
Code includes four factors which courts use to determine Fair Use:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.74
I will use these four factors to determine whether Taylor Mac’s use could be defended as Fair
Use (spoiler: it cannot, but it is still a worthwhile exercise).
The first of these four factors (“the purpose and character of the use”) actually contains
two considerations: first—going back to Gyles v. Wilcox—we must ask if Taylor’s use of these
97 songs reflects judy’s “invention, learning, and judgment;” in copyright law this is referred to
as transformative use. Pierre Leval explains in the Harvard Law Review that “the use must be
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose
from the original.”75 When Taylor sings Ted Nugent’s homophobic anthem “Snakeskin Cowboy,”
it is undoubtedly transformative, critical, and endowed with new meaning. It is a generous act of

74. 17 U.S. Code § 107.
75. Pierre N. Leval, “Toward a Fair Use Standard,” The Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 1111.
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resistance. As Taylor says, “we have to appropriate that shit.”76 However, not all songs are
presented in such a transformative way; when Taylor sings “Danny Boy,” it is not transformative,
but rather affirms the song’s historical significance.77 Second, for this first factor we must also
consider whether the use is commercial or for a nonprofit educational purpose. While A 24Decade History of Popular Music has largely been presented by non-profit arts organizations, it
is produced by Pomegranate Arts, a New Jersey-based for-profit production company. I cannot
say with certainty whether A 24-Decade History passes this first test, but it seems unlikely, since
it is only semi-transformative and semi-noncommercial. Failing this first test does not bode well
for any Fair Use defense, since, as Leval explains, “Factor One is the soul of fair use. A finding
of justification under this factor seems indispensable to a fair use defense.”78
The second factor asks what the nature of the copyrighted work is. This seems a rather
opaque consideration, but Justice Story gave a more explicit test in Folsom v. Marsh: we must
consider “the value of the material used.”79 Leval cautions that “this should not be seen as an
invitation to judges to pass on literary quality, but rather to consider whether the protected

76. John Stoltenberg, “Review: Taylor Mac’s ‘A 24-Decade History of Popular Music
(Abridged)’ at The Kennedy Center,” DC Metro Theater Arts, March 8, 2018, accessed
November 2, 2019, https://dcmetrotheaterarts.com/2018/03/08/review-taylor-macs-a-24-decadehistory-of-popular-music-abridged-at-the-kennedy-center/.
77. Mark Swed, “Critic’s Notebook: I survived 24 hours of Taylor Mac: a necessary 246-song
attack on the heteronormative narrative,” Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2018, accessed
November 2, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-taylor-macnotebook-20180326-story.html.
78. Leval, 1105.
79. Folsom v. Marsh, 348.
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writing is of the creative or instructive type that the copyright laws value and seek to foster.”80
This factor boils down to whether the work being used is already published. It all comes back to
intent—if you publish, you intend to create value. All of the songs in Taylor Mac’s production
are published, so it certainly does not pass this test. The third factor asks us to consider the
amount of the original work being used in this new composition. A substantial amount of each of
the 246 songs is used in A 24-Decade History, so the production fails according to this third
factor as well. The fourth factor asks whether this use has any direct or indirect impact on the
economic value of the work; the Supreme Court (in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises)
declared this “the single most important element of fair use.”81 This test measures not only the
loss of royalties, but also—more importantly—any market impairment.82 Not only does A 24Decade History deprive hundreds of songwriters of royalties, but it also could impact the
prospect of a jukebox musical for each of those songwriters—as ridiculous as this may sound, it
is a reason I personally have been given for why performance rights for a song were not granted.
When we consider the continuing frequency and commercial success of jukebox musicals, it
could be argued that Taylor’s work is having a considerable negative market impact. I imagine
judy would take pleasure in that last bit.
If it isn’t de minimis, and it clearly isn’t Fair Use, then how did Taylor and Pomegranate
Arts do it? I’ll explain. Earlier in this chapter I said that it was significant where this show was
developed: in cabaret spaces. Cabaret venues contract with Performing Rights Organizations

80. Leval, 1117.
81. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 (1985), 566.
82. Leval, 1124-5.
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(PROs) such as The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), which facilitate nondramatic performance licensing for a number
of use cases, including elevator music, telephone hold music, and live performances at music
venues. Nondramatic refers not to the nature of the work being licensed, but to the presentation
context. In other words, a PRO contract allows for a cover band to play a set including songs by
Bruce Springsteen and Stephen Sondheim, but does not cover the use of pop music as
underscoring in a play or dance performance. If the public performance is nondramatic, then a
PRO such as ASCAP or BMI can be used to negotiate what are called “small rights.” If the song
is to be used in a dramatic context, then “grand rights” must be obtained. While small rights are
lower in cost and complication (they are negotiated via a blanket contract with the PRO, who
disperses licensing fees according to play counts and set lists from contracted venues), grand
rights are much more costly, and must be negotiated on a case by case basis directly with the
rights holders. At this point, it should come as no surprise to my reader that these critical terms—
dramatic and nondramatic—which determine how, and at what cost, a song is licensed, have no
legal definition.83 Of course they don’t.
Courts, then, must engage any number of tests when determining whether a use
necessitates small or grand rights. One, proposed by the former General Attorney of ASCAP
Herman Finkelstein, suggests that nondramatic performances of a song are delivered “without

83. See Marilee Bradford, “From Tin Pan Alley to Title 17: Distinguishing Dramatic from
Nondramatic Musical Performance Rights,” Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review 7
(1987): 45-78.
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dialogue, scenery or costumes.”84 This definition was considered to be too broad by Melville
Nimmer (father of the aforementioned legal scholar David Nimmer), who offered instead a test
suggested to him by the late R. Monta of Metro-Goldwin-Mayer: “Delete the proposed musical
performance from the production … if after such deletion the continuity or story line of the
production is in no way impeded or obscured, then the proposed performance is nondramatic—
otherwise it is dramatic.”85 This test suggests that if removing a song affects the narrative of a
production, that song is serving a dramatic function and said use requires grand rights.86 Ralph
Jackson, then-director of BMI, said in 2006 that BMI looks at an event’s playbill, billing, and
reviews for evidence of the dramatic: a credited choreographer, for example, could suggest that a
production is not eligible for a small rights blanket license.87
Taylor crafted A 24-Decade History of Popular Music bit by bit, decade by decade, in
downtown cabaret venues; but when it premiered in its full, twenty-four-hour glory, it had
become something greater than the sum of its parts. While the show transformed in scale and
84. Herman Finkelstein, “The Composer and the Public Interest. Regulation of Performing Right
Societies,” Law and Contemporary Problems 19.2 (1954), 283. ASCAP agrees. On their help
page, they say “As a general rule a dramatic performance usually involves using the work to tell
a story or as part of a story or plot. Thus, when songs are employed as part of a dramatic
production - a Broadway musical such as Hamilton or in a ballet such as Twyla Tharp's "Nine
Sinatra Songs", for example - the performances of the music are dramatic and are beyond the
scope of an ASCAP license.” See “ASCAP Licensing: Frequently Asked Topics,” ASCAP,
accessed November 2, 2019, https://www.ascap.com/help/ascap-licensing.
85. R. Monta, quoted in Bradford, 61.
86. Bradford challenges this test, noting “It was not until the landmark 1943 musical Oklahoma!
that songs became so integrated into a musical as to be essential to or supportive of the plot.”
Bradford, 61.
87. Jack Vees, “Deal or No Deal, a Grand Rights Primer,” New Music Box, accessed November
2, 2019, https://nmbx.newmusicusa.org/deal-or-no-deal-a-grand-rights-primer/.
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ambition, it still operated under the same nondramatic small rights licenses. “How can I do what
Taylor did?” is the question I am always asked. Maybe the question should be “can I do what
Taylor did?” In search of an answer, I will now apply each of the above tests to A 24-Decade
History of Popular Music. First, does this production include dialogue, scenery, or costumes? Yes
on all three counts, especially costumes. Next, can you remove the songs without disrupting or
obscuring the continuity or storyline? Certainly not—the songs are not only a carefully curated
sample of—as the title suggests—popular music from each decade, but they are also expertly
juxtaposed and narratively deconstructed to make a critical statement on American history. Last,
is there playbill evidence that this is a dramatic work? Yes—the title page billing includes a
director, choreographic consultant, three designers, and a production stage manager.88
According to these three tests, we can confidently argue that A 24-Decade History is a
dramatic work and not eligible for small rights licensing. If, however, we applied the same three
tests to the cabaret concerts that collectively became A 24-Decade History, we might arrive at a
different conclusion, especially when we consider the collaborators billed on the title page: one
designer is listed, with no director, stage manager, or choreographic consultant.89 Still, the songs
are and always have been integral to the storytelling, and that test (offered by Nimmer) is the
most highly regarded in the courts. Can we identify the moment it became dramatic? Was it
always dramatic? I contend that it was and continues to be always at once dramatic and
88. “Program: A 24-Decade History of Popular Music,” Center for the Art of Performance,
UCLA, accessed November 2, 2019, https://cap.ucla.edu/data/notes/
193_TaylorMac_HP_FINAL_Webpdf.pdf.
89. “Program: Taylor Mac’s 24-Decade History of Popular Music: The 1920s,” Lincoln Center
Presents: American Songbook, accessed November 2, 2019, http://w.americansongbook.org/
2014/assets/img/download/03-05-Taylor-Mac.pdf.
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nondramatic—becoming-dramatic. Taylor describes the work as “music theater” (dramatic),
while Pomegranate Arts describes it as a “concert series” (nondramatic).90 Both are true at once
in this formal, critical, legal dialectic. At the start of this chapter, I said that “at 2:30am, Taylor’s
setlist crossed an invisible yet aggressively guarded American border—the border between the
Public Domain and Private Copyright.” I was wrong. Taylor doesn’t cross the copyright border—
judy inhabits it. The border becomes a site for radical resistance, a space to critique the past and
present of American cultural production, and the legacy of discrimination and coloniality
indexed in the American songbook. Taylor employs a strategy that cultural critic Walter D.
Mignolo termed border gnoseology: “absorbing and displacing hegemonic forms of knowledge
into the perspective of the subaltern.”91 In A 24-Decade History, Taylor absorbs the the American
songbook into a queer imaginary, and personally displaces its authors. But Taylor also leverages
the instability and vaguery of copyright to displace hegemonic systems of knowledge production.
Copyright is a broken system—one that has not evolved to meet our present cultural and
technological moment. I offer this case study of A 24-Decade History of Popular Music as an
exception that proves this truth. Some, like Taylor Mac, are able to bend this broken system to
their creative purpose, but many are stymied—creatively, dramaturgically—by the
incompatibility of live performance and copyright. Intellectual property scholar Lionel Bently
observed that “indeed, it has been argued that the death of the author in literary theory has

90. “A 24-Decade History of Popular Music,” Pomegranate Arts, accessed November 2, 2019,
https://www.pomegranatearts.com/project/a-24-decade-history-of-popular-music/.
91. Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories / Global Designs (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000), 12.
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already been paralleled by the demise of copyright and its replacement with trademarks law.”92
In the chapters that follow, I will offer three alternative legal/dramaturgical frameworks (one of
which is, as Bently suggests, trademark law), each of which enable a more discursive, read-write
cultural practice.

92. Bently, 976.
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Chapter Two: Creative Commons
Consider, if you will, the Read-Write Artist’s dilemma. Consider Taylor Mac, the subject
of our previous chapter. Taylor is the consummate Read-Write artist—judy’s work samples from
other compositions in a way that is discursive and indexical, and that challenges traditional (and
legal) notions of authorship. Taylor is also an author—a commercially successful playwright
who directly benefits from traditional (and legal) notions of authorship. This is not just judy’s
dilemma, it is the dilemma faced by all artists in the Read-Write Theatre. Their progressive,
samples-based approach to authorship paradoxically poses a threat to their own authorship.
In order to fully appreciate the complexity of this dilemma, and to imagine possible
solutions, we will play a little game. My game, the Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma, is modeled on
a popular game theory experiment that was first published by the RAND Corporation in 1952.1
In what could be described as a game of three-dimensional rock, paper, scissors, a pair of noncooperative participants decide between two strategies; as they decide, each is ignorant of the
other’s choice, but they do have access to the full matrix of outcomes. As evidence of the value
of storytelling, this game only penetrated the public consciousness because mathematician Albert
Tucker narratized it and gave it a catchy name: The Prisoner’s Dilemma.2 In a letter to the
game’s original designers, Tucker explained the scenario he authored:
Two men, charged with a joint violation of the law, are held separately by the police.
Each is told that

1. Merrill M. Flood, “Some Experimental Games,” RAND Corporation, June 20, 1952, accessed
November 27, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM789-1.html.
2. William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma (New York: Anchor Books, 1993), 116.
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(1) if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be given a reward . . . and the
latter will be fined . . .
(2) if both confess, each will be fined . . .
At the same time, each has good reason to believe that
(3) if neither confesses, both will go clear.3
In Tucker’s scenario each prisoner is informed that the other prisoner has been offered the same
deal, and that they both must decide whether to confess—without knowing what their compatriot
has decided. The matrix of decisions in this game is usually represented thusly:
Prisoner B silent

Prisoner B confesses

Prisoner A silent Both cleared of charges
Prisoner A confesses B fined, A cleared

A fined, B cleared
Both fined

Figure 3.1. A Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome matrix.
The tension in this game is between self-interest and common interest. If either prisoner pursues
their own self interest and confesses, they have a 50% chance of being fined; and if both act in
their own self-interest, they share in the worst outcome. For both prisoners to walk away free and
clear, they would have to invest in a common interest, choosing to stay silent in good faith.
Over the past half-century, this game has been adapted for countless permutations and
applications, including economics, business management, global politics, environmental science,
and philosophy. In my version of the game, The Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma, two noncooperative artists must decide whether to sample each other’s work. While there are legal
consequences for such sampling in the real world, the consequences in this game are not
3. Poundstone, 117-8.
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punitive, but rather exclusively economic. Each artist has invested a certain amount of time,
resources, and labor to develop their work of art, and seeks to exploit the surplus value of their
own artistic product through presentation fees and licensing. This is how artists recoup
investment costs and make a living. If one Read-Write artist samples another’s work, they are in
effect exploiting the surplus value of the other artist’s creative labor, time, and resources. While
it is a contested assertion, we will for now assume that sampling has a negative impact on the
value of the original sampled work, and further that a sampling artist is able charge a lower price
and/or recognize greater profits for their work since they do not have to reflect the initial
development and production costs in their pricing.4 This fact is demonstrated in the previous
chapter: if Taylor Mac were required to license all of the songs for A 24-Decade History of
Popular Music, those costs would make the production a financial impossibility. However, since
Taylor does not need to reflect the development and production costs of those nearly 100
copyright-protected compositions, judy is able to charge a lower presenting fee and also exploit
the value of those composers’ labor as judy’s own profit.
Given these assumptions for our game—(1) that the only negative consequence to
sampling is economic; (2) that sampling negatively impacts the value of an original work; and
(3) that sampling (or, infringing) lowers production costs for the sampler—the matrix for The
Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma is as follows:

4. See chapter 6 of McLeod and DiCola, Creative License, in which the authors calculate the full
cost of two samples-rich albums, Paul’s Boutique and Fear of a Black Planet.
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Artist B observes copyright Artist B samples
Artist A observes copyright Good for both

Best for B, Worst for A

Artist A samples Best for A, Worst for B

Bad for both

Figure 3.2. A Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma outcome matrix.
If both artists observe copyright law and refrain from sampling, both are able to enjoy the
monetary fruits of their own labor. This is a good outcome for both. If, however, either artist
chooses to sample the other’s work while the other artist refrains, the sampling artist is able to
exploit their own creative labor as well as, to a lesser degree, the labor of their fellow artist. As
the matrix identifies, this is the best outcome for one artist, economically, and the worst for the
other. If both artists sample each other, there is an overall decrease in value on original works,
but both enjoy the marginal economic benefit of sampling. To make these outcomes more
legible, I offer a simple numeric model:
Artist B observes copyright Artist B samples
Artist A observes copyright Each artist earns $3
Artist A samples $4 for A, $1 for B

$4 for B, $1 for A
Each artist earns $2

Figure 3.3. A numerical Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma outcome matrix.
Assuming:
1) That the original value of each artist’s work is $3
2) That the value of the original work is diminished to $1 when sampled
3) That the sampler derives $1 in value from sampling
As is the case with the original Prisoner’s Dilemma, the tension is between self-interest
and common-interest. If common-interest prevailed, both artists would observe copyright, since
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that yields the greatest total value for our micro cultural economy: $6. However, each artist is
compelled, following their own self-interest, to pursue the outcome that guarantees the greatest
individual financial benefit ($4 rather than $3), even if this strategy could lead to a mutual
economic loss, and the weakest micro cultural economy.
I am not the first to consider copyright through the lens of The Prisoner’s Dilemma. In a
2018 article in the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal, Adam
D. Moore uses a variation of the game to argue the need for intellectual property protections,
showing the sub-optimal outcomes that could emerge in an unregulated creative economy
governed by self-interest.5 Moore warns that self-interest could lead to a systemic failure that
would “inevitably spiral toward the collectively sub-optimal result of suppressing innovation and
content creation.”6 He argues that legal protections—such as those afforded by copyright—and
the corresponding fines for infringement are “all that is needed to avoid sub-optimal results . . .
making cooperation or not copying, the prudent act.”7 Fines would offset the financial benefits of
infringing, thereby making mutual observation of copyright the only strategy that satisfies selfinterest and yields a desirable outcome for the economy. Moore gestures to Thomas Hobbes’
Leviathan, in which the philosopher observes that “if any two men desire the same thing, which

5. Adam D. Moore, “Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory
Justifification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets,” Fordham Intellectual Property, Media
and Entertainment Law Journal 28.4 (2018): 831-69.
6. Moore, 868.
7. Moore, 862.
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nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;” Hobbes argues that a strong
government—a Leviathan—is needed to encourage and enforce cooperation.8
A heavy-handed Leviathan might seem to be a drastic solution, since although the game
assumes non-cooperative participants, one hopes that people could—over time—learn to
cooperate and pursue a shared interest. Moore, however, rightly observes that any sort of tit-fortat strategy (either mutual exploitation or the opposite, abstention) only makes sense within the
context of the game. It assumes that all players are equally invested and carry the same risk—
that they are all content consumers and producers. Although we may be moving, as Lawrence
Lessig optimistically observes, toward a Read-Write culture wherein cultural production is not
professionalized and unidirectional, we still presently exist in a cultural economy designed with
—and which frankly depends on—sharp distinctions between cultural producers and consumers
(democratized culture platforms such as YouTube and the like notwithstanding). Moore argues
that outside the game, in the real world, “content consumers would have no compelling reason to
adopt a tit-for-tat strategy because they have nothing to copy.”9 Mutually assured destruction
depends on both sides having something to lose. Moore’s thinking is clearly shaped by the
theories of ecologist Garrett Hardin, who he cites a number of times in the article. Hardin sums
up the dilemma thusly: “If everyone would restrain himself, all would be well; but it takes only
one less than everyone to ruin a system of voluntary restraint. In a crowded world of less than

8. Thomas Hobbes, qtd in David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political
Theory of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 15.
9. Moore, 847.
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perfect human beings, mutual ruin is inevitable if there are no controls. This is the tragedy of the
commons.”10
The “tragedy of the commons” is an oft-cited concept that suggests humans are not
capable of holding things in common without bringing it to ruin through selfishness. Hardin
offers the following parable in his ecological essay on scarcity:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as
many cattle as possible on the commons . . . As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to
maximize his gain . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system
that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society
that believes in the freedom of the commons.11
Hardin ponders, “how do we legislate temperance?”12 His solution to the ruin of the commons is
to place legal restrictions on use, for mutual benefit. Like Moore after him, Hardin contends that
government can induce cooperation, thereby resolving the dilemma.
My reader is forgiven for finding Hardin’s argument persuasive, as I have not yet
disclosed the essay section that follows the quote above: “Freedom to Breed is Intolerable.”13 In

10. Garrett Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,” Psychology Today 8,
(1974): 805.
11. Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1244.
12. Ibid., 1246.
13. Ibid., 1246.
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this next section, Hardin reveals his true purpose and, to again quote Read-Write artist Toshi
Reagon, “it’s all about race.” Hardin asks, “in a welfare state, how shall we deal with the family,
the religion, the race, or the class (or indeed any distinguishable and cohesive group) that adopts
overbreeding as a policy to secure its own aggrandizement.”14 It’s no wonder that the Southern
Poverty Law Center identifies Garrett Hardin as a white nationalist, stating that he “used his
status as a famous scientist and environmentalist to provide a veneer of intellectual and moral
legitimacy for his underlying nativist agenda.”15 What is surprising, however, is how widely
“The Tragedy of the Commons” is still cited today in scholarship, despite his overt racism and
xenophobia. In a Scientific American blog post, environmental policy scholar Matto
Mildenberger calls for a rejection of Hardin’s metaphor, noting that “it’s hard to overstate
Hardin’s impact on modern environmentalism . . . His essay remains an academic blockbuster,
with almost 40,000 citations. It still gets republished in prominent environmental anthologies.”16
In “The Tragedy of the Commons,” mankind—or, rather, non-whites—are portrayed in what
Hobbes would describe as a state of “perpetual and restless desire,” and only through legislation
are we able to control this desire.17 We property the commons to stave off ruin.

14. Ibid., 1246.
15. “Garrett Hardin,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/garrett-hardin.
16. Matto Mildenberger, “The Tragedy of the Tragedy of the Commons,” Scientific American,
accessed November 27, 2020, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/the-tragedy-of-thetragedy-of-the-commons/.
17. Hobbes, qtd in Gauthier, 14.
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Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom notes that Hardin was not the first to suggest this human
tendency, citing his many antecedents going back to Aristotle, who said, “what is common to the
greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.”18 Commons anxiety is as old as western
democracy, which presents an interesting contradiction since the latter assumes an ability to
collectively self-govern, while the former proclaims that as an impossibility. Ostrom argues, “the
paradox that individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes seems to
challenge a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve rational results.”19 Her
book offers a defense of humankind and its capacity to act rationally and collectively. It’s
important to note that Ostrom’s foil, Hardin, did not choose the word “tragedy” to suggest a
sadness or loss, but rather he used philosopher Alfred North Whitehead’s definition of tragic
theatre to point to the inevitable “remorseless working of things.”20 For both Hardin and Ostrom,
it is more than a question of behavior—it is a question of ontology. Ostrom identifies an inherent
problem with Hardin’s theory: when confronted with the tragedy of the commons, scholars and
policy-makers consider one of two opposing modes of governance: a public authority
(legislation) or free market (privatization). In Governing the Commons, published in 1990,
Ostrom rejected this simple binary and offered a model in which the participants “make a
binding contract to commit themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will work

18. Qtd in Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015), 2.
19. Ibid., 5.
20. Hardin, “Tragedy,” 162.
82

out.”21 Ten years later, in 2002, a California non-profit created such a binding cooperative
contract for the cultural economy.
Founded by Lawrence Lessig and Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Creative Commons
“helps overcome legal obstacles to the sharing of knowledge and creativity” by offering a bundle
of easy and free-to-use license agreements.22 Lessig, having long been an advocate for free
culture, recognized a lack of middle ground solutions for read-write cultural production: on one
side is copyright, with “all rights reserved;” on the other is the public domain, free for use
without restriction. Some point to Fair Use as a middle ground solution, but as we explored in
the previous chapter, not only is Fair Use narrowly-defined, it is a legal defense, not a set of
permissions.23 Lessig considered Fair Use to be “a terrible structure on which to build freedom”
since “everything is a constant debate.”24 He and his colleagues at Creative Commons designed a
new model for Read-Write cultural exchange: a series of legal addenda that work with existing
copyright laws to create a new middle ground solution, what they cheekily refer to as “some
rights reserved.”25 They offer a solution to the “tragedy of the commons”: cooperation.

21. Ostrom, 15.
22. “What We Do,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
creativecommons.org/about/.
23. For more on this, see David Bollier’s history of Creative Commons, Viral Spiral (New York:
New Press, 2009), 94.
24. Qtd in Bollier, 94.
25. “Frequently Asked Questions,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
creativecommons.org/faq/#what-does-some-rights-reserved-mean.
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Creative Commons presently offers six license agreements, each one a permutation of a
core agreement. The Creative Commons website features a simple tool for choosing a license,
asking artists to identify which of the following permissions they wish to grant to users:
1. Can the user create derivative works (adaptations, samples, remixes)?
1a. If yes, are they required to offer their derivative work with the same Creative
Commons license? This is known as the Share Alike provision.
2. Are commercial uses allowed?26
A playwright, for example, might choose to allow others to create derivative noncommerical
works, using her script, as long as the resulting work is offered under the same license agreement
—or, in the parlance of Creative Commons, as long as the sampler agrees to share alike. In this
case, she would be using the Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike license.27

Figure 3.4. Creative Commons license icons.
If, however, she chooses to not allow derivative works—meaning fellow artists could
only use the script, unedited and in its entirety, in the creation of a new work—she would choose

26. “Share Your Work,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
creativecommons.org/share-your-work/.
27. “Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27,
2020, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/.
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the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license.28 Any use case that falls outside of the
permissions outlined in a Creative Commons license is governed by the terms of copyright. If,
for example, a filmmaker approaches our playwright to use her script—which is available on an
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license—for a commercial film, the Creative Commons
license would not apply and the filmmaker would need to license said script from the playwright
directly. With Creative Commons, the artist allows her work to become part of a rhizomatic
cultural economy. But make no mistake, the author is not dead (as Roland Barthes would have us
believe); she’s just sleeping, and she’ll wake up when a commercial opportunity comes along.
A brief aside for an important point of clarification: nonprofit is not the same as
noncommercial. In its licenses, Creative Commons defines commercial use as “any manner that
is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or monetary compensation.”29
Creative Commons further clarifies that “the definition of NonCommercial depends on the
primary purpose for which the work is used, not on the category or class of reuser.”30 Nonprofit
is a class of reuser, noncommercial is a purpose. This distinction proved to be so confounding
that Creative Commons commissioned a 2009 study, sponsored by the Mellon Foundation, to
determine how people interpret and understand the word “commercial.”31 I offer this point of

28. “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0,” Creative Commons, accessed November
27, 2020, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
29. Ibid.
30. “NonCommercial Interpretation,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/NonCommercial_interpretation.
31. “Defining NonCommercial,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
wiki.creativecommons.org/Defining_Noncommercial.
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clarification so as to not reinforce a seemingly popular misconception that Creative Commons
offers nonprofit arts organizations a way around copyright.
What makes the Creative Commons licenses truly revolutionary is their layered form.
Each license is made available in three languages, acknowledging different constituencies and
the importance of legibility. All three layers of the agreement articulate the license in a different
vernacular: the “Legal Code” offers the traditional legalese meant for courts and lawyers; the
“Commons Deed” is the human readable version, and while it is not legally-enforceable, it
allows for a shared understanding between artists; and the third layer is a machine readable
digital code that allows for Creative Commons licensed works to be indexed and accessed on the
internet.
This layered approach made Creative Commons a more accessible solution to Read-Write
artists; it required neither legal literacy to license nor computer literacy to share. In under two
decades, use of Creative Commons licenses has risen exponentially, reaching nearly 1.5 billion
works in 2017. Creative Commons works are indexed on YouTube and photo sharing site Flickr,
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and all of Wikipedia carries a Creative Commons license.32 You may not have noticed it before,
but at the bottom of every Wikipedia page, it reads “text is available under the Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.” Recently, the music group Nine Inch Nails chose to
include raw music track data with their new albums, available under a Creative Commons
license, to make their work more accessible for fan remixes and Read-Write discursivity.33 This
is the Read-Write cultural exchange Lessig imagines in his book, Remix. In the introduction to
Remix, Lessig recounts a story about composer John Philip Sousa who, testifying before
Congress in 1906, decried the “infernal machines” of his day—gramophones—proclaiming that
“we will not have a vocal cord left.”34 Sousa feared that these machines would turn everyone into
consumers, and that we would lose an appreciation for amateur expression. He was right. But
with Creative Commons and our new “infernal machines,” computers, a new Read-Write cultural
economy emerges.
Creative Commons is part of a larger shift in how intellectual property is regarded.
Jessica Reyman sees this as a rhetorical shift, a movement from individual ownership to
collective accountability. In her book, The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property, Reyman identifies a
pervasive narrative, what she calls “the property stewardship narrative,” which suggests that
“copyright law protects the interests of content owners from those who would otherwise exploit

32. “State of the Commons,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
stateof.creativecommons.org.
33. “Case Studies/Nine Inch Nails Ghosts I-IV,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27,
2020, https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/case_Studies/Nine_Inch_Nails_Ghosts_I-IV.
34. Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (New
York: Penguin, 2008), 25.
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their works through unauthorized reproduction and distribution.”35 The property stewardship
narrative portrays a vulnerable rights holder who must be protected from pirates who steal
intellectual property with abandon. As we explored in the previous chapter, this narrative can be
traced, in part, to John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, which Reyman identifies as
“seminal to property rights in the U.S.”36 Locke connects ownership of a property to the labor
performed on it—“the Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly
his.”37 In the property stewardship narrative, a labor of intellect is a property, deserving of the
same protections under the law as a parcel of land. This is not a postmodern, intellectual
interpretation of Locke; it is substantiated by his contemporary, Richard Atkyns, a Cavalier who
—following the English civil war—attempted to secure a privilege dating back to Queen
Elizabeth I on common law book printing.38 Atkyns argued the merit of such a patent:
The King . . . hath a great Quantity of Ground . . . And the Neighbours thereabouts, do
not only eat the Herbage, but steal the Kings Deer, and destroy his Woods . . . To prevent
which Mischief, the King Incloseth several Parks, and gives the keeping of them to
several Persons by Patent . . . Just so is it by Inclosing Printing; the King (having the
Right thereof, as much as of any Crown-Lands) Grants all sorts of Books . . . it will much

35. Jessica Reyman, The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law and the Regulation of
Digital Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010), 59.
36. Ibid., 54.
37. Qtd in Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2011), 126.
38. Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2009), 31-4.
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concern these Patentees, in Honour and Profit both, to see their several Grants be not
Trespassed upon, nor Corrupted by others.39
The argument is plain, and remains pervasive today: an intellectual property is a private property,
and legal protections are required to keep people from poaching on it.
Even Michel de Certeau, whom I have cast in this dissertation as a sort of Read-Write
proponent, reaffirms the property stewardship narrative in The Practice of Everyday Life.” He
writes:
Far from being writers—founders of their own place . . . readers are travelers; they move
across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across fields
they did not write.40
While Certeau’s argument is simply that consuming is not a passive act, Reyman’s point
remains: the rhetoric of property stewardship has successfully infiltrated our cultural
understanding and has defined our social and legal relationship to intellectual property.
With the rise of commons-based solutions such as Creative Commons, Reyman has noted
a corresponding rhetorical shift toward collective accountability. She identifies an emergent
“cultural conservancy narrative” that “emphasizes the importance of protecting access to existing
works, which have become ‘endangered resources,’ for ongoing intellectual and creative

39. Richard Atkyns, The Original and Growth of Printing Collected Out of History, and the
Records of this Kingdome (London: John Streeter, 1664), retrieved from https://
quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A26139.0001.001/1:5?rgn=div1;view=fulltext.
40. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2008), 174.
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expression in our culture.”41 This narrative is based on the concept of cultural environmentalism
first proposed in James Boyle’s Shamans, Software, and Spleens in 1996.42 Note Reyman’s use
of the words “endangered resources;” here, too, we see an intellectual-property-as-land rhetorical
framework. Commons advocates use this metaphor to make an ecological argument for cultural
cooperation. They suggest that culture is a common interest, and that without conservation
efforts many creative works will go to ruin. It’s worth remembering, however, that commons
opponents like Hardin have used the same ecological strategy to argue for legal remedies and
privatization.
Reyman’s research illuminates how fear is used to reinforce the dominant property
steward narrative. She observes a pervasive rhetoric that is marked by a “fear that new
technological developments will alter the cultural landscape in such a way that the production of
intellectual and creative works will fundamentally change in a negative way, perhaps even
ceasing to exist altogether.”43 Reyman quotes songwriter Michelle Lewis, who asserted in a 2007
anti-piracy classroom video that “people value what they pay for and if it’s free, it’s like
wallpaper, it’s like air, it’s like water. It becomes disposable.”44 This fear correlates with my
Read-Write Artist’s Dilemma matrix: in the lower right square, we see that mutual exploitation
ensures not only the worst individual outcome, but also overall ruin of the economy.

41. Reyman, 75.
42. James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
43. Reyman, 46.
44. Qtd in Reyman, 46.
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Artist B observes copyright Artist B samples
Artist A observes copyright Each artist earns $3
Artist A samples $4 for A, $1 for B

$4 for B, $1 for A
Each artist earns $2

Figure 3.3. Repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
However, this outcome, and this fear, is incongruous with the widespread adoption of Creative
Commons (a community that facilitates mutual exploitation), so much so that I must reconsider
the underlying assumptions of this game. I focus particularly on assumption #2, as it exemplifies
the rhetoric of the property stewardship narrative: that sampling negatively impacts the value of
an original work. While this assumption is foundational for most copyright litigation, and is a
critical determinant for Fair Use, recent empirical studies have suggested that sampling has no
negative impact on the value of an original work, and further that sampling has been shown to
result in increased sales of the sampled work.45
If we remove from our matrix the negative economic impact of sampling, a radically
different set of outcomes emerges.
Artist B observes copyright Artist B samples
Artist A observes copyright Each artist earns $3
Artist A samples $4 for A, $3 for B

$4 for B, $3 for A
Each artist earns $4

Figure 3.6. RW Artist’s Dilemma outcome matrix, adjusted.

45. See Michael W. Schuster, David M. Mitchell, and Kenneth Brown, “Sampling Increases
Music Sales: An Empirical Copyright Study,” American Business Law Journal 177 (2019):
177-229, and William M. Schuster, “Fair Use, Girl Talk, and Digital Sampling: An Empirical
Study of Music Sampling's Effect on the Market for Copyrighted Works,” Oklahoma Law
Review 67.3 (2015): 443-519.
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Assuming:
1) That the original value of each artist’s work is $3
2) That the value of the original work is not diminished when sampled
3) That the sampler derives $1 in value from sampling
In this matrix, we see that mutual exploitation is not only individually optimal, it is also the best
outcome for the economy as a whole. Further, we see that mutual abstention (meaning, no one
samples anyone) is the path to economic ruin. Strict observance of copyright law means
everyone loses; in the context of the game, everyone should agree to infringe on each other’s
copyright. Moore reminds us that such a tit-for-tat strategy only works in the game because all
participants are cultural producers, meaning they offer something to be sampled while sampling.
And therein lies the brilliance of Creative Commons: it represents a micro economy in which all
participants are producers and consumers, and all share alike. It is, to borrow from anthropologist
Victor Turner, a liminal cultural space, separated from the dominant mode of cultural production;
and the Read-Write creators it empowers are a communitas of equal individuals.46 It does not
seek to displace the traditional, Read-Only cultural industry (nor could it); Creative Commons is
—like the licenses it offers—a legal addendum to traditional cultural production.
Surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly, given how technologically regressive theatre
tends to be as a form) there has not been any significant adoption of Creative Commons in the
theatre. While several news outlets and website have erroneously stated that Mike Daisey has
offered a new draft of The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs (a work we addressed in the

46. Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine Publishing,
1969), 95.
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introduction) with a Creative Commons license, the truth is that Daisey chose to offer it with a
royalty-free license for all derivative uses and public performances.47 Despite the prevalence of
Creative Commons in music, photography, scholarship, and film, I was in fact only able to find
one significant artist in theatre or contemporary performance who made work available with a
Creative Commons license: choreographer Merce Cunningham.
The story of how Cunningham came to Creative Commons is a dramatic tale of an artist’s
reckoning with their craft and their mortality. Even in his later years, despite his recognition and
prolific catalog (of over 150 original choreographic works), Cunningham did not plan for his
death. Whenever the question of his estate and his copyrights came up, Cunningham’s executive
director Trevor Carlson says he “skirted the issue.”48 But after the summer of 2000, what Siva
Vaidhayanathan calls “the Summer without Martha Graham,” Cunningham began to think about
his legacy.49 When she died in 1991, Graham—Cunningham’s onetime mentor—had bequeathed
the copyrights to her dances to her friend, Ron Protas, who took leadership of her company. In
2000, after months of friction with the ensemble, he was fired from his position as artistic
director of the Martha Graham Dance Company. Protas retaliated by refusing to license her

47. See, as an example, Claire Lawton, “Ron May Explores the Sad Evolution of Mankind in
The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs,” Phoenix New Times, October 4, 2012, accessed
November 27, 2020, https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/arts/ron-may-explores-the-sadevolution-of-mankind-in-the-agony-and-ecstasy-of-steve-jobs-6578446.
48. Diane Solway, “When the Choreographer is Out of the Picture,” New York Times, January 7,
2007, accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/arts/dance/
07solw.html.
49. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How
It Threatens Creativity (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 185.
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choreography to the Company; the Company in turn implored other ensembles to refrain from
licensing and performing her work. Hence, “the Summer without Martha Graham.”50
Shortly thereafter, Laura Kuhn, a friend of Cunningham, asked the choreographer if he
owned the copyright to his works, to which he replied, “I don’t know.”51 Kuhn conveyed to the
New York Times that Cunningham was “‘horrified’ to discover in his eighties that his artistic
legacy was at risk, that he might not hold the right to decide if, how and where his dances were
to be performed.”52 Cunningham quickly transferred his rights to a trust to oversee the licensing
and preservation of his works. The Cunningham Trust prevented a “Summer without Merce
Cunningham,” but perhaps more importantly it allowed for Cunningham to sustain his
commitment—as biographer Roger Copeland notes—to “collaborate . . . with materials that lie
beyond the self.”53
Beginning in 2001, Cunningham worked with Marc Downie, Paul Kaiser, and Shelley
Eshkar (collectively the OpenEnded Group) on a new digital art project based on his solo hand
dance, Loops, with the support of the Mellon Foundation.54 This digital artwork was part of a
larger preservation effort by the Cunningham Dance Foundation as it prepared to dissolve (and
50. “Renewing the Dance of Martha Graham,” New York Times, July 14, 2000, accessed
November 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/14/opinion/renewing-the-dance-ofmartha-graham.html.
51. Solway.
52. Solway.
53. Roger Copeland, Merce Cunningham: The Modernizing of Modern Dance (New York:
Routledge, 2004), 94.
54. “Case Studies/Loops,” Creative Commons, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Case_Studies/Loops.
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turn its assets over to the Trust).55 Cunningham described the Loops hand dance as “an Event for
soloist,” consisting of several different choreographic sections that could—and must—be
randomly arranged for each performance. It was first performed by Cunningham in 1971 at the
Museum of Modern Art, alongside a painting by Jasper Johns, and each subsequent performance
was completely unique, not only in context but also in composition.56 Loops exemplified a core
principle of Cunningham’s creative project: chance operation. Cunningham was inspired by
Marcel Duchamp’s practice of “canning chance”—a creative process wherein random decisions
(such as drawing musical notes from a bag) prompt new creative solutions and break
compositional habits; desiring such a break from habit, Cunningham began using a coin toss
while choreographing in 1950.57 But Cunningham went beyond Duchamp in his interrogation of
chance—he not only employed randomness in composition, he built variables into the
performance of a work (an example of this being the random sequencing of choreographic
sections in Loops).58
Chance operation produces a number of intellectual property paradoxes: the resulting
work is both singular and reproducible; authorship is both aggressive and abdicated; and, most
important to this dissertation, a chance operation dance is and is not a copyrightable work. In the
55. “Preserving Merce Cunningham’s Loops,” The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, accessed
November 27, 2020, https://mellon.org/grants/grants-database/grants/cunningham-dancefoundation-inc/10700604.
56. “Loops,” Merce Cunningham Trust, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
www.mercecunningham.org/the-work/choreography/loops.
57. Carrie Noland, Merce Cunningham: After the Obituary (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2020), 17.
58. Ibid., 18.
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previous chapter, I demonstrated that two factors make a work a work in the eyes of copyright:
intentionality and fixity. Cunningham’s chance operation destabilizes our understanding of
intentionality by consciously employing randomness, and it confounds legal notions of fixity by
generating dance notation without a singular or authorial ordering. It is fitting, then, that such an
exemplar work of chance operation, Loops, was the foundation upon which Cunningham and the
OpenEnded Group built an intermedial exploration of authorship.
The OpenEnded Group used motion capture technology to transcribe the Loops dance, as
executed by its sole performer, Cunningham. Then, like Cunningham, they took chance a step
further. The capture data was used to create a dynamic “digital portrait,” one that used
algorithmic randomness to create sequences that would never repeat.59 Curiously, while the
randomly generated dances are not protected under copyright law, the software generating said
dances is. The OpenEnded Group code transcribes not only Cunningham’s gestures, but also the
very notion of chance, in a way that is fixed and intentional. Thus, what is copyrighted is
Merce’s intentionality, his hitherto privately obscured decision-making engine.
This new digital version of Loops addressed the question, “as a dance, can it outlive the
now-88-year-old who is its sole performer? As a digital artwork, can it survive the rapid
obsolescence of its hardware and software?”60 The software—what Cunningham considers to be
the “definitive version” of the dance—was made available with an open source license, and the
original choreographic score was released under an Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
59. “Loops,” OpenEnded Group, accessed November 27, 2020, http://openendedgroup.com/
artworks/loops.html.
60. “Loops Cultural Ecology,” OpenEnded Group, accessed November 27, 2020, http://
openendedgroup.com/artworks/loops_culture.html.
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license at a New York Public Library for the Performing Arts event, a year before the
choreographer’s death in 2009.61 While this Creative Commons license allows for Cunningham
to engage in creative collaborations that “lie beyond the self”—beyond his own selfhood—the
digital portrait software, in open source form, serves to “address the practical problems of
keeping the work running.”62 The OpenEnded Group explains:
Our open source license allows future (and even contemporaneous) programmers to
update the work as well as to create their own derivative artworks – they can forge
creative reinterpretations of it in a fashion that will go far beyond the present-day practice
of “remixes,” which operate only on the surface rather than on the structure of the
original work. Thus we are truly entrusting the future preservation and perpetuation of
Loops to unforseen hands.63
Pun intended, I believe. Armed with the underlying rights granted by the Creative Commons
license, along with the open source software code, artists are invited to preserve and expand on
the work of Cunningham and the OpenEnded Group.
The 2009 Boston Cyberarts Festival took up this invitation. With the support of the LEF
Foundation, the festival commissioned four artists—Brian Knep, Golan Levin, Casey Reas, and

61. “Loops: Solo Dance, CC-Licensed,” Creative Commons, February 22, 2008, accessed
November 27, 2020, https://creativecommons.org/2008/02/22/loops-solo-dance-cc-licensed.
62. “Loops Open Source,” OpenEnded Group, accessed November 27, 2020, http://
openendedgroup.com/artworks/loops_open.html.
63. Ibid.
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Sosolimited—to craft digital portraits based on the code and choreographic notation.64
Sosolimited’s portrait, Ascenders & Descenders, offers a three-dimensional typographic
visualization of Cunningham’s hands, tracing the movement of each finger with a trail of words
excerpted from reviews and essays about the choreographer.65 Sosolimited describes the work
thusly: “The piece cannot exist without the feeble words that huff and puff to make sense of
Merce's work. It is, in a sense, a Cunningham dance work reconstructed from textual
deconstructions of other Cunningham dance works.”66

Figure 3.7. Ascenders and Descenders by
Sosolimited. (Video still, from Soso, https://
www.sosolimited.com/work/ascendersdescenders.)

Figure 3.8. Merce’s Isosurface by Golan
Levin. (Video still, from “Merce’s Isosurface,”
Flong, http://flong.com/archive/projects/
merce/index.html.)

Levin’s work, Merce’s Isosurface, bears little resemblance—aesthetically or conceptually
—to Ascenders & Descenders, or to the source code and choreography. He describes his project:
64. “Boston Cyberarts Festival 2009,” Boston Cyberarts, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
www.bostoncyberarts.org/boston-cyberarts-festival-2009.
65. “Ascenders & Descenders,” Sosolimited, accessed November 27, 20202, https://
www.sosolimited.com/work/ascenders-descenders.
66. Ibid.
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[It] returns a mortal coil to the disembodied datapoints of Merce Cunningham's "LOOPS"
performance. Here, the digitally captured coordinates of Cunningham's fingers and
knuckle joints are used to structure a smooth field of simulated energy. The result is a
twitchy, fleshy blob, animated by Cunningham's own movements, which dances in the
liminal territory between pure abstract form and medical information visualization.67
Two months after the Cyberarts Festival, Merce Cunningham shuffled off his mortal coil, but his
dancing hands—and chance operation—live on in smooth fields of simulated energy, twirling
textual deconstructions, and invitations to collaborate in the commons.
I am, admittedly, moved by this story. But I have to acknowledge that Cunningham’s
embrace of Creative Commons is the exception that proves the rule: unlike film, music,
photography, and other creative media, theatre and performance makers have not embraced the
commons. To conclude this chapter, I will explain why this is the case, using a brief story about a
radical experiment that never was. In 2013, the nonprofit consulting firm EmcArts, through their
ArtsFwd platform, launched a national contest called Business Unusual. The program invited
nonprofit arts organizations across the nation to articulate complex challenges in the field and
imagine an adaptive response; the winner would be awarded $35,000 to prototype their new
approach to this complex challenge.68

67. “Merce’s Isosurface (Excerpt),” Vimeo, accessed November 27, 2020, https://vimeo.com/
4272382.
68. “EmcArts Launches ArtsFwd Business Unusual Challenge,” ArtsFwd, March 20, 2013,
accessed November 27, 2020, https://www.artsfwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/BusinessUnusual-Challenge-Press-Release.pdf.
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HowlRound, a theatre communication platform hosted at Emerson College, made a
radical proposal to address economic disparity in the non-profit arts sector, and the problem of
“sweat equity.”69 HowlRound proposed the creation of Culture Coin, a digital peer-to-peer
currency that “put the ‘equity’ back into ‘sweat equity’” by assigning value to uncompensated
arts labor.70 One of the designers of Culture Coin, Vijay Matthews, explains:
Sweat equity is always going to be in the arts . . . it’s very much a labor of love and
passion . . . but this not-for-profit scene is still copying the market world in that these
organizations have so many resources they could give to artists, but they’re not, because
there’s no intentional system in place to make that happen for them . . . You have material
resources like rehearsal space, plus expertise in marketing and communications that could
be leveraged but are not being tapped at the moment.71
Culture Coin would transform the uncompensated labor of theatremaking into currency, which
could then be exchanged for underused institutional—or peer—resources. Arts Emerson artistic
director David Dower gave some examples of “un/underpaid” labor that could be compensated
in Culture Coin:
• Do a 29-hour reading and get the cash fee plus equivalent Culture Coin supplement to
make the wage more respectable—paying the "sweat equity" portion in Culture Coin.

69. “HowlRound – Challenge Semi-Finalist,” ArtsFwd, May 15, 2013, accessed November 27,
2020, https://www.artsfwd.org/challenge-howlround.
70. Ibid.
71. Paul M. Davis, “Culture Coin, An Alternative Currency to Sustain Artists,” Shareable, July
17, 2013, accessed November 27, 2020, https://www.shareable.net/culture-coin-an-alternativecurrency-to-sustain-artists.
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• Volunteer as a script reader, usher, or performer at a benefit, get compensated with
Culture Coin.
• Direct, produce, perform, design, tech a project for a small company (even your own)
where cash is not available for compensation and get paid in Culture Coin granted to
the project from your community CC (Culture Coin) bank.72
Conspicuously absent from these examples is one theatre laborer: the playwright. Combing
through interviews, articles, and project updates, I found no suggestion that playwrights could or
should be compensated with Culture Coin. Theirs is a labor that exists outside of this economic
utopia because, I contend, their work yields the only wholly non-ephemeral, circulable,
copyrightable product. For all of their talk of commons-based solutions, HowlRound still sets the
playwrights and their labor apart. Ushers, performers, designers, producers, technicians do it for
the love and can be offered Culture Coin. But playwrights? Playwrights have to get paid.
This, I argue, is why commons-based solutions have not taken hold in the theatre, and
why Merce Cunningham is the rare example of Creative Commons in performance. Theatre is
filled with progressive leaders like those at HowlRound, who are thinking beyond capitalism and
copyright to imagine new solutions to economic inequity—but their imaginations stop at the
playwright. One could argue that the valorization of the playwright in the United States is a
product of history (they are the original makers of Western theatre, and playwright is the
category of artist most remembered in the canon), sociology (see David Savran’s Highbrow/
Lowdown), or etymology (playwright literally means theatre maker), but I contend that the

72. David Dower, “Practical Applications of the Culture Coin,” HowlRound, May 28, 2013,
accessed November 27, 2020, https://howlround.com/practical-applications-culture-coin.
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reason is purely economic. Playscripts are copyrightable, in ways that the live elements of theatre
simply are not. Plays are the foundation of the theatrical cultural economy: they are the
circulable good, and playwrights are the branding, the trademark. This is the challenge. This is
the limit of commons thinking in the theatre. What if, instead of trying to address this challenge
through legal addenda like Creative Commons, we embrace it? What if we center our ReadWrite theatre economy on branding. In the next chapter, we will move beyond copyright, to
consider a cultural economy built entirely on trademark.
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Chapter Three: Trademark
Seated at the bench, Judge Lucy Koh held a sheet of black glass in each hand above her
head. She pointedly asked Samsung’s attorney, Kathleen Sullivan, whether she could tell which
sheet of black glass—which tablet computer—was made by her client, and which was made by
Apple. “Not at this distance your honor,” replied Sullivan, who was standing at a podium about
ten feet away. This was not the first time Koh had remarked on the similarities between the two
products, so she pressed on. “Can any of Samsung’s lawyers tell me which one is Samsung and
which one is Apple?” she asked aloud. After a moment, one of Samsung’s lawyers was able to
correctly identify their product, the Galaxy Tab.1 But the damage was already done. "It took a
long time to make that distinction," quipped Koh.2 For a judge who claims to reject theatrics in
her courtroom—at another point in this trial, she remarked “I will not let any theatrics or
sideshows distract us from what we are here to do”—this was a remarkably theatrical moment, a
sensation scene from a classic melodrama.3 You could imagine the standing-room only
courtroom gasping in unison.
This sensation scene was more than just good drama; it marks the moment that Apple’s
2012 lawsuit against Samsung shifted from one concerning patent violation to a far more
1. Dan Levine, “Apple must show patents valid in Samsung case - U.S. judge,” Reuters, October
13, 2011, accessed November 27, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
idINIndia-59884420111014.
2. “Samsung’s lawyers make ironic court blunder,” LawyersWeekly, October 27, 2011, accessed
November 27, 2020, https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/18-home-page/folklaw/9412samsung-s-lawyers-make-ironic-court-blunder.
3. “Smartphone patent case: Judge scolds Samsung, lets trial proceed,” Reuters, August 3, 2012,
accessed November 27, 2020, https://www.indiatimes.com/hardware/smartphone-patent-casejudge-scolds-samsung-lets-trial-proceed-34649.html.
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subjective intellectual property dispute based on trade dress. In her instructions to the jury, Koh
explained:
Trade dress is the non-functional physical detail and design of a product, which identifies
the product's source and distinguishes it from the products of others. Trade dress is the
product's total image and overall appearance, and may include features such as size,
shape, color, color combinations, texture, or graphics. In other words, trade dress is the
form in which a person presents a product or service to the market, its manner of display.4
Koh charged the jury with the difficult task of determining whether the form of one product—
size, shape, color—was similar enough to another product to cause customer confusion. But like
Koh’s little sideshow with the tablets, this distillation is overly simplified. Trade dress is a subset
of trademark, so to understand the former it’s critical to first have a grasp on the latter.
Trademark—as it is understood today in the United States— was defined in 1946 with the
Lanham Act: “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a
person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”5 Put more simply,
trademark is brand. Trademark can exist in many forms, including: a company name, such as
Apple or Samsung; a symbol such as, again, an Apple; a color, such as Corning’s pink fiberglass
or jeweler Tiffany’s distinctive hue of blue; a sound, like HBO’s static sound that precedes their
original programming; or the fluted contours of a Coca-Cola bottle.

4. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2013). See “Instructions to
the jury,” case 11-CV-01846-LHK, doc. 1427, 24.
5. 15 U.S. Code § 1127.
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Trademark’s purpose is to indicate the source of a good or service, to instill customer
confidence, and to prevent confusion. When you see that Tiffany blue box, you can expect a
certain quality of good inside. Capitalism has successfully alienated humanity from the material
realities of production; it has obscured the processes by which food, technologies, jewelry, and
more are made, and—perhaps more importantly—by whom they are made. Trademark restores
some portion of consumer awareness, if only to maintain a confident economy. If I get food
poisoning from a McDonald’s hamburger, I know who to sue. To that end, a successful
trademark must be distinctive. It cannot be descriptive of the service or good; that means Mr.
McFeely from Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood would have had a hard time trademarking Speedy
Delivery. A trademark must have “acquired distinctiveness”—a secondary meaning that points
directly to the source.6 An apple is just an apple, but an apple with a bite taken out of it has
acquired distinctiveness in the markets of technology, media, and health. Its secondary meaning
is so recognizable, in fact, one of my son’s first words was “apple”—not because it was his
favorite food, but because it was the logo he saw on the back of my iPhone whenever I took his
photo, which was often.
Most importantly, trademark is not copyright. Although they are lumped together as
intellectual properties, trademark is in many ways the opposite of copyright. Whereas copyright
is a somewhat arbitrary limited-term monopoly, defined and enforced by the government, the
value and duration of a trademark is entirely determined by the market. A strong, defensible
mark is one that has acquired—through use over time—a direct and distinctive relationship to a
product or service. A mark is legally protected only as long as it is recognizable, and registration

6. 15 U.S.C. §1052(f).
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does not guarantee ownership; it only signifies intent to use. It’s critical to note that a
trademark’s value is proportional to its distinctiveness, not its recognizability. A mark can
become so recognizable that it becomes a victim of what trademark lawyers refer to as
“genericide.” Zipper, thermos, aspirin, and escalator were all once strong trademarks, but they
became so universal that they became generic terms for the products they sold. When it was clear
that Band-Aid was going to be genericided, Johnson & Johnson rewrote their famous jingle to
assert that it was not a generic term, but a brand; the lyrics are now “I am stuck on Band-Aid
brand, ‘cause Band-Aid’s stuck on me.”7
Judge Lucy Koh compelled her jury to consider the trade dress—the packaging and nonfunctional design of two different tablet computers—to determine whether customers might
accidentally mistake the source of Samsung’s Galaxy Tab. The jury decided in favor of Apple,
awarding the Cupertino-based corporation $1.06 Billion on the grounds that the South Korean
electronics company Samsung had not only infringed on several patents, but had also willfully
bred customer confusion by copying non-functional design elements of the iPad.8 The term nonfunctional offers a critical distinction: functional design elements—such as touch input
technology and screen dimensions—are protected by design patents which, like copyright, offer
the creator a limited-term monopoly. For a design element to be deemed non-functional—and
therefore deserving of unlimited exclusivity—the US Patent and Trade Office stipulates that it
cannot be “essential to the use or purpose of the article” nor impact “the cost or quality of the

7. Mary Pilon, The Monopolists: Obsession, Fury, and the Scandal Behind the World's Favorite
Board Game, (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2015), 154.
8. Samsung, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079.
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article.”9 The shape of a coke bottle is not essential to its purpose, nor does it impact the cost or
quality of the soft drink. This jury determined that Apple’s design was non-functional, and
distinctive, and therefore protected under the Lanham Act.
Apple’s victory was momentous, but also momentary. Three years later, in 2015, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the damages awarded for trade dress violation,
citing the functionality of Apple’s registered trade dress elements—the shape of the iPad, the
icon design, and the materials used in manufacturing.10 These design elements had not acquired a
distinctive, secondary meaning; they served a functional purpose. It was a short-lived victory, to
be sure, but it’s easy to see why Apple attempted a trade dress argument. So many intellectual
property pundits have declared the patent system broken that there are two episodes of the
popular radio program This American Life dedicated to the lamentation.11 As such, technology
companies have looked for alternative strategies, outside of patent protections, to secure their
properties; hence Apple’s decision to shift from an exclusively patent-based argument to one that
includes trade dress.
Intellectual property scholar Lionel Bently observes (but does not subscribe to) a similar
shift from copyright to trademark. Citing the work of both film theorist Jane Gaines and
sociologist Celia Lury, Bently notes: “it has been argued that the death of the author in literary

9. TMEP §1202.02(A).
10. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
11. Ira Glass, “441: When Patents Attack!,” This American Life, WBEZ, podcast audio, January
6, 2012, https://www.thisamericanlife.org/441/when-patents-attack; and Ira Glass, “496: When
Patents Attack…Part Two!,” This American Life, WBEZ podcast audio, May 31, 2013, https://
www.thisamericanlife.org/496/when-patents-attack-part-two.
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theory has already been paralleled by the demise of copyright and its replacement with trade
marks law . . . The boundaries of copyright law, built on the concept of authorship, no longer
correspond to our ideas of what should be protected.”12 Copyright is predicated on a stable
concept of authorship; copyright defines the rights an author has to an original work, and in turn
the figure of the author defines what constitutes a work. If the author is dead—as Roland Barthes
observed—then copyright has neither guarantor nor beneficiary.
This poststructuralist argument, Bently contends, is purely philosophical and has “no
significant influence on copyright law.”13 I, however, am more aligned with Lury, who notes:
Recent developments in technologies of culture have . . . contributed to a change in
relations of authority between producers and audiences, specifically, a shift in authority
from producers to the audience . . . from copyright to trademark as the principal legal
principle through which rights in intellectual property are constituted in relation to
audience practices.14
It all comes down to a question of fixity. Contemporary copyright law still authorizes producers
(over audiences) because it is built on the pre-digital assumption that a creative work will
eventually be fixed in a tangible form for consumption. The work will be printed, painted,
published. As the work is solidified, so, too, is the meaning. The producer—or, author/publisher
—determines how the work is experienced (in time, space, and physical form) and how it is

12. Bently, 976.
13. Ibid., 977.
14. Celia Lury, Cultural Rights: Technology, Legality and Personality, (London: Routledge,
1993), 8.
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understood as a discrete and autonomous object. This is the pre-digital logic of copyright, which
Lury finds at odds with this cultural moment. Cultural production in the digital age is networked;
audience-driven platforms like Wikipedia and YouTube signal a rapid shift toward a future
wherein fixity is not only unnecessary (since digital, unlike print, can be edited ad infinitum), but
also directly in conflict with a more rhizomatic value system. Pre-digital culture is arborescent—
like a tree, it values permanence, hierarchy, and historical lineage. To quote Deleuze and
Guatarri, “we’re tired of trees . . . they made us suffer too much.”15 Rhizomatic digital culture
liberates and empowers the audience; it cuts down the tree, displacing the singular authority of
the printed text with the relational authority of the hypertext.
Lury observes, consequentially, a shift from copyright to trademark as a means of
propertying intellectual works. This movement aligns with Katherine Hayles’ notion of
posthumanism: copyright is a humanist construct of print culture, and trademark is a posthuman
strategy for the digital age.16 Copyright negotiates the ontological boundaries of culture: it
determines when a work is born and when it dies, entering the economic graveyard that is the
public domain. Literary theorist Paul Saint-Amour goes as far as to frame copyright as a means
of cheating death, since copyright can extend after an author’s life has concluded, or can even be
granted posthumously: “having relinquished his physical body, the dead author would return in

15. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 15.
16. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature,
and Informatics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 27.
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the legal body.”17 Trademark, on the other hand, follows the Tinkerbell rule: a large, networked
audience of consumers have to believe in it—have to recognize it as a brand—for it to live. The
audience—the diverse, networked lot of them—confer meaning and value in a posthuman,
digital culture.
Jane Gaines also tracks the shift from copyright to trademark, but her argument is more
legal than literary. In her essay “Superman and the Protective Strength of the Trademark,” she
tracks the transformation of this iconic superhero from character to symbol. Superman appears as
a character in countless comic books, movies, and television shows, and everywhere he is dying
—economically, that is; his future value is always diminishing as copyrights expire. Worry not,
however, because Superman—like Harry Potter and Mickey Mouse—is a character that has
transcended his narrative purpose to become a trademark. This transformation occurs when a
character appears in several narratives by the same creator, and comes to represent that series, or
even that rights holder (as Mickey’s silhouette does for Disney).18 In trademark, there is the
chance for immortality. While the copyright for Superman comics and movies will eventually
expire, Superman the symbol will live on—and the trademark holders will reap the rewards—as

17. Paul K. Saint-Amour, The Copywrights: Intellectual Property and the Literary Imagination
(Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 2003), 127
18. Jane Gaines, "Superman and the Protective Strength of the Trademark," in Logics of
Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism, ed. Patricia Mellencamp (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990), 182.
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long as he is relevant.19 Therein lies the allure of trademark and trade dress—like the diamond
contained within, the Tiffany blue box is forever.
When Judge Lucy Koh held up those identical black slates, asking if someone could tell
them apart, she encapsulated the rationale for a post-patent and post-copyright economy. Koh’s
theatrics created an unmediated relationship between a product and an audience—between a
work and its reader. In previous chapters I have demonstrated the inadequacies of copyright as a
means of propertying theatre. To recap:
1. Copyright protects only that which is fixed in a tangible form, excluding the critical,
ephemeral element of theatre: performance.
2. Copyright considers public performance to be a means of copying or distributing a
work of art, and not a work of art in and of itself.
3. Copyright creates inequity, valuing some creative labor more than others.
4. Most critically, copyright disregards the audience as co-author of a work; a work is
constituted in itself, and its value and lifespan are determined through legislation.
Trademark, conversely, is a contract with the audience. There is no third party, governmental or
otherwise, to establish the limits of value; economic worth is directly proportional to recognition
and utility. In a trademark-based cultural economy, a work of art is worth only as much as the
value it produces. In a trademark-based cultural economy, authorship and ownership are
19. There are two ways Superman can die, actually, and neither of them involve kryptonite. Lury
explains that for a character like Superman to be a trademarked symbol, he must remain flat.
Rounded characters—characters who undergo change with the passage of time—are protected by
copyright and will someday die (economically and narratologically). Flat characters are
immortal. Lury notes that Superman is, significantly, an immortal alien, but that “with every
human-like act Superman would approach death and so consume himself as an intellectual
property.”
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constantly negotiated, as all works of art inevitably move toward either obscurity (lacking
distinctiveness) or ubiquity (genericide)—in either outcome, the work loses authorship and is
reabsorbed into the public domain.

public domain

authorship/ownership

obscurity

public domain

distinctiveness

ubiquity

Figure 4.1. An authorship and distinctiveness spectrum.
Though my argument—abandoning copyright in favor of a trademark-based cultural
economy—may sound radical, it is not without precedent. I contend that traces of this movement
can be found in the history of American theatre and entertainment media. Our earliest example
predates federal trademark laws, but is nevertheless a valuable starting place as it gestures
toward a market-based (or, reception-based) system of authorship and ownership. For this first
case study, we travel from one American courtroom to another; from a twentieth century
technology trial to a nineteenth century melodrama melee; from Lucy Koh to Boucicault.20
Dion Boucicault was one of the most successful dramatists of his era, having perfected
the melodramatic form. His work was celebrated in its time—and is remembered to this day—
particularly for having introduced the theatrical device known as the “sensation scene.”21
Utilizing the latest advances in stagecraft and technology, these hyper-theatrical moments thrilled
nineteenth-century audiences; in Boucicault’s The Poor of New York, for example, the repentant
20. Yes, I am quite proud of that rhyme.
21. Nicholas Daly, Literature, Technology, and Modernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 18.
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villain, Badger, narrowly escapes a burning building—rendered onstage with live flame and an
actual fire engine!22 Boucicault knew just how to thrill and delight audiences, with nearly 150
plays to his name; he once mused “I can spin out these rough-and-tumble dramas as a hen lays
eggs. It’s a degrading occupation, but more money has been made out of guano than out of
poetry.”23 In the summer of 1868, he premiered After Dark (A Drama of London Life), which
included a sensation scene that, according to the London Times, “rais[ed] the audience to a
perfect fever of excitement.”24 In the play’s climactic conclusion, an army captain is drugged and
left unconscious on the tracks of London’s new underground railroad. With a train rapidly
approaching, a destitute veteran named Old Tom breaks free from captivity and rolls the captain
off the tracks just in the knick of time!25 This sensation scene had a personal relevance for
Boucicault, whose oldest son had died in a train accident, and whose presumed father Dionysius
Lardner was a self-proclaimed, and reckless, locomotive experimentalist.26
Having conquered the London stage, Boucicault sold the New York rights to After Dark
to Henry Palmer and Henry Jarrett.27 The New York production opened in November 1868, and
22. Ibid.
23. Quoted in A World History of Railway Cultures, ed. Matthew D. Esposito, (London:
Routledge, 2020), 37.
24. Ibid., 36.
25. Dion Boucicault, After Dark: A Drama of London Life in 1868, PDF file, accessed November
27, 2020, https://ia800806.us.archive.org/34/items/afterdarkdramaof00bouc/
afterdarkdramaof00bouc.pdf, 27.
26. Daly, Literature, Technology, and Modernity, 21.
27. Bruce E. Boyden, “Daly v. Palmer, or the Melodramatic Origins of the Ordinary Observer,”
Syracuse Law Review 68.1 (2018): 147.
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Palmer and Jarrett were instantly hit with an injunction. They were barred from presenting the
railroad sensation scene because it—as complainant Augustin Daly argued—violated the
copyright of his play, Under the Gaslight. In his play, the heroine, Laura, frees herself from a
wooden shed just in time to save Snorkey, the one-armed Civil War veteran, from an oncoming
train.28 The similarities are hardly coincidental. This quarrel between Daly and Boucicault could
have played out in London earlier that same year, but Daly did not have a British copyright to his
play and thus had no legal recourse.29 Under the Gaslight had made the reverse trans-Atlantic
journey one year prior, opening in London after a successful run in New York.30 This is where it
is believed that Boucicault first saw the train sensation scene. He was not, however, the only
dramatist to take inspiration from Daly; in October of 1868, The Era noted “there are are now 5
theatres in which the same incident is nightly exhibited.”31 With so many knockoff productions,
Daly’s trademark scene ran the risk of losing distinctiveness and being genericided. When the
New York production of After Dark opened, Daly finally had a home court advantage and a
United States copyright in hand to protect his scene against would-be usurpers. The Copyright

28. Augustin Daly, Under the Gaslight, PDF file, accessed November 27, 2020, https://
en.wikisource.org/wiki/Under_the_Gaslight.
29. Marvin Felheim, The Theater of Augustin Daly (New York: Greenwood Press, 1956), 55.
Boucicault himself had a rather practical view on international copyright. In an article he penned
for the Watson’s Art Journal, he remarked that “the Americans have not been guilty of either theft
or piracy. We have no claim on their justice or even on their honesty . . . Authors assume that
they possess a natural right in their works; this is not so.” See Dion Boucicault, “International
Copyright,” Watson’s Art Journal 8.6 (1867): 85.
30. Boyden, 147.
31. Quoted in Daly, Literature, Technology, and Modernity, 10.
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Act had only recently been amended, in 1856, to include protections for dramatic compositions
and to restrict public performances of copyrighted works.32
What makes the case that followed, Daly v. Palmer, so fascinating, and so relevant to my
project, is that Boucicault, in crafting his sensation scene, copied not a single word, character, or
setting from Daly, and yet the determination was that Palmer and Jarrett’s production of After
Dark’s sensation scene constituted a public performance of Daly’s scene. Recall that copyright
protects only ideas as they are expressed in a tangible medium. As such, Daly could neither argue
that the After Dark playscript infringed his Under the Gaslight copyright, since Boucicault’s play
was not published in the United States; nor could he contend that his production was being
copied, since copyright does not protect intangible expressions such as performance. His only
recourse was to assert that Palmer and Jarrett—in staging After Dark—were actually presenting
an unauthorized public performance of Daly’s sensation scene, as it was articulated in the lines
and stage directions of the copyrighted script for Under the Gaslight. If I hadn’t yet proved the
inadequacy of copyright for theatre and performance, this example surely makes my case.33
In Judge Blatchford’s lengthy decision, he explains why this is infringement, despite the
fact that no actual text was copied or publicly performed without permission:

32. Boyden, 147. Also see Benjamin W. Rudd, “Notable Dates in American Copyright:
1783-1969,” Copyright.gov, accessed November 28, 2020, https://www.copyright.gov/history/
dates.pdf.
33 This case is so impenetrable that the story of Daly v. Palmer has been rewritten in public
consciousness: on the Internet Broadway Database, the production credits for After Dark read,
“Written by Dion Boucicault; Plot stolen from Under the Gaslight by Augustin Daly.” See “After
Dark,” Internet Broadway Database, accessed November 28, 2020, https://www.ibdb.com/
broadway-production/after-dark-13023.
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The important dramatic effect in both plays is produced by the movements and gestures
which are prescribed and set in order so as to be read, and which are contained within
parenthesis. The spoken words in each are of but trifling consequence to the progress of
the series' of events represented and communicated to the intelligence of the spectator by
those parts of the scene which are directed to be represented by movement and gesture.34
Let us look past Judge Blatchford’s dismissal of dialogue as “trifling consequence” and focus
instead on his appeal to the “intelligence of the spectator.” This imagined spectator, who would
—after this decision—come to be known in copyright law as the “ordinary observer,” allows the
law to look beyond the actual content of a copyrighted work to consider perceived similarities.35
While the ordinary observer is evoked in other forms of intellectual property—including
copyrights and patents—I contend that the audience is most principally considered in trademark
law, and that Daly v. Palmer exists as a sort of proto-trademark case. At the time of Daly v.
Palmer, there were no federal laws established for the protection of trademarks in the United
States. There was a New York trademark law passed in 1845, but this was enacted specifically to
address the use of counterfeit postage.36
Nevertheless, if we look at this case from the vantage point of our present moment,
considering the current state of trademark and copyright, Daly v. Palmer offers a model for a
34. Daly v. Palmer, 36 How. Pr. 206 (1868), 215.
35. Boyden, 148. Blatchford’s decision set precedent for more than 70 years. It is even cited in
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
36. Eugene Alan Gilmore, ed., Modern American Law: A Systemic and Comprehensive
Commentary on the Fundamental Principles of American Law and Procedure, Accompanied by
Leading Illustrative Cases and Legal Forms, with a Revised Edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries (Chicago: Blackstone Institute, 1915), 479.
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trademark-based cultural economy. Daly’s sensation scene was a “trademark” feature, and I
mean this both colloquially and legally. Under the Gaslamp was a phenomenon in the United
States; it toured in cities across the continent for thirty years, and played at a theatre in Brooklyn
or Manhattan every year until the 1880s.37 The railroad sensation scene had acquired such
distinctiveness and was so directly associated with Under the Gaslight that it was used in
advertising posters. An 1867 New York Times advertisement read “Under the Gaslight,
Witnessed by 100,000 people . . . the wondrous Railroad Sensation, the universal topic of
conversation.”38 Had this all occurred a century later, Daly would have benefited from Lanham
Act protections. He would have been able to assert control over this trademark railroad scene
which, like Mickey Mouse and Superman, had ascended to the immortal echelon of branding.
The railroad sensation scene was Under the Gaslight’s trade dress; when Dion Boucicault
appropriated the scene, he was not stealing an expression of an idea, he—like many other
contemporaries—was capitalizing on the success of a Daly’s rival product and creating customer
confusion. Boucicault was Samsung to Daly’s Apple.
This is not merely a philosophical argument; after the introduction of the Lanham Act in
1946, we see examples of theatre artists leveraging the Lanham Act to protect their work from
trademark violation and customer confusion. In the 1990s, two landmark complaints—both of

37. See Boyden, 148 and Amy Hughes, Spectacles of Reform: Theater and Activism in
Nineteenth-Century America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 200.
38. Advertisements for Under the Gas-light, by Augustin Daly, Worrell Sisters’ New-York
Theatre, New York Times, 30 September 1867, 7; 2 October 1867, 7; 11 December 1867, 7. These
advertisements are originally compiled and cited in Amy Hughes, Spectacles of Reform: Theater
and Activism in Nineteenth-Century America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012),
118.
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which were ultimately settled and, thus, never decided—were issued by Broadway directors
whose stagings had been appropriated in regional theatre productions. Although both directors
foregrounded their copyright claims, insisting that their stage directions had been publicly
performed without license, they also each invoked the Lanham Act, suggesting that these
unauthorized regional productions had led to customer confusion.
In his complaint against Tony DeSantis (the producer at Chicago’s Drury Lane Theater),
Gerald Gutierrez argued that the Drury Lane production of Most Happy Fella borrowed liberally
from his 1992 Broadway revival.39 Although copyright protections are not extended to theatre
direction, Gutierrez’s lawyer, Ronald Schechtman, argued that directing is essentially “a
combination of choreography and pantomime,” both of which are expressly protected under
copyright law.40 To support his claim, Gutierrez submitted his prompt book for copyright
registration. In response, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a statement:
The copyright law protects the expression of an author fixed in a tangible form. With
regard to stage directions, this expression will generally be in the form of literary
authorship. Reference to “stage directions” in an application however, does not imply any
protection of a manner, style or method of directing, or for the actions dictated by them.41

39. Gutierrez v. DeSantis, No. 95-1949 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
40. Qtd in Michael Fleming, “Conroy and Par in Harmony on ‘Beach Music’ Deal,” Variety,
June 26, 1995-July 9, 1995, 2.
41. Talia Yellin, “New Directions for Copyright: The Property Rights of Stage Directors,” The
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 24.317 (2001): 328.
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In this perplexing statement, the Copyright Office asserts that legal protections are extended to
stage directions, but only to the extent that they exist as literature.42 Copyright does not protect
the execution of said directions. More specifically, copyright does not protect the style of
execution—the packaging. Packaging cannot be copyrighted; it is the domain of trade dress.
Perhaps in anticipation of this argument, Gutierrez’s complaint also makes a case for trademark
violation: “the defendants have falsely designated the origins of and have falsely represented the
Drury Lane Production in commerce. Such false designations and representations have caused
and will continue to cause actual, severe and irreparable harm to plaintiff.”43 By falsely
representing the origins of their product in commerce, DeSantis and Drury Lane had, in effect,
violated Gutierrez’s unregistered trademark staging style, and profited off the strength of his
brand.
Only a year after Gutierrez’s suit was settled, famed director Joe Mantello filed a similar
complaint against Caldwell Theatre Company, asserting that their staging of Love! Valor!
Compassion! directly copied his 1995 Broadway production. Mantello claimed that Caldwell,
and director Michael Hall, violated the Lanhan Act by suggesting, through emulation, that theirs
was the acclaimed Broadway production.44 Lacking a registered trademark, Mantello had to
prove that said violation occurred in New York—despite the fact that Caldwell Theatre is in

42. Many have noted that this statement does not align with how the Copyright Office regards
choreographic notation and dance copyright. See Yellen, 328 and Jessica Talati, “Copyrighting
Stage Directions & the Constitutional Mandate to ‘Promote the Progress of Science,’”
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 7.2 (2009), 248.
43. DeSantis, No. 95-1949 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), quoted in Yellin, 345.
44. Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Florida—since that was the geographic extent of his protections. Mantello and his union lawyers
tried their best, even suggesting that the migratory patterns of “many New Yorkers” (winters in
Florida, summers in the City) makes New York and Florida a unified market for the purposes of
Lanham Act violations.45 Their initial claim was dismissed, and the two parties eventually
reached a symbolic settlement—a fee which Mantello donated to a directors apprenticeship fund,
and an acknowledgement that “certain elements of the New York production” were used in
Caldwell’s.46 Although Mantello’s and Gutirrez’s cases both ended in settlement, their union—
the Stage Directors and Choreographers Society (SDC)—contends that they would have likely
won, specifically on the grounds of trademark violation.47
As these cases illustrate, trademark might be a means of easing the tension between
dramatists and directors (and, respectively, the Dramatist Guild and SDC). Although it may be
regarded as a collaborative art form, theatre is—economically and legally speaking—a solo
endeavor. As I observed in the previous chapter, playwrights (and composers) are historically the
only theatrical artists credited as author, and the only artists whose contributions exist apart from
any single production as a propertied, circulable work of intellect. This cultural and economic
privilege has been challenged in recent years by directors, dramaturgs, and actors who have

45. Ibid.
46. Kenneth Jones and David Lefkowitz, “Mantello and Caldwell Theatre Settle L!V!C! Case;
Issues Still Unresolved,” Playbill, April 25, 1999, accessed November 28, 2020, https://
www.playbill.com/article/mantello-and-caldwell-theatre-settle-l-v-c-case-issues-still-unresolvedcom-81475.
47. Yellin, 345. Also, it is important to clarify that until recently they were known as SSD&C,
but I have chosen to use their current abbreviation.
120

insisted some portion of authorship and ownership of a playwright’s work.48 In his
provocatively-titled lecture—“Protecting the American Playwright”—Dramatist Guild president
John Weidman pushed against the idea of a director’s copyright, focusing at one point on the
Gutierrez suit:
If Mr. Gutierrez could acquire copyright ownership of his staging, then the directors of
each and every one of these productions could have acquired copyright ownership of
theirs as well. Had this happened, over the course of the last four decades The Most
Happy Fella would have gradually ceased to exist as an independent piece of dramatic
literature, giving way instead to a multitude of “Most Happy Fellas” . . . If at some point
in the future, a theater wished to produce The Most Happy Fella, they would be faced
with a choice. They could examine—how?—each of the then existing copyrighted
productions and select the one they wished to reproduce. Or they could proceed with their
own original production, running the risk that a particular piece of business, or a stage
effect, or their overall approach would be attacked by a director as an infringement of his
previously copyrighted version.49
Weidman’s fear mongering is unsurprising and understandable; he is charged with preserving the
singular authority of the playwright. What he describes, what he fears, is a multitudinous

48. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2nd Cir. 1998); dramaturg Lynn Thomson
claimed joint authorship with Jonathan Larson on Rent. Similarly, the cast of Hamilton fought for
a royalty share, but their fight, unlike Thomson’s, ended in success: Richard Morgan, “How
Hamilton’s Cast Got Broadway’s Best Deal,” Bloomberg, September 28, 2016, accessed
November 28, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-hamilton-broadway-profit.
49. John Weidman, “Protecting the American Playwright,” Brooklyn Law Review 72.2 (2007),
650.
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hypertext. He fights for an arborescent culture, upholding the notion that “an independent piece
of dramatic literature” could exist, untainted by collaboration.
Weidman later argues that it is not a question of authorship; the playwright is
unquestionably the author. Rather, he says that he agrees with his would-be opponent, SDC
lawyer Schechter, who said to the New York Times “at bottom, this is all about money.”
Weidman suggests that directors should fight for a portion of the producer’s subsidiary rights
share (rather than the playwright’s), since the producer is the director’s employer, and the
director is adding value to the producer’s creative property.50 I don’t agree that this is all about
money—and Mantello’s settlement donation suggests that it is not—but I do concur that the
answer isn’t taking from the playwright. There’s enough authorship to go around. Rather than
fight over copyright, could we not become multitudinous in how we recognize and valuate
authorship—choosing the appropriate legal instrument to suit each creative labor. Playwrights
make work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression; copyright works for them. Directors
bring style, form, and recognition; trademark can be theirs. To each one’s own.
These lawsuits—Mantello’s and Gutierrez’s—both ended in settlement, so we, just like
SDC, can only speculate as to how trademark could function as a means of propertying the
extratextual elements of theatre. To see how it might have played out, how trademark could be
used as an effective tool for protecting style and preventing confusion, we need only look to two
forms that sit slightly to either side of theatre: performance and pornography.

50. Subsidiary rights is the right to produce a derivative work based on the original source
material.
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Figure 4.2. Promotional image for Blue Man Group. (Photo by
Lindsey Best, from “Blue Man Group is sold to Cirque du Soleil,”
Chicago Tribune, https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/
theater/ct-blue-man-sold-cirque-soleil-20170706-column.html.)
First, performance. When I began research for this chapter, I was sure that I would find a
perfect example of theatrical trademark in the world famous performance ensemble Blue Man
Group. I poured over their trademark filings in search of a registration for their distinctive shade
of blue facepaint. I imagined that if Owens-Corning was able to secure a trademark for their pink
insulation, then the Blue Man Group certainly would have exclusive rights to their titular blue.51
Alas, I was wrong. Undeterred, I looked for evidence that the Blue Man Group’s style—
specifically their blue color—had acquired distinctiveness, which would prove my thesis that
trademark is a more effective means of propertying theatrical creativity.
In 2005, Blue Man Group Productions opposed an application for use of the name
Blueman as a trademark for tobacco products.52 Their initial failure to prevent said use is
seemingly of little consequence to my argument; it was an effort to protect their fairly descriptive
wordmark—literally, the words “Blue Man”—from being used as a trademark, and had nothing

51. In re Owens-corning Fiberglas Corporation, 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
52. Blue Man Productions, Inc. v. Tarmann, 75 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1492 (TTAB 2005).
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to do with their distinctive color (or, trade dress). However, buried within the opinion written by
Judge Seeherman of the United States Patent and Trade Office’s Trial and Appeal Board is a brief
but important consolation:
From the probative evidence, we conclude that BLUE MAN GROUP has achieved a
degree of recognition as a mark for entertainment services, such that the mark would be
viewed as a strong and distinctive mark, and not be considered only as highly suggestive
of performance services rendered by a group of men who are colored blue.53
While Judge Seeherman does not regard the Blue Man trademark to be famous enough to
warrant a dilution or customer confusion argument, she does concede that their mark is “strong
and distinctive” and not “suggestive.”

Figure 4.3. The trademark spectrum of distinctiveness.
These designations come from the “trademark spectrum of distinctiveness,” a taxonomy
established in Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc.54 In Abercrombie, Second Circuit
Judge Friendly identifies “four different categories of terms with respect to trademark protection.
Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the
degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and

53. Ibid.
54. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1976).
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(4) arbitrary or fanciful.”55 When visualized, this spectrum of distinctiveness usually splits
arbitrary and fanciful into two separate classes, bringing the total to five.
Judge Seeherman locates Blue Man Group’s trademark somewhere to the right of
suggestive, in the strong and distinctive zone. Note, however, that she is not simply referring to
the strength of their wordmark in isolation; Seeherman considers the distinctiveness of their
mark in relation to the distinctiveness of their performance style and color—their trade dress.
Their name is not merely “suggestive of performance services rendered by a group of men who
are colored blue.” Rather, as their trademark style and use of color acquired distinctiveness—
through appearances in popular Intel computer chip advertisements and a successful Las Vegas
show—so too did their name.56 There is no functional reason for their blue-ness; it is simply
packaging, like a fluted Coca-Cola bottle. While Blue Man Productions may not carry a
registered trademark for their hue of blue, this fanciful trademark design has transformed a
wordmark that would be descriptive (they are, in fact, a group of blue men) into a fanciful mark,
by extension.
In 2009, the decision by Judge Seeherman and the USPTO was overturned in the District
Court for the District of Columbia—not on the merits of Blue Man Group’s argument, but on a
technicality, since neither the USPTO nor the tobacco seller (the hilariously-named Eric
Tarmann) responded to multiple invitations from the District Court.57 In their appeal, Blue Man
Productions had cited as evidence an unsolicited email, sent years before Tarmann’s

55. Ibid.
56. Tarmann, 75 U.S.P.Q. 2d.
57. Ibid.
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trademarking attempts, in which a disappointed fan of the Blue Man Group recalls a knock-off
Blue Man show in Mexico used to advertise a new cigarette brand (unrelated to Tarmann’s
company).58 Blue Man Production’s contention was that any association with a tobacco product
could dilute and weaken their brand, and cause negative associations through customer
confusion. It’s remarkable that this new piece of evidence, a single fan letter, was central to their
appeal.
Taken as a whole, this Blue Man trademark saga illustrates the critical difference between
a copyright-based cultural economy and one based on trademark. The former is ontologically
stable and absolute, whereas the latter is always in a constant state of negotiation. Blue Man
Productions lost their initial suit on the grounds that their mark, while distinctive, was not quite
famous enough to warrant a customer confusion argument. And yet, paradoxically, the opinion of
a single consumer might have been enough to win their appeal. The strength of any mark—or
any threat to a mark—is proportionately tied to recognition; but recognition is not something that
can be quantified or empirically understood. It is a subjective and highly interpretive
measurement.
A brand is not a stable object with a stable value and stable authorship. It is, as branding
theorists Mary Jo Hatch and James Rubin observe, a “social text.”59 Hatch and Rubin argue for a
hermeneutic approach to brand analysis, building on the work of—among others—Hans Robert
Jauss, to consider how a brand meets (or fails to meet) a consumer’s horizon of expectations, and

58. Ibid.
59. Mary Jo Hatch and James Rubin, “The Hermeneutics of Branding,” Journal of Brand
Management 14 (2006), 40.
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how this tension between expectation and experience constantly rewrites the brand-as-text.60
They explain:
In this sense of hermeneutics, the brand as text remakes itself with each new reading even
while the history of previous readings never disappears completely. It is thus that the
reader/consumer creates the text/brand with the author, the horizon of a text becoming
framed by the dialogue that transpires between past, present and future.61
Taking this hermeneutical approach, we might understand why a a single consumer email could
be enough to substantiate Blue Man’s customer confusion claim. This patron, Sonia Vargas,
wrote: “I’m sorry to say that the reason I’m writing is not very pleasant,” because her horizon of
expectations had been violently betrayed. She asked them to give “some kind of explanation for
this terrible performance,” assuming it was a sanctioned Blue Man show. Her experience as
reader/consumer will never disappear completely—it is forever inscribed in the brand-as-text.
Vargas acknowledges that this so-called “Blue Man show” had “nothing to do with the one I saw
in NY” apart from the fact that “there were 3 men painted in blue.” Clearly, packaging matters.
Through this Blue Man Group example, we see not only how trademark can function as a
means of protecting extratextual elements of live performance, but also how this approach could
foster a more immediate and responsive post-postmodern relationship between artist and
audience. This trademark-based relationship is one that is constantly negotiated through a
productive tension between expectation and experience. In my second theatre-adjacent example,

60. They reference Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception: Theory and History of
Literature (Volume 2) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
61. Hatch, 45-6.
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we see what happens when that tension becomes unproductive. In 1978, the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders sought an injunction to block the exhibition and distribution of a pornographic film,
Debbie Does Dallas, on the grounds of trademark infringement.62 The film features a twelveminute sequence in which the protagonist, Debbie, engages in sexual acts while dressed as a
“Texas Cowgirl” cheerleader.63 The costume she wears in this scene and in advertisements—
white boots and shorts, a blue blouse, and a star-studded vest—closely resembles the costuming
of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders.64

Figure 4.5. Photo of Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders (1979). (From “History of the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ Look,”
People, https://people.com/style/the-historyof-the-dallas-cowboys-cheerleaders-look.)

Figure 4.4. Poster for Debbie Does Dallas
(1978). (From Wikimedia Commons,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Debbiedoesdallas.jpg.)

62. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. Plot summary courtesy of the LexisNexis case brief. “Law School Case Brief:
Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. - 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979),”
LexisNexis, accessed November 28, 2020, https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/casebrief/p/
casebrief-dall-cowboys-cheerleaders-inc-v-pussycat-cinema-ltd.
64. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d.
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In his opinion, Judge Ellsworth Van Graafeiland affirmed that this was in fact trademark
infringement and dilution, stating that “it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen defendant’s
sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff’s cheerleaders.”65 He
makes his opinion of the film known, repeatedly using words like “gross” and “revolting,”
referring to “the plot, to the extent that there is one,” and dismissing the performers as “actors” in
quotation.66
Graafeiland clarifies that “in order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that the
owner of the mark actually produced the item and placed it on the market,” but that the mark
holder simply approved of it.67 In other words, we don’t need to believe that Joe Mantello
directed the Caldwell production of Love! Valor! Compassion!, just that he gave his blessing for
them to use his direction and trademark style. The producer of Debbie Does Dallas, known
mobster and porn kingpin Michael Zaffarano, asserted that the Cowboys Cheerleaders’
trademark was invalid, since their uniform is a “functional item necessary for the performance of
cheerleading routines” and therefore ineligible.68 The court dismissed this claim: “it is well
established that, if the design of an item is nonfunctional and has acquired secondary meaning,

65. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F. 2d. Interestingly, this film also offers us the rare example of a
work that lost its copyright protections because it was published and released without a copyright
notification (before notifications became less relevant in 1989). Because of this, Debbie Does
Dallas is now in the public domain. See M & A Associates, Inc. v. VCX, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 454
(E.D. Mich. 1987).
66. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F. 2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
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the design may become a trademark even if the item itself is functional.”69 In short, the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleader costume is an arbitrary design of a functional clothing item, a design that
has acquired secondary meaning through high visibility in popular culture. Debbie Does Dallas
threatened to dilute this brand with negative association; but it isn’t an entirely unexpected
association. I contend that what boiled Judge Graafeiland’s blood is not that this film featured
lascivious objectification, but that it called attention to a more socially acceptable form of
lascivious objectification. But I digress.
The more important takeaway from this case—beyond the re-affirmation that trademark
could be a useful alternative to copyright—is this persistent question regarding functionality.
Trademark protections are not extended to functional elements, since those are protected by
patents (and not, like trademark, in perpetuity). What is unclear, however, is what constitutes
“functional” design. Recall that an element is deemed functional if it is “essential to the use or
purpose of the article” or “affects the cost or quality of the article.”70 What, then, of aesthetics? Is
beauty in design simply functional if beauty is the ultimate purpose? The aesthetic functionality
doctrine in trademark asserts that “when the aesthetic design of a product is itself the mark for
which protection is sought, we may also deem the mark functional” if a design feature “may not
provide a truly utilitarian advantage . . . but provides other competitive advantages.”71 The
USPTO Manual further clarifies aesthetic functionality by citing Brunswick Corp v. British
Seagull Ltd, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed that using the color black in the design of

69. Ibid.
70. TMEP §1202.02(A).
71. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. (93-1577), 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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outboard motors was a functional choice since it made it easier to color coordinate with different
boats.72 Everything goes with black.
Should we then conclude that theatrical design and form—which does not provide
utilitarian advantage but does certainly provide competitive advantage in the art world—is
functional and therefore ineligible for trademark and trade dress protections? Or is theatrical
style deserving of trade dress protections because it serves as an indicator of source? According
to Michael Mireles (in the Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal), this remains unresolved.
Some courts have held that trademark cannot be used to protect an artist’s unique style—citing
Leigh v. Warner Bros., in which a photographer unsuccessfully argued that the film company’s
emulation of their compositional style constituted trademark infringement (“such a use would…
overly extend the reach of trademark law, and would circumvent copyright law’s prohibition on
the protection of ideas”).73 Other courts, Mireles notes, have taken the opposing view, extending
the domain of trademark to include artistic style—most notably with Hartford House, Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., in which Judge Monroe McCay of the 10th Circuit affirmed that “the
overall trade dress, i.e., the overall appearance or look” of a greeting card was a nonfunctional,
protectable feature under the Lanham Act.74 Style either is or is not functional, and it is or is not
protected under trade dress. It depends on who you ask.

72. TMEP §1202.02(A).
73. Michael S. Mireles, “Aesthetic Functionality,” Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 21.2
(2013): 212. He cites Leigh v. Warner Bros., a Div. of Time Warner, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D.
Ga. 1998).
74. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
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In 2012, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals gave us a both/and answer when fashion
designer Christian Louboutin appealed a District Court decision that his signature red outsole
could not be protected by trademark and trade dress.75 The USPTO had granted Louboutin a
trademark for the distinctive red lacquered sole in 2008, but when the designer sought an
injunction to block the marketing and sale of Yves Saint Laurent’s monochromatic red heel, the
court questioned the validity of their color mark, dismissing it as functional.76 In his decision,
Judge Victor Marrero cites Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., in which the court determined that if
the aesthetics of a product are “essential to the use or purpose” of the product, it is only eligible
for design patent or copyright protection, with limited terms on monopoly (“one of the essential
selling features of hotel china, if, indeed, not the primary, is the design. The attractiveness and
eye-appeal of the design sells the china”).77 Judge Marrero ponders: “suppose that Monet, having
just painted his water lilies, encounters a legal challenge from Picasso, who . . . alleges that
Monet, in depicting the color of water, used a distinctive indigo that Picasso claims was . . . the
hallmark of his Blue Period.”78 Louboutin’s red outsole is not, according to Judge Marrero, like
75. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc. - 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir.
2012).
76. “Case: Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303 (2d
Cir. 2013),” The Fashion Law, accessed November 28, 2020, https://www.thefashionlaw.com/
resource-center/cases-of-interest-christian-louboutin-v-yves-saint-laurent.
77. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), in which the judge cites Pagliero et al. v. Wallace China Co., Limited, 198 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1952). For a better understanding of this complex question, I consulted Yevgeniy Markov,
“Raising the Dead: How the Ninth Circuit Avoided the Supreme Court's Guidelines Concerning
Aesthetic Functionality and Still Got Away with It in Au-Tomotive Gold,” Northwestern Journal
of Technology and Intellectual Property 6.2 (2008): 199.
78. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d.
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Owens-Corning’s pink insulation, a color which is only truly seen at the point of purchase and
then hidden away inside walls; with Louboutin’s red soled heels, the aesthetics are the
functionality. That sounds like a capitalistic riff on the old Marshall McLuhan line, “the medium
is the message.”
In Louboutin’s appeal, the Second Circuit found a compromise: Louboutin’s red sole
mark is valid, but only when the red sole contrasts “with the remainder of the shoe.”79 Everybody
wins: Yves Saint Laurent can freely market and sell an all-red shoe with a non-contrasting sole,
and Louboutin retains protections for his trademark aesthetic. The significance of this decision
cannot be overstated: first, this resolves any fears that trademarking color will lead to color
scarcity (Picasso suing Monet); and second, it cracks the door open for trademarking theatrical
aesthetics. In fact it was this decision, Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent, that inspired
me to undertake this dissertation project nearly a decade ago. I came upon it as I searched in vain
for a legal answer to what would be my first of many Read-Write Theatre quandaries.
In June of 2012, the website Culturebot published an article by Jeremy Barker about an
aesthetic standoff between two Read-Write Theatre companies.80 In the article, Barker calls
attention to a production by Washington D.C.-based Factory 449, titled The Ice Child, in which
the company had seemingly appropriated the signature aesthetic of the New York-based
Temporary Distortion. Barker presents the evidence, a series of damning diptychs showing

79. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc. - 696 F.3d.
80. Jeremy Barker, “UPDATED: Were Temporary Distortion’s Designs and Concepts Stolen by
Another Company?” Culturebot, accessed November 28, 2020, http://www.culturebot.net/
2012/06/13733/was-temporary-distortions-designs-and-concepts-stolen-by-another-company/.
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images from The Ice Child alongside strikingly similar images from Temporary Distortion’s
2009 Americana Kamikaze.
In a written response to Barker and Temporary Distortion, Factory 449 employ an
arborescent, textocentric legal defense. They assert that despite the similarities seen above, The
Ice Child has a “completely different narrative,” on which they “place equal if not greater
weight” than the visual elements they admit were “inspired by” Americana Kamikaze. Factory
449 reminds their colleagues that artists are always inspiring each other, and to say otherwise
“would be naive or dishonest.” They remind Temporary Distortion that “theatre is more than a

Figure 4.6. Production stills comparison. (Collage from “UPDATED,” Culturebot.)
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set of photographs,” all the while reducing theatre to nothing more than narrative for their legal
and ethical purposes.81
Temporary Distortion certainly could have claimed copyright violation, since their scenic
designs are fixed in a tangible medium of expression—not only design sketches, but also the
above photographs. They most likely would have won—especially with Factory 449’s written
admission of guilt. That wouldn’t address the real issues of brand dilution and customer
confusion. Having worked for fifteen years in performance curation and served on multiple
panels for arts funders, I can attest to the importance of images and branding in contemporary
theatre and performance. Photos often stand in for the live work art as quick decisions are made
about which productions to program and which to fund. When Factory 449 “took inspiration”
from Temporary Distortion, they may have taken much more—touring opportunities, grants,
press recognition. They leveraged—and thereby diluted—a signature aesthetic that Temporary
Distortion crafted over years, and which had acquired distinctiveness.
Factory 449 ends their defense with a quote from French philosopher Michel de
Montaigne: “The bees pillage the flowers here and there but they make honey of them which is
all their own.”82 A Read-Write credo. In my next—and final—chapter, I look to the bees,
modeling a new cultural economy, one that transcends notions of intellectual property and
traffics in the smallest unit of cultural production: the meme.

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
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Chapter Four: Memes
“The curse of broadcast technologies is that they are profligate users of limited
resources,” Chris Anderson writes in a 2004 Wired magazine article, “this is the world of
scarcity. Now, with online distribution and retail, we are entering a world of abundance.”1 In
“The Long Tail,” Anderson points to a seemingly endless supply of niche content that is now
available to consumers thanks to the internet. There is an economic opportunity, he argues, in this
long tail. The tag line of his similarly-titled 2006 book sums it up: “Why the Future of Business
Is Selling Less of More.”2 In the graph below, the dark grey area represents broadcast culture—
the high volume (and Read-Only) cultural segment in which bestselling books, network
television, blockbuster movies, and popular music are circulated. This was culture for most
before the internet. A culture shaped by scarcity: scarcity of space on bookshelves, jukeboxes,

popularity

movie theater screens. A scarcity of hours in the day.

Figure 5.1. The Long Tail curve.

1. Chris Anderson, “The Long Tail,” Wired, October 1, 2004, accessed November 28, 2020,
https://www.wired.com/2004/10/tail.
2. Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More (New
York: Hyperion, 2006).
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The light grey area is Anderson’s Long Tail. The Long Tail includes all of the hitherto forgotten
content—books, music, movies that lacked the mass popularity to warrant costly publication and
distribution. However, in this age of digital abundance and algorithmic curation, the low
popularity (and, thus, low-volume) content on the Long Tail can find its consumer.
The Long Tail presents an interesting, if not radical, solution for how the Read-Write
Theatre might contend with intellectual property. Recall from my first chapter that the ReadWrite Theatre is a form that emerged in this new digital “world of abundance.” Read-Write
artists speak through the full spectrum of disembodied media that is the internet, and they
embrace a posthuman and post-postmodern vision for knowledge and cultural production—
everything is intensified: here, now, and embodied. The challenge faced by the Read-Write
Theatre is that contemporary copyright still reflects a world of scarcity, and a pre-digital notion
of authorship.
The Long Tail curve charts culture from the perspective of the consumer; the y-axis
indicates the relative popularity and circulation of a creative work. If, as Michel Foucault tells us,
“the function of an author is to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain
discourses within a society,” then might popularity be a means of quantifying the relative
function and value of authorship?3 Foucault identifies the “author function” as a taxonomical
device; an author’s name certifies a work as a work (as opposed to a non-work, such as a

3. Although I have, up to this point, used Michel Foucault, “What Is An Author,” trans. Josué V.
Harari in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (London: Methuen,
1980), 141-160, I have chosen to use a different translation for this passage, from Michel
Foucault, “What is an Author?” in Language, Counter Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews, trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1977),
124.
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shopping list) and points to a larger literary or philosophical discourse.4 I contend, further, that
the “author function” is an economic device; attaching the name Stephen King assigns value to a
novel. The degree to which an author’s name assigns value to a work is directly proportional to
the author’s popularity. While there are many examples of works that achieve popular
recognition despite their unremarkable authorship (and of popular authors who make unpopular
works), for the vast majority of creative works under capitalism, the author functions as a
trademark—an indicator of source and a means of instilling customer confidence. As such, I
offer my own Long Tail curve, replacing the y-axis label, “popularity,” with what I term “author

author functionality

functionality.”5

the focus of this
chapter

Figure 5.2. The author functionality curve.
The dark grey area represents works with high author functionality, including the writings
of Freud and Marx (who Foucault identifies as “initiators of discursive practices”), but also
compositions by theatrical luminaries such as Shakespeare and Sondheim. Here, we find popular
and canonical works, and works whose popularity and canonicity are directly tied to their
4. Foucault in Textual Strategies, 103.
5. Others have adapted the Long Tail to explore similar ideas, including Derek Mueller, who
charted the frequency distribution of scholarly citations. See Derek Mueller, Network Sense:
Methods for Visualizing a Discipline (Fort Collins, Colorado: WAC Clearinghouse, 2017).
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authorship. In this chapter, however, we look further down the author functionality curve, even
past the light grey area, to the place where author functionality approaches zero. Foucault
explains that “the ‘author function’ is tied to the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe,
determine, and articulate the realm of discourse”—which reads to me like a perfect description
of copyright. If the author function is tied to copyright, then as author functionality approaches
zero, we might achieve that fluid exchange of ideas envisioned by one of this country’s legal
framers, Thomas Jefferson: “ideas . . . like fire, expansible over all space . . . and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive
appropriation.”6
In this chapter, I look to that expansible space at the limits of authorship, where writing is
—as Foucault would have it—nothing more than “an interplay of signs.”7 As we explored in the
first chapter, “author” and “work” are concepts that exist in a tautological relationship to one
another. So, as we move to the right along the x-axis, the force that binds together a work—
authorship—diminishes, and we are left not with a total work of art, but rather a loose
arrangement of gestures, expressions, moments. In this expansible space, culture is decomposed
to its smallest circulable unit—the meme—and out of the meme a new theatrical form is born, a
memetic Read-Write Theatre beyond the grasps of authorship, author functionality, and
copyright.

6. Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Isaac McPherson,” The Founders' Constitution, accessed
November 2, 2019, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. Note,
as I clarified in an earlier chapter, that Jefferson was writing about patents and inventions, but I
believe his vision is still relevant to copyright.
7. Foucault in Textual Strategies, 102.
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While memes have gained popular recognition in recent years, they were first theorized
by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene in 1976.8 Dawkins introduces the meme as a unit of
cultural transmission, so named to invoke the sense that it is the cultural equivalent of a gene.9
Memes are the building blocks of creativity; they are the smallest unit of culture—“tunes, ideas,
catch phrases, clothes fashions.”10 Like a gene, memes are not a uniform size or length—they
can be impossibly small—like the horn hit used in Madonna’s “Vogue” (from the first chapter)—
or they can be long sequences of cultural code.11 Memes are replicators, and their primary
purpose is to propagate. Dawkins endows them with a sort of agency, describing their movement
as they “leap from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called
imitation12.” Susan Blackmore cautions us not to mistake this agency as subjectivity: “we can
say that memes are ‘selfish’, that they ‘do not care’, that they ‘want’ to propagate themselves,
and so on, when all we mean is that successful memes are the ones that get copied and spread,
while unsuccessful ones do not.”13 Memes describe how we learn, how ideas spread, how trends

8. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 189-201.
9. Dawkins, 192.
10. Ibid.
11. Susan J. Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 53.
Blackmore offers this as a defense of memes, which are criticized as an object of study for not
even having a unit or uniform size. Dawkins explains that a meme’s length using genetics,
likening it to “a unit of convenience, a length of chromosome with just sufficient copying-fidelity
to serve as a viable unit of natural selection”—in Dawkins, 195.
12. Dawkins, 192.
13. Blackmore, 7.
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form, and how cultures change over time (in a way that memeticists liken to evolution).14 Memes
are often described like a virus; some memes die in a host, while others survive through
replication.15 Either way, the outcome is always an erasure of authorship.
Like a virus, memes replicate, mutate, and spread so quickly that it becomes impossible
to trace back to an original author. Even when an origin can be identified, their authorship is
already irrelevant, as the meme has transformed and taken on new meaning.16 In her book,
Memes in Digital Culture, Limor Shifman illustrates this process of transformation using a predigital meme entitled “Kilroy Was Here.”17 During World War II, a shipyard inspector named
James Kilroy would mark the work he inspected with the words “Kilroy Was Here.” Soldiers
noticed the graffiti once the ships were launched to sea; without knowing the meaning or origin,
they began to scribble the phrase in unexpected places, along with a small cartoon drawing of a
14. As is the case with any Darwinian theory, cultural evolution seems to ignore the impact of
colonialism, racism, sexism, and other oppressive and discriminatory forces in suggesting that
culture develops as the most vital and selfish memes propagate.
15. Researchers have actually constructed an epidemiological model showing how memes spread
like a virus. The mathematicians who created this model noted “it is interesting to see that a
process as apparently random as the self-propagation of an idea through the minds of the masses
can be modeled by such a simple model and fit a theoretical curve so closely. Since the SIR
model was a basis for this work, the success of the modeling indicates that memes can indeed be
considered to be infectious in nature.” See Lin Wang and Brendan C Wood “An Epidemiological
Approach to Model the Viral Propagation of Memes,” Applied Mathematical Modelling 35.11
(2011): 5442–5447.
16. Intellectual property scholar Stacey Lantagne observes that memes are “imbued with
meaning beyond that intended by the original creator, buoyed by the collaborative creativity of
its replication through varied Internet communities, all of them adding their own stamp and
commentary.” Stacey M. Lantagne, “Famous on the Internet: The Spectrum of Internet Memes
and the Legal Challenge of Evolving Methods of Communication,” University of Richmond Law
Review 52.2 (2018), 387-424.
17. Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 53.
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man peaking out above a wall with his long nose draped over. The Kilroy meme spread with the
war, and became a pop culture icon. Without an author (or, author function) to limit what
Foucault identifies as “the cancerous and dangerous proliferation of significations,” memes like
The Kilroy become ciphers.18 They acquire new meanings in context, or as part of a meme
sequence, and inspire the formation of meme communities.
Soldiers who replicated The Kilroy contributed to a cultural phenomenon that was greater
than the meme itself. Shifman notes that “the act of reproducing the meme created an invisible
bond with a community of ‘Kilroy Writers.’”19 Participating in a meme community is,
paradoxically, a plagiaristic means of asserting individuality and articulating one’s original self.
It exemplifies what Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman terms “networked individualism”—a social
operating system that remaps community for the digital age, cutting across traditional class,
family, religious, and professional networks.20 Sending a friend a text message gif (a short
animation) from a popular TV show allows me to assert my individuality while also signaling my
social networks. The Kilroy meme has, in recent years, taken on another set of meanings as it
binds together a new virtual community. Founded in 2013, The Kilroys is a collective of

18. Foucault in Textual Strategies, 118.
19. Shifman, 26-7.
20. Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman, Networked: The New Social Operating System (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2012), 6-7. This also relates to Henry Jenkins notion of “participatory culture” in
Convergence Culture (New York: New York University Press, 2006) and what Kiri Miller
describes as “playing along”—a reconstituting act of co-authorship that occurs in “affinity
spaces: play, performance, experimentation, interpretation, teaching, and learning. These
practices encourage participants to experience a sense of connection across differences.” Kiri
Miller, Playing Along (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 7.
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playwrights, directors, and producers committed to gender parity in the theatre industry. They
use The Kilroy to make their presence known—to say, “We Are Here.”
Memes are everywhere, but nowhere are they more visible than the internet.21 They
usually appear online as pithy bits of media—images, short videos, illustrations. The most
popular form of internet meme—the “image macro”—features a photograph with humorous text
superimposed in a bold white font. There are several online tools that allow users to quickly
generate their own image macros. Users begin by choosing from a large library of memetic
images: images with low author functionality and, thus, potential for expansive meaning and
rapid dissemination. Then, the user adds their own humorous or incongruous text, thereby
elongating the meme sequence, diminishing the image’s already low author functionality, and
networking the user’s individualism.
To illustrate, I offer two examples below. On the left is an image macro I made of Judge
Lucy Koh, using her own words (quoted in the previous chapter). This image macro is one of
only a few Judge Koh memes to be found online. The viability of a meme—its infection rate—is
determined by the socio-cultural appropriateness of a meme in an environment.22 My Judge Koh
meme will likely die here in this dissertation, unless I introduce it to a social network of
intellectual property scholars—there it would replicate and thrive. On the right is a popular
theatre meme that circulated during the COVID-19 quarantine, featuring comic film actor Will
Farrell calling for people to attend a play reading over the videoconference platform Zoom, even

21. Blackmore suggests that the internet didn’t just make memes more visible, but that they have
been accelerated by computers and network technologies. Blackmore, 20.
22. This is a common theory in memetics, but it is clearly stated in Shifman, 9.
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as the world burns. This authorless meme was quickly shared within theatre social networks. It
leapt from brain to brain, acquiring a semiotic shorthand as it became—like a word or symbol—a
means of expressing frustration with the theatre field’s general lack of self-awareness during the
COVID-19 crisis.

Figure 5.3. Even Judge Lucy Koh
can be a meme.

Figure 5.4. Popular theatre meme. (From
Roger Casey, Twitter post, September 6 2020,
1:42 p.m., http://twitter.com/irogertherabbit.)

Dawkins tells us that memes are selfish, meaning they “act” with a singular purpose,
which is replicating to survive: “if a meme is to dominate the attention of a human brain, it must
do so at the expense of ‘rival’ memes.”23 But memes are also self-ish—as in they express
something that seems like, but is not, a self. Memes are more than just the building blocks of
creativity; they might be the building blocks of selfhood. Blackmore builds on the consciousness
theories of Daniel Dennett, a prominent memeticist who rejects the idea of a Cartesian Theater—
the metaphor that consciousness is a little version of me sitting in a screening room inside my
23. Dawkins, 197.
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brain, watching the world as my body moves through it.24 Dennett suggests, instead, that our
brains consume and replicate an endless stream of memes, writing “multiple drafts” of
understanding to memory.25 One of these drafts is the version of the story we tell ourselves, the
version that inserts an author, an “I,” a little self made of memes.26 Dennett calls this a “benign
user illusion.”27 Blackmore, however, considers the self to be the ultimate memeplex—a
collaborative effort by a group of memes to ensure their survival and replication. Blackmore
notes that memeplexes—including the self, but also religion, cults, and alien abductions—“take a
highly emotional naturally occurring human experience with no satisfactory explanation, provide
a myth that appears to explain it, and include a powerful being or unseen force that cannot easily
be tested.”28 Blackmore presents the human body as a host for memes and genes, and the self as
a memetic construct, a myth that answers the question “who am I, anyway”:
…beliefs, opinions, possessions and personal preferences all bolster the idea that there is
a believer or owner behind them. The more you take sides, get involved, argue your case,
protect your possessions, and have strong opinions, the more you strengthen the false

24. Blackmore, 225.
25. Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), 111-12.
26. Blackmore, 225.
27. Dennett, 311.
28. Blackmore, 182. Robert Aunger concurs: “Memes constitute (at least aspects of ) the self.”
See Robert Aunger, The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think (New York: The Freee
Press, 2002): 228.
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idea that there is not only a person (body and brain) talking, but an inner self with
esoteric things called beliefs. The self is a great protector of memes.29
I am attracted to this concept, not only because it reveals the profundity of seemingly trivial
internet memes, but also because it provides a way out of copyright, at least conceptually. If
there is no self, there can be no author. If there is no author, there can be no work. If there is no
work, there can be no copyright.
Come, then, and slide with me down the curve toward that conceptual space where
author functionality approaches zero. Here we will imagine a memetic theatre, where work is
composed from memes and where there is no author to—as Foucault tells us—impede “the free
composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.”30 Memetic theatre interrogates the
construction of culture and selfhood. It is not a theatre about memes, nor does it borrow themes
and aesthetics from memes (as was the case with the 2020 streaming media play Circle Jerk by
Fake Friends).31 It is, like all of the Read-Write Theatre, a form that is defined by an artist’s
relationship to the underlying properties that constitute a work. My purpose here is not to insist
another theatrical form or discover another category, but rather to engage my reader’s
imagination. The dramaturgy of memetic theatre transcends the textocentricity of copyright, the
utopianism of the commons, and trademark’s insistence on self-commodification. While I believe
that under capitalism a truly memetic theatre—and the requisite erasure of authorship—is a legal
29. Blackmore, 233. She also reminds us that our selfhood constructed from birth through
memes—we learn through imitation; Blackmore, 6.
30. Foucault in Textual Strategies, 119.
31. This production by Fake Friends streamed live on https://circlejerk.live, but is no longer
available.
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and cultural impossibility, I have found one example of Read-Write Theatre that comes quite
close to the memetic: Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble.
Also known as ROKE, this “musical priesthood” is the creation of Tei Blow and Sean
McElroy. If you believe their website biography (and I suggest you don’t), “ROKE was formed
when Brown hosted Oberlin for the 2001 Liberal Arts Spring Fling. They went on to cement
their partnership a year later when they both enrolled in the low-residency Masters program in
Women’s Studies at Stanford-Hofstra-University of Phoenix-Online.”32 ROKE often ridicules the
holiness of authorship and the pervasiveness of self-promotion in the art world; in Contemporary
Theatre Review, they said, “ROKE’s next projects include a Steve Reich/Wilhelm Reich tribute
album produced in collaboration with Kanye West, and The Art of Luv (Part 5): ROKÉ Cupid,
which premiered in May of 2017 at The Bushwick Starr in Brooklyn, NY.”33 One truth, one lie.
When asked why they chose karaoke for their name and their theatrical form, McElroy
commented that “it’s like you’re channeling pop culture when you’re singing [karaoke]…it’s less
about performing as a way of self-expression and more about building community through
technologically-enhanced channeling of pop culture.”34 This certainly resonates with our
understanding of memes, networked individualism, and the self. While their collaboration began

32. “About,” Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, accessed November 28, 2020, http://
www.royalosiris.com/about-1. The truth, as they revealed in an interview with Jennifer ParkerStarbuck, is that they met on Craigslist. Jennifer Parker-Starbuck, “Royal Osiris Karaoke
Ensemble (ROKE),” Contemporary Theatre Review 27.3 (2017): https://
www.contemporarytheatrereview.org/2017/royal-osiris-karaoke-ensemble.
33. Parker-Starbuck, “Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble (ROKE).”
34. Ibid.
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with the Ancient Egyptian karaoke ritual performance Everything One in the Disc of the Sun,
their masterwork of memetic theatre is the six-part Art of Luv.
Each part of The Art of Luv reflects the ideals of memetic theatre in its own way, so I will
unpack all six in chronological order, according to their premier date.35 Part 1, subtitled Elliot, is
named after Elliot Rodger who, on May 23, 2014, killed six people in a violent rampage in Isla
Vista, California. Rodger’s YouTube diary, where he spewed misogynistic and self-aggrandizing
diatribes, is hashed with clips from seduction and self-help seminars, haul videos (in which
people—usually women—share the spoils from a recent shopping trip), and romance films. This
all comes together in what Jennifer Parker-Starbuck says “invokes a quality of the old ‘mixtape.’”36

Figure 5.5. Production still from ROKE’s The Art of Luv (Part 1): Elliot. (Video still, from
Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, http://www.royalosiris.com/art-of-luv-part-1-elliot.)
35. The Art of Luv (Part 1): Elliot, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, La Mama, ETC, New
York, NY, January, 2015. The Art of Luv (Part 2): LUV Pavilion, by Royal Osiris Karaoke
Ensemble, Pop-up venue, Queens, NY, May, 2015. The Art of Luv (Part 3): Meg Mondays, by
Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, Pop-up venue, Queens, NY, May, 2015. The Art of Luv (Part
4): Project Peplum, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, video project. The Art of Luv (Part 5):
ROKÉ Cupid, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, The Bushwick Starr, Brooklyn, NY, May,
2017. The Art of Luv (Part 6): Awesome Grotto!, by Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, Abrons
Arts Center, New York, NY, June, 2018.
36. Jennifer Parker-Starbuck, “Karaoke Theatre: Channeling Mediated Lives,” Contemporary
Theatre Review 27.3 (2017): 384.
148

ROKE’s video mix is played on VHS tape, and projected onto a center screen above
Blow and McElroy, who wear an historically-inaccurate Ancient Greek ceremonial garb: white
robes, goldface, laurel wreaths, wavy wigs, and bare feet. Wearing in-ear monitors, they take
turns positioning themselves before an old video camera, reciting the muted audio of these video
clips as though they were holy incantations. Their stoic faces are projected onto screens flanking
the mix-tape screen, as they synchronize their unaffected delivery with the moving lips in the
source video. The effect is often humorous (especially when they recite the ridiculous advice of
self-described pick-up artists), but it is also devastating. In the absence of personality, social
cues, and emphasis, all we are left with are the words—a violent desperation. This mix-tape
karaoke performance reveals the darker side of love: entitlement and unfulfilled desire.
Dawkins identifies three metrics for assessing a meme’s vitality: longevity, fecundity, and
copying-fidelity. He explains that the longevity of any particular copy of a meme (say, a song as
committed to memory) is less important than the longevity of the meme (or song) itself.37
Therefore, the more critical metric is the fecundity—or fertility—of a meme. YouTube, the
source of ROKE’s video mixtape content, provides a handy means of quantifying fecundity: the
view count. Each time a video is viewed on YouTube, in part or completely, the view counter
ticks up. Unlike the baroque Nielsen ratings system of pre-digital culture, this metric is not only
publicly available but sits directly below the video. ROKE purposefully selects videos with high
memetic potential to use in their hash—videos with low view counts, and thus low fecundity.
These haul clips and self-help videos are juxtaposed against content with high fecundity.
Rodger’s testimonial—entitled “Why Do Girls Hate Me So Much?”—had nearly 1.5 million

37. Dawkins, 194.
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views before it was taken down in 2018 for violating their terms of service.38 Content created by
mass shooters boast high fecundity and invite memetic spread through imitation. The
perpetrators of mass shootings in Poway, California and El Paso, Texas both indicated that they
were inspired by a manifesto written by Christchurch, New Zealand shooter, who was himself
inspired by videos on YouTube.39 Blackmore reminds us: "people imitate the best imitators.”40
ROKE chose not to use Rodger’s terrifying manifesto; instead, they selected an earlier
video that portrays the perpetrator as merely desperate, and certainly harmless. It’s only when we
consider his final savage act—and the viral spread of his memetic words—that we recognize all
of the violence we have witnessed and laughed at throughout the performance. The pick-up artist
videos, the haul clips, and the romance films all signal a sort of harmless desperation, and yet
they mask a terrifying, violent misogyny. Taken as a whole, they are a fertile memeplex: toxic
masculinity. ROKE teaches us to perceive the toxic masculinity memeplex by offering us a more

38. I used the Internet Archive to find the last play count before the user account was removed:
https://web.archive.org/web/20180330055816if_/https://www.youtube.com/user/ElliotRodger.
Other diary entries include “My reaction to seeing a young couple at the beach, Envy” and “Life
is so unfair because girls don’t want me.”
39. See Tim Arango, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs and Katie Benner, “Minutes Before El Paso
Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online,” New York Times, August 3, 2019, accessed
November 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/us/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shootermanifesto.html; Gianluca Mezzofiore and Paul P. Murphy, “The New Zealand mosques attack
appeared to inspire California synagogue suspect,” CNN, April 29, 2019, accessed November 20,
2020, https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/29/us/california-synagogue-8chan-new-zealand-mosque;
Nick Perry, “Report finds lapses ahead of New Zealand mosque attack,” APNews, December 8,
2020, accessed January 10, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/intelligence-agencies-shootingsbrenton-tarrant-new-zealand-new-zealand-mosque-attacksd8217fa30fe4eeba45fb001b77857385.
40. Blackmore, 133.
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familiar memeplex template: God.41 Their costuming and devotional tone evoke religious ritual,
which serves as a humorous contrast to the seeming triviality of the video mixtape content. I
contend, however, that ROKE’s embodiment of the God meme also teaches us to see how
ideologies are constructed from memes—in the case of religion, certainly, but also with
memeplexes like gender and love.
Although most of their video content is harvested from digital sources like YouTube,
ROKE remediates these clips—to borrow a term from J. David Bolter and John Grusin—by
transferring them onto analog VHS tapes—which are used as the video source in performance.
Through this remediation, ROKE renders visible the degradation and mutations that can result
from memetic replication. Digital technologies allow for absolute and infinite copying-fidelity, in
theory, but ROKE reminds us to consider the medium. The meme is mutated in its initial transfer
to VHS, and with each subsequent playback. As Philip Auslander observes us in Liveness, “since
tapes, film, and other recorded media deteriorate over time and with each use, they are physically
different objects at each playing.”42 ROKE transforms these videos—infinitely reproducible
works of art in the age of digital reproduction—into auratic objects, rich with authenticity and
presence. This is a playful inversion of Walter Benjamin’s observation that mechanical
reproduction “emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual.”43 ROKE’s

41. See Dawkins, 193: “God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high survival value, or
infective power, in the environment provided by human culture.”
42. Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (London: Routledge,
1999), 45.
43. Quoted in Steve Dixon, Digital Performance: A History of New Media in Theater, Dance,
Performance Art, and Installation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 117.
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use of ritual and manufactured aura highlights what Robert Aunger identifies as the parasitic
nature of memes.44 Blow and McElroy don’t indulge our fetishization of liveness and
authenticity, but rather call our attention to the awesome potential of digital memes—to spread,
to intermediate, to replicate.

Figure 5.6. Luv Pavilion. (Photo by Maria Baranova, from Royal
Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, http://www.royalosiris.com/new-page.)
Parts Two and Three of the Art of Luv are interrelated, so I will examine them together.
Part Two, subtitled Luv Pavilion, was a month-long, pop-up event center in Queens, New York.
The design of this pavilion was thoroughly memetic in its representation of love, featuring heart
shaped prints, towers, and window stickers along with provocative projections (a Matrix-like
animation of cascading 69s) and suggestive sculpture. But it was also memetic in its practice.
The venue was granted to ROKE, but they re-granted it as a space for other voices and ideas to

44 Aunger,

229.
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come together to interrogate love in the twenty-first century. Authorship was subordinated to a
more collaborative—or, memetic—circulation of ideas.45

Figure 5.7. Meg Mondays. (From Royal Osiris Karaoke
Ensemble, http://www.royalosiris.com/new-page-5.)
Meg Mondays (Part 3 of The Art of Luv) was a three-part event that took place at the Luv
Pavilion. It was publicized by Abrons Arts Center thusly:
On three Mondays in June, ROKE will host a psychedelic transformation of the Meg
Ryan / Nora Ephron trilogy of American romantic comedies: When Harry Met
Sally, Sleepless In Seattle, and You’ve Got Mail, re-edited to reveal the films’ underlying
mythic structure, and displayed in kaleidoscopic, circular-format ROKE-Vision. 46
Each film was playfully re-rendered to highlight the memetic constructs of love in the Ryan/
Ephron trilogy. The Meg Mondays films, re-rendered as kaleidoscopic mandalas, enact what
Baudrillard describes as the first step in a movement toward simulacrum: from representation—
45. “The Art of Luv (Part 2): LUV Pavilion,” Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, accessed
November 28, 2020, http://www.royalosiris.com/new-page.
46. “Meg Mondays,” Abrons Arts Center, accessed November 28, 2020, https://
www.abronsartscenter.org/on-stage/shows/meg-mondays.
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“the reflection of a profound reality”—to the masking and denaturing of that reality.47 The next
three parts of The Art of Luv continue that journey toward simulacrum—toward representation
without referent and, like a meme, without author.

Figure 5.8. Project Peplum. Original YouTube video (left) and
recreation (right). (From Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, http://
www.royalosiris.com.)
Project Peplum (Part 4) is a film, a “careful recreation of an unpopular (63 views)
shopping haul video made on Labor Day 2013.”48 The story behind the film is that ROKE
discovered this video on YouTube shortly after it was posted, and watched it “over a hundred
times.”49 This sudden uptick in views on her haul video must have worried the creator, since she

47. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1994), 6.
48. “Project Peplum,” Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, accessed November 28, 2020, http://
www.royalosiris.com/new-page-1.
49. Ibid.
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quickly took down the video and deactivated her YouTube account.50 ROKE “carefully recreated
the video and restored it to YouTube in July 2016…purchasing all items featured in the haul
video, fabricating whatever ones that we could not find for sale, and hiring a professional film
actor to recreate the original performance.”51
As their project description makes clear, the video’s low view count was critical. In the
description, and in an interview with Parker-Starbuck, Blow and McElroy refer to the creator of
this haul video as the “author.”52 This video’s low author functionality, along with the author’s
own self-erasure (when she deactivated her account), make it the perfect source text for memetic
theatre. Through their meticulous re-creation of this haul video, ROKE successfully “masks the
absence” of an original; this is the second step in the movement toward simulacrum. Given
ROKE’s penchant for ceremonial garb and occult aesthetics, it is fitting that Baudrillard calls this
“the order of sorcery.”53
Project Peplum perfectly captures a twenty-first-century cocktail of ennui and anxiety. In
the original haul video, the author oscillates between mild delight and self-doubt as she unpacks
her shopping bags for the camera, or—as the low view count suggests—for no one. ROKE’s
“careful” recreation of the video, after its deletion, deprives the author a right to her work and
50 Her trauma is seemingly overlooked. Memes have had traumatic effects, especially when
someone’s likeness is appropriated and circulated, as was the case with Blake Boston, whose
image was used in a popular meme called Scumbag Steve. “Q&A with Blake Boston (Scumbag
Steve),” Know Your Meme, https://knowyourmeme.com/editorials/interviews/qa-with-blakeboston-scumbag-steve.
51. “Project Peplum,” Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble.
52. Ibid. This is repeated in Parker-Starbuck, “Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble (ROKE).”
53. Baudrillard, 6.
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her privacy. It is a selfish act, in the most memetic sense of the word (and perhaps in other
senses, too). To be fair Project Peplum does not make her video a meme, it merely calls attention
to the ways in which we are always already memetic and mediated. In the same Parker-Starbuck
interview, McElroy muses, “at this point ‘media’—technological media—is something that is
completely woven into our everyday experience. So, you actually can’t pass through a day
without being mediated. Heavily.”54 This calls to mind the argument made by Auslander, that live
culture is informed by—and not ontologically-distinct from—mediated culture.55 While this
rings true, I prefer to read Project Peplum in conversation with another scholarly text,
Unmarked, by Auslander’s foil Peggy Phelan.56
Phelan identifies performance as the space and practice wherein an individual can
unmark themselves as a commodity for circulation within capitalism. Unlike media, which fixes
ideas into tangible forms of expression that facilitate circulation, performance is ephemeral and
is always in process of dying and disappearing—it cannot be held and cannot be sold, so the
author (and their identity) remain outside the marketplace. I agree with McElroy that it is
impossible to pass through this world unmediated, but perhaps the meme is our twenty-firstcentury strategy for self-unmarking. Like the author of the Project Peplum source, we can
disappear ourselves, erase our authorship, leaving only ideas. As these ideas spread and mutate,

54. Parker-Starbuck, “Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble (ROKE).”
55. Auslander, 7.
56. Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1993). I will not
rehash Auslander and Phelan’s early 2000s “liveness” debate here. I believe Steve Dixon already
did so brilliantly in Digital Performance (where he dismissed Auslander’s narrow reading of
Phelan and insistence on his own theory as being like “a dog with a bone”). Dixon, 125.
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the original authorship recedes further and further, until the author is fully unmarked. The work
still circulates, and in that respect capitalism wins. But the author is liberated.
After three intermedial expressions of Luv, the fifth part of this series, ROKÉ Cupid,
brings us back to the stage. The text of this performance is “21st century sacred love poetry”—a
weaving together of “found romantic texts”: online dating profiles, dating guides, and love letters
from internet scammers.57 Again, the source material is authorless, or at least unattributed and
plucked from the far end of the author functionality curve. Like Part 1, this pastiche of reperformed texts reveals the memetic operations of love—the tropes and turns-of-phrase that are
circulated in online and in-person romance. The performers wear the same ceremonial garb, now
with a few sultry twists: a red headband—tying back a longer wig—replaces the laurel wreath,
and the robe falls seductively off the shoulder.

Figure 5.9. Production still from ROKE’s ROKÉ Cupid. (Photo by
Maria Baranova, from Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, http://
www.royalosiris.com/the-art-of-luv-part-5-rok-cupid.)
57. “The Art of Luv (Part 5): ROKÉ Cupid,” Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, accessed
November 20, 2020, http://www.royalosiris.com/the-art-of-luv-part-5-rok-cupid.
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The artists describe ROKÉ Cupid as “a psychedelic rock opera, light show, and courtship
ceremony . . . a ritual interrogation and . . . elaborate courtship dance representing the Lover's
Quest.”58 Like their other works, the stage design of this piece makes use of geometric shapes,
saturated color, and unconventional seating (floor pillows and benches in the round, or, rather,
triangle). The most delightful design element, however, is truly unexpected: their mic stands.
Initially, these microphone stands appear to be the ordinary straight stand found in many
downtown performances—comedy, spoken word, music, storytelling. However, these stands are
anything but ordinary; ROKE designed and engineered them as floor-length gooseneck poles that
writhe and twist with the performer’s body. It is a sensuous design element, a co-performer that
accompanies the text brilliantly. It also functions on a memetic level: sitting in The Bushwick
Starr theatre, we recognize the straight music stand as a meme. It is a trope of many shows in
that venue. With its curls and undulations, this mic stand is a mutation. ROKE took the music
stand like an image macros, and added their own caption. ROKE meme’d the mic stand.
Part 6 of The Art of Luv is truly a culminating event. Awesome Grotto! is a live ritual
performance event and installation that brings together themes, design elements, and media
content from the previous five parts. The ritual stage is bedecked with heart sculptures and
astroturf, and the proscenium is filled with an enormous paper moon that serves as a shadow
puppetry and projection surface. There is a haggard, desperate look to the officiants—they are
without wigs, their makeup barely covers their faces, and their robes are poor and wrinkled. Like

58. Ibid.
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Jacques Ranciere’s Ignorant Schoolmaster, they have endeavored to teach love without knowing
the language, and this event is their moment of recognition, and emancipation.59

Figure 5.10. Production still from ROKE’s Awesome Grotto! (Photo by
Maria Baranova, from Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble, http://
www.royalosiris.com.)
Outside of the theatre, they have erected a man-made media grotto with several screens, each
looping a unique “careful recreation” of the haul video from Project Peplum. In this platonic
cave of memes, we see only shadows. Bathing in the multiplicity of haul memes, we lose all
relation to the original YouTube video. This meme grotto is a pure, hyperreal simulacrum.60
Inside the theatre, the ROKE ritual reaches its apotheosis as Blow and McElroy enter a
chamber at the back of the audience risers. This chamber, we soon realize, is a camera obscura.
59. Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
60. Baudriallard, 6.
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The analog magic of the camera obscura projects their speaking image onto the paper moon. In
the pursuit of truth, it isn’t enough to imitate the meme; they cross the medial threshhold,
entering into the camera where they give their own testimonials, reminiscent of those uttered by
Elliot Rodger before that bloody day in 2015. While Rodger’s memetic, misogynistic rants live
on in pockets of the internet—even after YouTube removed them—Blow and McElroy’s
testimonials die and disappear even as they are uttered. Or, perhaps they don’t, since their ideas
find new hosts in the brains of the audience, including mine. And now, in a way, yours.61
While The Art of Luv illustrates the dramaturgical dimensions of memetic theatre, it does
not address a critical question: what are the economic dimensions of memetic theatre? It is easy
to imagine a theatre without authors, but without the author function, how is work valuated?
Memes are exceptional in our cultural economy; they defy monetization. In fact, the European
Parliament “specifically excluded” memes from their new copyright legislation, Article 13,
which forces online platforms like YouTube and Facebook to take a more proactive stance on
copyright enforcement.62 May Cheng and Maryna Polataiko brilliantly summed it up when they
wrote, in The Lawyer’s Daily, that “the collectivity of memes spurns Romantic notions of
61. As I completed this chapter, Tei Blow from ROKE sent me a text, asking if I would want to
cameo in their next piece. I asked him if this was a new chapter in The Art of Luv, and he replied:
“It’s new series called The Sprezzaturameron about the great privileged male artist. It takes place
in a diverse and equitable future where all art is a synthesis of cultures and programming is truly
wide in its values and scope. And a lone South African-American curator discovers an
abandoned ROKE piece from 2019. And goes into a wormhole of discovering the world of the
great male auteurs . . . It’s complicated. I think the piece is going to start with a 8-minute title
sequence of all the land acknowledgements and ADA compliance instructions as well full credits
and source citations.” I enthusiastically replied “yes.”
62. Zoe Kleinman, “Article 13: Memes Exempt as EU Backs Controversial Copyright Law,”
BBC, March 26, 2019, accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-47708144.
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authorship. Their collaborative nature defies traditional conceptions of originality . . . the meme
as an ever-evolving idea escapes fixation while simultaneously drawing on a pre-set
prototype.”63 Memetic expression is boldly unoriginal and always in motion. There is no genius
author underneath a successful (or fecund) meme; it’s memes all the way down.
Memes are radical. Even the field of study, memetics, is seen as unconventional and
unscholarly. Aunger attributes this to the nature of its practitioners, and its position in the
academy:
Adherents of memes encompass philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, computer
scientists, and, more generally, interested passers-by from all walks of life. Most
memeticists are not biologists or anthropologists by training, and so neither evolutionary
nor cultural theory is their professional expertise. This has given memetics a distinctly
“populist” flavor. It is the “people’s choice” for an explanation of culture. There is even a
counterrevolutionary feel to it, against the Ivory Tower nature of other, academic
approaches to explaining culture.64
I would argue that memes, like memetics, also have a populist and counterrevolutionary feel to
them. This is why they have been the preferred instrument of populist movements across the
political spectrum, from white nationalists and QAnon to Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives
Matter. Memes are such a potent tool for spreading ideology because they operate outside of the

63. I was unable to access the original, but it is reposted in full here: May Cheng, Maryna
Polataiko, “Need a Good Laugh? Memes and Copyright,” Osler, April 30, 2020, accessed
November 20, 2020, https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2020/need-a-good-laughmemes-and-copyright.
64. Aunger, 16.
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rules of capitalism, but that also makes them hard to monetize. How, then, do we monetize the
memetic theatre?
ROKE has wrestled with this question; while they have received considerable attention
for their work, they have no circulable good—script or otherwise—to fund their complex and
costly projects. In 2017, they experimented with patronage as a solution. They were in a group of
creators invited by crowdfunding platform Kickstarter to help them launch a new unfortunatelynamed service, Drip, to compete with rival Patreon.65 Kickstarter introduced Drip as “a tool for
people to fund and build community around their ongoing creative practice.”66 It allowed
creators to connect with fans who would pledge a monthly patronage in exchange for tiered
access to the artist, their craft, and exclusive content. Drip barely survived two years, but the
continuing success of Patreon—whose creators now make a combined $1 billion per year—
signals what Patreon founder Jack Conte calls The Second Renaissance.67 Conte perceives a shift
away from the dominant ad-supported model of online content creation toward a communitybased patronage model that connects artists directly with audiences.
One could easily dismiss Conte’s declaration of a Second Renaissance as a thinly-veiled
marketing ploy for his own company, but it is true that current revenue models are either

65. “Royal Osiris Karaoke Ensemble,” Drip, accessed November 20, 2020, https://d.rip/
royalosiris. I encourage my reader to explore their Drip page.
66. Perry Chen, “Introducing the New Drip,” The Kickstarter Blog, November 15, 2017,
accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/introducing-the-new-drip.
67. Jack Conte, “Create on Your Terms with Your Community,” Patreon Blog, September 1,
2020, accessed November 20, 2020, https://blog.patreon.com/patreon-series-e-announcement;
Jack Conte, “The Second Renaissance is Coming,” YouTube, September 24, 2020, accessed
November 20, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTw9vkgxPQU&t=3s.
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inadequate (ad-supported, music streaming) or are not designed to recognize the full spectrum of
non-copyrightable creativity. Recent activity shows that patronage solutions are being adopted by
many creators. In 2020, during the COVID-19 quarantine, Patreon saw a precipitous rise, with
creator revenue doubling (compared to 2019).
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Figure 5.11. Patreon creator earnings (in millions of USD).
Data source: Brian Dean, “Patreon: Subscriber and Creator
Statistics for 2021,” Backlinko.
In 2021, a new financial instrument captured the imagination of artists, the press, and investors:
Non-Fungible Tokens, or NFTs. While these digital tokens are built using the same blockchain
ledger as cryptocurrencies, they are not actually a currency. Rather, as the name suggests, they
are non-fungible, meaning they are each unique cannot be exchanged for an identical token.
NFTs are bits of digital code that certify the authenticity and ownership of a work of
digital art. They facilitate the sale and circulation of a digital work in a manner that resembles
traditional, analog art sales. The artist is able to retain a copyright (to the extent that there is
something in the work to be copyrighted) while selling the “original work” to a collector or
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financial speculator.68 NFTs allow for only one copy—one of the infinite, perfect copies of a
digital work of art—to be identified and sold as the original. The blockchain, a revolutionary
technology that allows for a secure, distributed ledger of transactions, has given investors such
confidence in NFTs that in the first three months of 2021, the market capitalization of NFTs rose
from $23 million to $435 million.69 There is real money to be made in NFTs—digital artist
Beeple sold a jpeg image file with an NFT for $69.3 million at a Christie’s auction, and Twitter
founder Jack Dorsey sold an NFT attached to the first tweet he ever sent (“just setting up my
twttr”) for $2.9 million.70 Even some theatres are getting into the NFT game. In March, 2021,
Curve—a fintech (financial technology) firm—partnered with London’s Theatre Support Fund+
to auction a series of NFTs to raise money for theatre workers affected by the COVID-19
pandemic. The auction only made $840, but that can be attributed to the fact that the art attached

68. In a whitepaper prepared by Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, the authors also
cautioned that artists should be mindful of the 3rd party or underlying rights they may not have
secured for their NFT. They give the example of an artist who made over $1 million selling NFTs
attached to drawings he made of DC Comic characters he drew when he worked as a contractor
for the publisher. DC warned their freelancers and employees not to use their IP in NFTs. James
Gatto, Laura Chapman and Yasamin Parsafar, “NFTs and Intellectual Property:
What IP Owners and NFT Creators Need to Know,” Sheppard Mullin, March 26, 2021, https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/nfts-and-intellectual-property-what-ip-5945088.
69. Joseph Young, “NFT Market Rages On: NFTs Market Cap Grow 1,785% In 2021 As
Demand Explodes,” Forbes, March 29, 2021, accessed April 10, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/
sites/youngjoseph/2021/03/29/nft-market-rages-on-nfts-market-cap-grow-1785-in-2021-asdemand-explodes/?sh=804515d7fdcf.
70. Scott Reyburn, “JPG File Sells for $69 Million, as ‘NFT Mania’ Gathers Pace,” New York
Times, March 11, 2021, accessed April 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/11/arts/
design/nft-auction-christies-beeple.html; Taylor Locke, “Jack Dorsey sells his first tweet ever as
an NFT for over $2.9 million,” CNBC, March 22, 2021, accessed April 10, 2021, https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/03/22/jack-dorsey-sells-his-first-tweet-ever-as-an-nft-for-over-2point9million.html.
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to the five NFTs were all cartoons based on Curve’s branding—such cynical “art” is unlikely to
have high demand or memetic fecundity.
It’s important to note that those buyers do not “own” these works—the tweet or jpegs—
meaning they cannot monetize or license them. They own the NFT, the certification that they
own what the artist deems as the “original print.” They own the NFT like one owns a painting—
they can show it, admire it, and even sell it for a profit, but they cannot license the underlying
artwork, nor can they limit the proliferation of digital duplicates. Some have called NFTs a
bubble. Comedian John Cleese finds them so “completely absurd” that he offered his own NFT
—an iPad sketch of the Brooklyn Bridge which he, like con artist George C. Parker before him,
would like to sell you.71
Strip away all of the technology, and NFTs are just a new form of patronage, part of
Conte’s Second Renaissance. NFTs offer a unique solution to our memetic theatre quandry.
Imagine a cultural economy built on memes, where artists craft small units of culture which are
sold to wealthy patrons with non-fungible tokens. The underlying work could be made available
for use by anyone—license free—to be recompiled in some new memetic sequence. The rich
underwrite culture, making it free for everyone else to consume, sample, and mutate. That
sounds a bit like the Renaissance to me. This radical, memetic cultural economy would—
paradoxically—depend on a healthy patrician class; thankfully (or, unfortunately), the world’s

71. Keiran Southern, “John Cleese Says NFT Boom is ‘Completely Absurd’ As He Offers
Drawing of His Own,” Evening Standard, March 24, 2021, accessed April 10, 2021, https://
www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/john-cleese-jack-dorsey-american-monty-python-twitterb926115.html.
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billionaires increased their wealth by 54% over the past year.72 The conditions for a patronage
economy are perfect. NFTs are quickly transforming from an art world curiosity to a legitimate
financial instrument and a means of funding independent artmaking. Recently, filmmaker Kevin
Smith announced that he will sell his latest film using an NFT. The title of this film? Kilroy Was
Here.73

72. Aimee Picchi, “Billionaires Got 54% Richer During Pandemic, Sparking Calls for ‘Wealth
Tax,’” CBSNews, March 31, 2021, accessed April 10, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
billionaire-wealth-covid-pandemic-12-trillion-jeff-bezos-wealth-tax. The COVID-19 quarantine
seems to have laid the foundation for a memetic theatre in other ways, too. eMarketer.com
reports that meme engagement has risen dramatically since the quarantine began: Jasmine
Enberg, “To Meme or Not to Meme?: A Marketer’s Guide to Memetic Media in 2021 and
Beyond,” eMarketer, January 25, 2021, accessed April 10, 2021, https://www.emarketer.com/
content/to-meme-or-not-to-meme.
73. Louis Chilton, “Kevin Smith to Sell Latest Film, Horror Anthology Killroy Was Here, As An
NFT,” The Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/kevinsmith-nft-killroy-was-here-b1831131.html.
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Conclusion
I began this dissertation with a quote from a Facebook page, so it’s fitting that I should
end with one. This time, my own. On August 7, 2017, I posted:
Yesterday, as I changed my daughter’s poopy diaper, I received a tap on my wrist from
my Apple Watch, notifying me that there was an increased presence of volatile organic
compounds in the air in my apartment, and that I should open a window. You see, my
smart air sensor had detected a poop smell and sent a notification to my watch, so that I
could remedy the situation. The system works.
Since that post, my fascination with connected technologies has only grown. My home is fully
automated, with sensors measuring motion, temperature, humidity, sound levels, and electricity
and water usage; my smartwatch measures my sleep patterns, step count, and heart rate; my
smart glasses measure the direction of my gaze; my phone records my global positioning in
space and time; and my ten smart speakers listen closely for my command. My every movement,
word, heartbeat, and act of consumption is inscribed in the chaotic posthuman ledger that is the
internet.
I am not alone. There are many who use technology to capture what Wired magazine
editors Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly termed “the quantified self.” Wolf and Kelly even turned this
idea into an independent web-based project, dedicated to “self-knowledge through numbers.”1
Cultural anthropologist Natasha Dow Schüll observes that the quantified self bears a striking
resemblance to the “dividual,” a Deleuzian figure that Schüll summarizes as:

1. Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, “Know Thyself: Tracking Every Facet of Life, from Sleep to
Mood to Pain, 24/7/365,” Wired, June 22, 2009, accessed April 10, 2021, https://
www.wired.com/2009/06/lbnp-knowthyself.
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…endlessly subdividable collections of data points . . . not subject to the architectural
enclosures, institutional arrangements and postural rules of disciplinary society (as
described by Foucault) but, rather, [moving] through a networked web of continuous
monitoring, assessment, and modulation.2
Individual means, literally, that which cannot be divided. Individuality is a humanist construct, a
stable binary on which institutions like copyright are built. Copyright term limits are set relative
to a work’s birth or an author’s death, and the defensibility of a copyright is tied to other
humanist concepts like originality and intent. The dividual, however, is posthuman. It does not
negotiate presence and absence, but rather infers selfhood somewhere in the randomness of raw
data. The dividual self, as it is decomposed into data, is “endlessly subdividable” and fluid—it is
measured in step counts, heart rates, and lines of flight.3 The dividual is liberated; it is not subject
to “institutional arrangements” such as copyright. It is a collection of interwoven data streams
that each are always authoring—always turning abstract ideas and gestures into tangible
expressions.

2. Natasha Dow Schüll, “Data for Life: Wearable Technology and the Design of Self-Care,”
BioSocieties 11 (2016): 327. Deleuze introduces the dividual in "Postscript on the Societies of
Control", October 59, (1992): 3-7. There he observes that “individuals have become ‘dividuals,’
and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’”
3. Here I use the term “lines of flight” in two ways: first, in a literal sense to describe the data
that captures gesture in six degrees of motion, and second to evoke Deleuze and Guattari’s
meaning: a deterritorialized springing forth that “never consist in running away from the world
but rather in causing runoffs, as when you drill a hole in a pipe; there is no social system that
does not leak from all directions, even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal
the lines of flight.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 204.
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Copyright, we have observed, depends on a stable definition of “author” and “work.”
Such stability seems to be a relic of the pre-digital era. Now, the ground beneath it is forever
shifting. Networked technologies have enabled a networked mind, and a networked, dividual
subjectivity. All knowledge can be accessed with such immediacy that it becomes embodied.
This digital turn has birthed a new, or perhaps age-old, mode of cultural production, what
Lawrence Lessig calls Read-Write culture. After Lessig, I have offered here the idea of a ReadWrite Theatre, not as a form or practice, but as a critical lens through which to view an emergent
transformation. We have examined this phenomenon by considering an artist’s relationship to
knowledge, knowledge production, and the underlying works they cite, remix, and speak through
in their theatrical compositions.
While I have cited many legal cases, my aim has not been to analyze, critique, or theorize
the law, but rather to reconsider intellectual property laws as dramaturgies. I argue that
dramaturgy is like a codec, the software that enables the encoding and decoding of a file.
Dramaturgy is a technology: it compresses creative ideas into a tangible form of expression, and
also facilitates the unpacking and expansion of said expression back into abstract thought.
Copyright is not simply a limited-term, government-backed monopoly designed to encourage
creativity and publication; it is the unacknowledged dramaturgical force that guides so much of
theatrical composition and reception.
Having established the inadequacies of copyright—for its textocentricity, its dependence
on pre-digital scarcity, and its baroque and ever-evolving parameters—I offered my reader three
alternatives to copyright, three dramaturgical frameworks for this post-postmodern moment.
Each alternative enables a different form of Read-Write engagement, as well as a different
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approach to propertying and valuating creativity. As radical as each of my alternatives might
seem, I hope to have demonstrated that they are all not without legal, economic, and
dramaturgical precedent.
My first alternative, Creative Commons, is an already-established and widely accepted
solution. Commons-based strategies are particularly suited for this cultural moment because they
are designed assuming abundance (unlike copyright, which assumes scarcity). It’s not an
alternative to copyright, but rather a set of legal addenda that allow for a secondary Read-Write
cultural economy to exist in harmony with the traditional Read-Only copyright-based culture.
Creative Commons presents a dramaturgical compromise: it allows for remixes to flourish
without denying authorship or the right to property protections. As a Read-Write dramaturgy,
Creative Commons is unique in that it fosters creative collaboration.
My second alternative, trademark, is perhaps more cynical and capitalistic than the
previous, commons-based solution. A cultural economy based in trademark reduces artistic craft
to branding. It does so, however, to create a system of propertying creativity that is constantly renegotiating value with the audience. Unlike the government-enforced monopoly that is
copyright, the strength of a trademark rises and falls with engagement—in time and space.
Although trademark protections have only been invoked in a handful of theatrical lawsuits,
recent decisions regarding aesthetic functionality lay the groundwork for a trademark-based
cultural economy. As a Read-Write dramaturgy, trademark is unique in that it considers form,
aesthetics, and the audience.
My final alternative, memes, is the most radical of the three. Memetics is, to again
borrow from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, deterritorializing: it liberates creativity from the
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legal and economic systems of authorship that restrain it.4 Memes are the smallest unit of cultural
production, and are the matter from which culture, identity, and ideology are formed in the most
childlike way: through imitation. A memetic dramaturgy invites us to reconsider humans, not as
the originators of culture, but as its parasitic hosts. As a Read-Write dramaturgy, memes are
unique in that they erase authorship and originality, and provide the building blocks for a
thoroughly posthuman and post-postmodern cultural economy.
Where do we go from here? The quantified self suggests that we are entering an era
where authorship is severed from its core delimiter: intentionality. If sensors and cameras
continue their march toward ubiquity, then soon we will all be always authoring, without
intending to do so. In 2015, Yehuda Duenyas (creating under the name xxxy) shared a work-inprogress entitled The Ascent, a theatrical experience that wrestles with this tension between
creativity and intention.5 Dressed in a harness and an EEG headset, a single participant slowly
rises in an expansive space filled with concentric circles of light, as they attempt to control their
own mind. If the EEG sensor detects brain activity, their ascent is halted. When they are able to
clear their mind, they resume. The sensor data also triggers dramatic light and sound events
designed to increase brain activity and decrease their upward progress. The Ascent casts the
audience as co-author of a wordless and—I can attest—highly emotional experience.6 However,
to be a successful co-author, they must vacate their brain of any thought or intent.

4. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 454.
5. The Ascent, by XXXY, East of Hollywood, Brooklyn, NY, June 21, 2015.
6. I experienced The Ascent as a beta experience in a Sunset Park, Brooklyn warehouse. It seems
to still be under development.
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Figure 6.1. The Ascent by xxxy. (Photo by Andrew Federman, from
ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Yehuda-DuenyasAscent-2011-Ascent-2011-Yehuda-Duenyas-Image-creditAndrew_fig5_333384545.)
In my second chapter, I explored a collaborative work by Merce Cunningham and the
OpenEnded Group, an algorithmic recreation of Cunningham’s chance operative-performance,
Loops. Sensors captured Cunningham’s performance, transcribing it into copyrightable code.
This act of authorship was certainly intentional, but the sensor technology did not insist that it be.
These works—by Cunningham, The OpenEnded Group, and xxxy—signal a future where
intentionality is irrelevant and the conscious labor of authorship is unnecessary. This would
explode copyright’s Cartesian model, built on the idea-expression dichotomy that suggests a
mind has ideas and a body expresses them. In the future foretold by the quantified self, there
exists neither differentiation between mind and body, nor between idea and expression; it is all
authorship, in real-time.
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The future of copyright gets even more complicated when we think biologically. I
recently began a new project with my frequent collaborator, Janani Balasubramanian, and
designer Mimi Lien, along with researchers at Stanford University led by data compression
scientist Dr. Tsachy Weissman. Our project will animate cutting-edge research into the long-term
potential use of DNA as a storage medium—how can DNA base pairs be used for the inscription,
preservation, and transfer of knowledge in binary code? While there are challenges to using DNA
to store data (not the least of which is cost), the promise is undeniable: using DNA, all of the
world’s digital data (writings, songs, videos, pictures, etc) could fit in a one meter cube.7 In my
introduction, I suggested that monologist Mike Daisey and news anchor Brian Williams—both of
whom transformed their third-person research into first-person narrative—were post-postmodern
Read-Write storytellers who re-embodied disembodied data. I meant this metaphorically; they
didn’t actually ingest the knowledge and inscribe it in their body. Or so I thought.
Recent research suggests that living creatures already use DNA as a storage medium.
DNA is not just a genetic ledger, it also offers a long-term storage solution for our brains to
inscribe memories that are retrieved as needed by neural networks.8 In 2018, David Glanzman at
the University of California, Los Angeles injected RNA from one sea slug into another. The first
slug had been taught to respond to an electrical stimulus, and this learning was seemingly
transferred to the other slug through the RNA injection. Glanzman said “it’s as though we

7. Sang Yup Lee, “DNA Data Storage Is Closer Than You Think,” Scientific American, July 1,
2019, accessed April 10, 2021, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dna-data-storage-iscloser-than-you-think.
8. Bernard Widrow and Juan Carlos Aragon, “Cognitive Memory,” Neural Networks 41 (2013):
13.
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transferred the memory . . . if memories were stored at synapses, there is no way our experiment
would have worked.”9 This discovery not only invites us to reconsider the inheritance of memory
and trauma, but it also changes the way we think about how ideas are created, circulated, and
inscribed. We often use textual metaphors when talking about memory—“I wrote it in my head”
or “you read my mind”—but the idea that our abstract ideas actually are already being inscribed
in symbolic letters (or the biological equivalent) is transformative. How can there be an ideaexpression dichotomy if to have an idea is to express it. I can imagine a future courtroom where
memorial DNA is offered as evidence of original authorship. This research further destabilizes an
already-precarious copyright, inviting the question, what takes its place? I definitely have some
thoughts, though I suppose I already expressed them.

9. Javier Yanes, “Can Memory Be Inherited?” BBVA OpenMind, August 16, 2019, accessed April
10, 2021, https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/science/bioscience/can-memory-be-inherited.
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Coda
I began this project in one cultural reality and completed it in another. The COVID-19
quarantine had a profound, intensifying effect: network technologies became the foundation for
social interaction, productivity, and creative expression; theatre moved online (with the
unfortunate advent of the zoom play), making liveness a fetishization of time; and the
dramaturgical dimensions of intellectual property were suddenly apparent as theatre companies
struggled to become media companies.
While I consider all of this to be a temporary condition, a necessary pivot at a desperate
moment, I am certain that this digital intensification—of culture, of knowledge, of the creative
self—will have a lasting impact on Read-Write cultural production. This phenomenon does not
prompt me to reconsider my thesis; rather, I see it as an accelerant, moving us closer to a ReadWrite future and intensifying the urgent need for new legal and dramaturgical models.
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